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ABSTRACT
A VICTORIAN CHRISTMAS IN HELL:
YULETIDE GHOSTS AND NECESSARPLEASURES IN THE AGE OF CAPITAL

Brandon Chitwood
Marquette University, 2012

This dissertation explores how the cultural and literary development – one might argue,
creation – of a specifically Victorian Christmas arose in response to social anxieties
related to the expansion of industrial capitalism, Darwinian theories of evolution, and the
increasingly problematic definition of the family during the nineteenth century in Britain.
Using a Lacanian psychoanalytic lens, the dissertation explores how the liminal figure of
the ghost pervades the literary narrativization of the Christmas holiday, and how such
ghosts provided uncanny comforts to a reading public increasingly horrified by social,
economic, and natural forces seemingly beyond their control. The dissertation argues
that the success of the literary institution of Christmas as a necessary assurance of
cultural pleasure in the face of social anxiety has made it perhaps the most long-lived of
Victorian artifacts. Indeed, the importance of Christmas to our late capitalist present
suggests post-modernity is not so far removed from Victorian sensibilities as we might
suspect.
The first chapter of A Victorian Christmas in Hell examines the seminal role of
Charles Dickens’ Christmas Carol in constructing the Victorian Christmas narrative, and
its astonishing longevity as a living cultural touchstone to the present day. The chapter
argues that A Christmas Carol’s success is due in large part to its construction of a
seductive injunction to enjoy that deflects and transcends social anxiety. The second
chapter examines the role of mourning and grief that pervades Victorian Christmas texts,
and how this focus on melancholy paradoxically underwrites the command to enjoy
Christmas. The third chapter focuses on how the uncertainty of the role of women in
Victorian culture helped lend a volatility, urgency, and horror to the genre of the
Christmas ghost story – a genre developed in large part by women writers. The fourth
chapter explores the role of children in Christmas ghost stories, and argues that the social
guilt of child abuse gave rise to the figure of the child ghost: a transcendent figure with
the power to believe in the fantastic and phantasmic aspects of Christmas for an
increasingly skeptical, and guilt-ridden adult population. A brief postscript considers the
possible evolution of the Christmas narrative beyond its capitalist trappings. What would
a post-Victorian Christmas look like after capitalism? Is it even possible, or desirable, to
exorcise our Victorian Christmas ghosts?
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Introduction:
Ghosts of Christmas Past
Christmas hath a darkness
Brighter than the blazing noon,
Christmas hath a chillness
Warmer than the heat of June
-- Christina Rossetti, “Christmas Eve”
Phantasms, ghosts, in this midnight hour, hold jubilee, and screech and jabber;
and the question rather were, What high Reality anywhere is yet awake? […] Is
our poor English Existence wholly becoming a nightmare; full of mere
Phantasms?
--Thomas Carlyle, Past and Present

I
The 1890’s in Britain were, in terms of literature at least, fantastic. This was the decade
that saw the birth of Dracula, Mowgli, Svengali, Dorian Gray, The Invisible Man, and a
full-blown invasion from Mars. Add to this the studied decadence and fetishized
cigarettes of Oscar Wilde, Arthur Symons and J. M. Barrie (before Peter Pan definitively
made him a children’s writer in the mind of posterity), the Celtic wonderlands of the
young Yeats, and one comes away with a sense that this was a period of febrile young
minds in revolt, devising abundant phantasmagoria as if in neurotic expectation of
replacing the prim bourgeois naturalistic world presided over by their waning bourgeois
queen. The revolt seems abortive, however, when we remember that the Queen herself
was an eager devourer of these fantasies. And no one’s fantasies were more appealing to
her than those of Marie Corelli, the best-selling writer of the decade. Whether one views
the literature of this period approvingly as an imaginative hotbed of Hazlittian gusto, or

2
more soberly as a wasteland of excess and purple prose, critical judgment must at least
pause to awe at the deliria of Ms. Corelli, who, whatever her failings, was certainly the
most fantastic of the fantasists. What may be most fantastic of all is that such writing
was so popular; that such strangeness -- digested by so much of the public and indeed
earning the imprimatur of the decidedly pedestrian taste of Victoria Regina – was, in
effect, normal.
Consider “The Devil’s Motor: A Fantasy,” a brief tale from 1896, which, while
representative of Ms. Corelli’s style and content, has a power of compression and
cohesion lacking in some of her more rhapsodic novels. As a narrative, this story details
the first joy ride of the Prince of Darkness in what was then a real novelty: an automobile.
From the opening lines, though, it is clear Corelli has something much more cosmic in
mind than relating a curious anecdote:
In the dead midnight, at that supreme moment when the Hours that are past slip
away from the grasp of the Hours yet to be, there came rushing between Earth
and Heaven the sound of giant wheels, -- the glare of great lights, -- the stench
and the muffled roar of a huge Car, tearing at full speed along the pale line
dividing the Darkness from the Dawn. And he who stood within the Car, steering
it straight onward, was clothed in black and crowned with fire; large bat-like
wings flared out on either side of him in woven webs of smoke and flame, and his
face was as white as bleached bone. Like glowing embers his eyes burned in their
cavernous sockets, shedding terrific glances through the star-strewn space, -- and
on his thin lips there was a frozen shadow of a smile more cruel than hate, -- more
deadly than despair. (141)
Just as Corelli’s style finds a happy medium between biblical cadence and the more
pictorial descriptiveness of a comic book, her subject is painted with a Miltonic sense of
opposition and paradox. Time and space exist in a contradictory twilight of inbetweenness. We are thrust into an infinite now poised between past and future, that
“supreme moment” of an ungraspable present, and into an impossible space between
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Heaven and Earth, seemingly neither material nor metaphysical. Corelli’s Satan is a
similarly contradictory whole: he is clothed in black but white as bleached bone, he is
made of fire and smoke, yet curiously frozen; he is elemental and immaterial, yet
cartoonishly “bat-like” and almost comfortingly clichéd in his aspect.
Corelli’s Devil is less compelling when he speaks.
‘…Follow me, all ye Forces which are destined to work the ruin of Mankind, -follow! On, on, over all beauty, all tenderness, all truth I ride, -- I, the Avenger,
the Destroyer, the Torturer of Souls, the Arch-Enemy of God! The Kingdom of
Hell grows wide and deep, -- praise be to Man who makes it!’ (142)
All this is rather one-sided and obvious, and one wonders when any of the irony, wit, and
deceit we associate with Satan will show up. Indeed, it is kind of hard to see how the
Devil finds so many followers when he gives the game away like this, but he apparently
has no problem raising a host of damned souls to ride with him to the Apocalypse:
The great Car flashed along with grinding, thunderous wheels, and as it flew, vast
Phantom-forms followed it, like rolling clouds jagged with the lightning, -- the
fairness of the world grew black, and the sulpherous fumes quenched all
sweetness from the air. The forests dropped like broken reeds, -- the mountains
crumbled into pits and quarries, the seas and rivers, the lakes and waterfalls dried
up into black and muddy waters, and all the land was bereft of beauty. In the
place of wholesome green fields and leafy woods, there rose up gigantic cities,
built in on every side, and bristling with thousands of chimneys belching forth
sickening smoke into the overhanging gloom which hid the skies; and the cities
were full of a deafening noise and crashing confusion as of ten million million
hammers beating incessantly – beating away all peace, all solitude, all health, all
rest. On, -- on, and into these countless prisons of stone and mortar the Demon of
the Car swept vast and ever-hurrying crowds of human beings, with the furious
force of a mighty whirlwind sweeping dead leaves into the sea. (142-3)
This is the verbal equivalent of a John Martin canvas: apocalypse porn as popular with
the masses as it was distasteful to the critical elite, but unerring in its power to provoke.
Corelli’s slips of the pen – the feverish consonance, the tortured sentence structure – all
seem to add to the effect of rushing, escalating disaster, just as the occasional crudities of
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Martin’s brush gave paintings like The Great Day of His Wrath (1851-3) the aura of a
Turner on steroids [Figure 1]. It is hard to sustain one’s snickering at Corelli in the face
of sentences like these:
Still faster and more furiously flew the Car, -- red meteors flashed in its course –
and the Phantom shapes which followed its flight crowded together in an everthickening, ever-darkening multitude, while bright stars were shaken down from
heaven like snowflakes whirling in a winter blast. (155)
This is wonderfully awful stuff, in every sense of the word.
Corelli’s Devil does a competent job of broadcasting the theme of the piece:
“Progress and Speed!” (146) he yells, will lead us straight to Hell. This was already a
fairly tired theme by the time Corelli’s Satan got his new motor-car, but I like to think
there’s something deeper going on here. Indeed, the very banality of Corelli’s theme,
tethered as it is to such over-heated prose and incredible imagery, seems to demand we
look closer at what this “progress” is. In light of the fact that Thomas Carlyle and
Charles Dickens were saying much the same thing in the 1830’s and 40’s (and Carlyle’s
prose, it must be admitted, is at least as peculiar as Corelli’s), we might charitably look
on Corelli’s take on “progress” as less a clumsy reiteration of old themes than a pastiche
of it: the breadth of Corelli’s canvas does invite an equally broad consideration of what
she means by progress as such. Corelli’s images: teeming cities, armies of smokestacks,
and those “ten million million hammers” of industry, suggest nothing less than a
panorama of sixty years of Victorian nightmare -- clichés not of her making, but of her
era. In this sense, we can see “The Devil’s Motor” less as a kitschy warning on the evils
of automobiles, but as a valediction to an age that had always been devising bigger and
better infernal machines. This may seem an apology for bad writing, but that is not my
intent, and in any case, to certain discerning tastes, bad writing of Ms. Corelli’s caliber
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Figure 1: John Martin, The Great Day of His Wrath, 1851-3.
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hardly requires an apology. Rather, I mean it as a way to understand how such writing
could be so popular to so many people who presumably had no inordinate fear of
automobiles or an abstract hatred of progress as such. To return to the question of how
such strange writing could have been so normal, as its popularity would by definition
make it: perhaps because Ms. Corelli’s Satan was already very well known to her
audience.
The strangest aspect of “The Devil’s Motor,” which goes furthest to suggest its
lack of strangeness to Victorian audiences, is the fact that this apocalyptic hellscape was
included as one of the holiday stories in Corelli’s Christmas Greeting of 1901. But then,
Corelli’s introduction to that book goes a ways toward explaining the inclusion of “The
Devil’s Motor.” She begins:
It is an old, very old, time-worn greeting, this of the friendly “Merry Christmas to
you!” and there are some folks among us in these days who profess to hate the
very word of it. It came into use when England was known as “Merrie England,”
an appellation which seems more than singular to us who have to endure the inane
dullness and melancholy stupidity of “society” as it exists in this present
gloriously progressive Motor-Era. Looking round on the tired, worn, nervous,
querulous faces in the crowds that fill the streets and shops at Christmas–time, -hearing the endless complaints, the new diseases, the troubles, real and fancied, of
each person who can manage to detain a friend for five minutes’ hurried and
morbid conversation, -- reading the delectable details of suicide, murder, mania
and misadventure preciously garnered up as gems of literature for the million by
the halfpenny press – one may reasonably wonder whether England was ever in
truth really “merrie,” as recorded. (3-4)
One does begin to wonder. And while it may be easiest to wonder at the mental health of
Ms. Corelli herself – this is certainly the oddest, most down-beat Christmas greeting one
is likely to receive – it is more interesting, I think, to wonder at the culture that produced,
sustained, and lionized Marie Corelli.
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Again, the surface singularity of the prose hides certain clichés that may more
fruitfully be termed cultural norms. Just as “The Devil’s Motor” treats in apocalyptic
imagery familiar to any Victorian, the introduction to the Christmas Greeting plays on
ideas about Christmas that would have been quite familiar to Ms. Corelli’s audience.
One would only need to glance at the most popular text of the era, Dickens’ Christmas
Carol, to find one of those strange people who “profess to hate the very word” Christmas.
And while Corelli does not offer a particularly clear definition of what “Merrie England”
means (or “society” for that matter), it would have been clear to any reader of
Washington Irving’s popular Bracebridge Hall stories what “Merrie England” meant,
why it went away, and, as Corelli herself suggests, why it may never have existed in the
first place. As to the seemingly gratuitous mentions of “suicide, murder, mania and
misadventure,” these disagreeable topics would have been general subjects of the most
popular genre of Christmas literature: the ghost story. Under closer scrutiny, Corelli’s
eccentric approach to engaging her reader reveals a common language and cultural
heritage. Indeed, this cultural heritage is ours as well. One might still ask: is there
anything stranger than the normalization of something so strange as Christmas? Is there
anything we take more for granted than the holiday which, by its very nature, bespeaks
itself as an anomaly, a divergence from normality? Marie Corelli’s Christmas Greeting
is, I submit, perhaps the most normal Christmas book ever written: it is so artless and
unself-conscious in its use of cultural tropes that it inadvertently exposes the inherent
strangeness, and darkness, of a holiday which has been bequeathed to us by the
Victorians with hardly a second thought. It is that paradoxical “supreme moment” of
Christmas, and its uncanny power of normalizing its own inherent strangeness, that this
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study is concerned with. Like Marie Corelli, I hope to uncover some of that strangeness
by engaging a bit with some of His darker materials.

II

If Marie Corelli was arguably the most popular writer of fiction in the Englishspeaking world, she was also probably the most critically reviled: her fantastically
melodramatic plots and artlessly moralistic style, combined with a shamelessly inflated
sense of literary worth won her few friends among the cultural cognoscenti. Today, her
reputation has ironically reversed itself: unread by the general public, Corelli survives on
the love of a number of literary critics who have forgiven her formal excesses, and see in
her an impressive, if slightly ridiculous icon of feminine self-fashioning. Such
forgiveness is undoubtedly aided by the natural love of the critic for the discarded
antiquity, burnished rather than flawed by a kitsch factor that adds rather than detracts
from its appeal over time. Irony, in other words, has come to the rescue of the overearnest Ms. Corelli, and by some dialectical fluke, what we read as her cartoonish
Victorianism seems to speak to our similarly cartoonish post-modernity. In Corelli, and
other once-eminent Victorians, two ages, each obsessed with dubious surfaces and the
nature of authenticity, meet, and recognize one another.
When we read the strange entertainments of Marie Corelli, or the countless,
perhaps slightly less strange productions of her peers, we inevitably ask: who are the
Victorians? Who are these people that seem so laughably foreign, yet uncannily familiar
to us? We may be tempted to frame the question, ‘who were the Victorians,’ as they are
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all dead now, and so their age may be safely periodized and reckoned with as an object of
history. There are no Victorians now, their voices are silent – save for the millions and
millions of words on the page, the legacy of the bureaucracy of empire and the
entertainment machine of Mudie’s lending library. So we read them, and ask what all
their words mean. Were they capitalists, or communists? We read Carlyle, and find the
hero-worshipper railing against the captains of industry. We read Marx (who, it must be
remembered, was as eminent a Victorian as Cardinal Manning or Florence Nightingale),
and find that his Capital is not a handbook for revolution, but an epic of parliamentary
blue books and the dark magic of money. Were they liberal, or conservative? We see the
Tory Disraeli – the self-described ‘radical conservative’ -- extend the franchise to
millions of working class men (women would have to wait), while the liberal Gladstone
spends his evenings attempting to evangelize prostitutes on the streets of London. Were
they paragons of moral rectitude, or repressed perverts? Depending how one reads the
strange cases of Charles Dodgson and John Ruskin, the answer could be one or the other,
both, or neither. It requires little reflection to conclude that the Victorians were
contradictory. So is any age; so is anyone. What is interesting is how the Victorians are
so popularly read as contradictory. It seems, in a way, one of their hallmarks.
The image of the Victorians as creatures of contradiction derives not only from
the modernists who mocked them in order to sublate them, but from the critical revival of
the 1950’s, the centerpiece of which is Walter Houghton’s magisterial Victorian Frame
of Mind, 1830-1870. In Houghton’s formulation, the Victorian Age can be
fundamentally diagnosed as an age of doubt, which in turn creates a schizoid psychology
of “two emotional attitudes” of “pleasure-pain responses” to which Victorians reacted
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with “hope and dismay, optimism and anxiety” (23). For both the modernists and their
heirs, the Victorian Age is if anything one of transition, an in-between period marked by
problematical binaries. For the modernists, of course, this was read as the notorious
Victorian penchant for “hypocrisy.” For Houghton, these binaries are the result of
spiritual and philosophical doubt: the effect of the passing away of an age of consensus
and belief. More recently, this conception has been challenged, if not altogether refuted,
by critics who see the Victorian Age as more a period of rebuilding than decadence, of
creation rather than destruction.1
Are these convolutions of binaries, however, representative of the Victorian
period itself, or simply the product of historical and critical reflection on the Victorian
period by their successors? Whether one reads the Victorian Age as a period of belief or
an “epoch of incredulity,” as Dickens puts it in his relentlessly dialectical opening of A
Tale of Two Cities, we tend to view the Victorian Age as one which seeks a universal
position through the juxtaposition of opposites. In other words, it is often characterized
as a self-consciously historical age, seeking self-definition through its relation to the past
and the future. Much of this characterization, however, may be due to the historical selfconsciousness of those doing the characterizing. Do we not, in seeking to define the
Victorians, also attempt to universalize by exception? What kind of Moebius strip do we
construct when we self-consciously historicize the Victorians as self-conscious
historians?
One of the stranger paradoxes of post-modernism is the way it has seemingly
brought the Victorians closer to us than they have been since, let us say, that uncanny
December in 1910 when, as Virginia Woolf laconically noted, “human character
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changed.” The conservative Gertrude Himmelfarb may as well be speaking of the
present when she notes that “so many crosscurrents between the traditional and popular
culture,” existed in Victorian England, “between ‘high’ literature and ‘low,’ that neither
can be entirely understood without the other” (407), while the Marxist Fredric Jameson
could just as easily be describing Victorian England when he declares that
“postmodernism replicates or reproduces – reinforces – the logic of consumer capitalism”
(125). After all, if post-modernism is a product of late capitalism, isn’t what we
understand as Victorian a product of the same system, however earlier its emergence? If
post-modernism destroys Lyotardian “meta-narratives,” and, as Jameson suggests, enacts
a kind of schizophrenic breakdown of temporal continuity, an “undifferentiated vision of
the world in the present” (120), could we not suggest that a properly post-modern
perspective is not that we are the heirs of the Victorians, or “post-Victorian,” but in some
fantasmic, Baudrillardian sense, Victorians ourselves?
How, after all, can a proper post-modernist otherwise engage the Victorians? As
Simon Joyce correctly points out:
…we never really encounter ‘the Victorians’ themselves, but instead a mediated
image like the one we get when we glance into our rearview mirrors while
driving. The image usefully condenses the paradoxical sense of looking forward
to see what’s behind us, which is the opposite of what we do when we read
history in order to figure out the future. It also suggests something of the
inevitable distortion that accompanies any mirror image; thus, the warning that
‘objects in the mirror are closer than they appear’ nicely expresses a feeling we
may have about the Victorians themselves, a recognition of a surprising (and
perhaps frightening) closeness to our past that occurred at different times and to
different people throughout the twentieth century. (3)
No, we can never know the Victorians themselves, but we may know them by the signs
they have left us.
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And those signs are as much our signs as theirs. Are the BBC’s seemingly
endless supply of televised adaptations of Dickens, Gaskell, the Brontës, and Trollope to
be classified as Victorian or post-modern? What of Francis Coppolla’s 1992 version of
the perennially filmed quintessence of Victorianism, Dracula? Cleverly titled Bram
Stoker’s Dracula, the film strays as far from Stoker’s text as any other adaptation, but
drenches itself so thoroughly in Victorian clichés that its title takes on a new resonance:
as pastiche, it both ironically winks at its claim to authenticity – it surely is not Bram
Stoker’s Dracula -- yet the very over-indulgence in lush stereotypes which we read as
Victorian lends it a paradoxical aura of authenticity. It seems to constantly suggest that
this is what Bram Stoker would have made of his material, had he been able to encode
himself into his fiction: Bram Stoker’s Dracula is, in a way, more Dracula than Dracula,
by including its author within the title itself.2 Such films illustrate a sense of culture
which is simultaneously post-modern and Victorian: each representation of the Victorians
makes our post-modern world more and more “Victorian,” while making the Victorians
more and more like us. As Nancy Armstrong suggests:
…postmodernism asks, what if the most oft-repeated and banal aspects of our
culture – rather than the curious and inaccessible excavations of modernism – are
the only basis for ourselves? What if in seeking access to some more primary
world of subjects and objects we do not approach those subjects and objects in all
their premediated purity, but encounter instead just another cultural formation
that we happen to consider more primary and real? To encounter such a nostalgic
formation is to encounter culture rather than anything like unmediated nature. In
doing so, moreover, we inevitably convert that chunk of an earlier moment of
cultural history into modern stereotypical form. In this respect, postmodernism is
perhaps more Victorian than even the Victorians were… (319)
Postmodernism, in other words, accepts the signs of the Victorians at face value. If
modernists like Virginia Woolf and Lytton Strachey seem somewhat parochial in their
stance toward the Victorians, it is perhaps because we are more hostile to what we take to
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be their smug “unveiling” of Victorian pretentions. The meta-historical historicizing of
postmodernism, as critics of postmodernism inevitably point out, replaces grand
narratives with the grand narrative of narrative as such: the “precession of simulacra”
which gives us access to a past from which the rejection of narratives has alienated us.
Though much has been written about the strange kinship between the Victorians
and postmodernism, few scholars have offered a theory that can explain why that curious
dialectic between “us” and “them” is operative. While many recent post-structuralists
have produced fruitful readings of Victorian texts, none of these studies have, to my
knowledge, explored what, if anything, makes such readings compelling. In other words,
while there is a growing body of scholarly work that deconstructs the Victorians, there is
little deconstruction of why deconstructionists deconstruct them. What this study in part
hopes to do is offer a theory of why the Victorians are so seductive to us Postmoderns:
both the academics who continue to psychoanalyze and deconstruct them, and the
broader culture which continues to absorb reproductions and adaptations of Victorian
narratives. It will consider why the Victorians, in a very real sense, continue to haunt us.
For haunting has become the operative word for post-structural considerations of
Victorian narrative. Since Jacques Derrida’s seminal 1993 reflection on the influence of
Karl Marx in a post-communist world, Specters of Marx, cultural theorists and literary
critics have become increasingly interested in the nature of haunting. Spurred in part by
Derrida’s playful coinage “hauntology,” critics have made the study of ghosts one of the
liveliest branches of post-structuralist theory. Existing in an in-between realm between
death and life, being and nothingness, ghosts operate as perhaps the most tangible
metaphors of Derridean discourse – apparitions of deconstruction as such. But ghosts
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have also been the specialty of psychoanalysis, at least since Freud’s 1919 essay, The
Uncanny, and psychoanalytic theories of spectrality, particularly Nicholas Abraham and
Maria Torok’s – which deeply influenced Derrida’s own engagement with ghosts – have
provided support and counterpoint for Derridean models, such that “hauntology” can be
considered a joint enterprise between psychoanalytic theory and deconstruction.
Julian Wolfreys’ 2002 study Victorian Hauntings is the first and most thorough
application of hauntology to Victorian studies. Through a series of compelling readings
of major Victorian texts, Wolfreys attempts to answer the following questions:
What does it mean to speak of spectrality and of textual haunting? What does it
mean to address the text as haunted? How do the ideas of haunting and
spectrality change our understanding of particular texts and the notion of the text
in general? (ix)
The difficulty in answering such questions satisfactorily is admitted at the outset.
Wolfreys succinctly characterizes spectrality as
…a gap between the limits of two ontological categories. The definition escapes
any positivist or constructivist logic by emerging between, and yet not as part of,
two negations: neither, nor. A third term, the spectral, speaks to the limits of
determination, while arriving beyond the terminal both in and of identification in
either case (alive/dead) and not as an oppositional or dialectical term itself defined
as part of some logical economy. (x)
In terms of defining a ghost as existing beyond and between two categories while
eschewing dialectical reasoning in positing that third category, Wolfrey’s definition is
clearly Derridean, and as such, quickly reaches a distinctly Derridean answer to the
question of what spectrality means:
To speak of the spectral, the ghostly, of haunting in general is to come face to face
with that which plays on the very question of interpretation and identification,
which appears, as it were, at the very limit to which interpretation can go. (xi)
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Those with a limited tolerance for Derrida can see where this is heading, and have
already likely begun rolling their eyes. Even those with a taste for the Derridean may be
asking themselves if it is entirely wise to begin a book at the very limits of interpretation
itself.
Let me state at the outset that I object to neither Wolfrey’s nor Derrida project.
Any sympathetic reader of Derrida, and I count myself one of them, understands the
merits of circling the “limits of interpretation.” Clearly, much can and has been learned
from such methods, and Wolfrey’s excellent book is a fine example. I do, however, feel
that the Derridean approach – with its endless second-guessing, its ontic instability and
insecurity – is not the ideal position from which to define terms. As a method predicated
on interrogating meaning as such, it strikes me as a self-defeating way to offer a concrete
answer to the question of what spectrality means – in the sense in which meaning is
commonly understood. Derrida’s project could be viewed as the ultimate reproof to
Wittgenstein’s famous claim that “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”
(Tractatus 157): Derrida speaks only of that which, strictly speaking, cannot be spoken
of, and at great length. Both Wittgenstein and Derrida, of course, work the liminal
borderlands of language and its possibilities, but if we wish to know what a ghost is, and
why it is there, to stop at the Derridean position – that it is indeterminate, and that it
neither is nor isn’t – is to not go far enough. Surely, between silence and abstraction,
there is a concrete way to speak of the non-concrete. What we need, and what this study
hopes to provide, is a non-Derridean hauntology.
While the specter of Derrida will certainly haunt these pages, it will not dominate
them. I certainly do not reject deconstruction, or Derridean hauntology in this study, but
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I will dispense with one of its central premises: that the ghost is not, as Wolfreys puts it,
“an oppositional or dialectical term itself defined as part of some logical economy.” On
the contrary, I argue that any definition of “spectrality” or “ghost” worthy of being called
such must be dialectical in nature. For isn’t a ghost an essentially dialectical being/nonbeing, in that its congress with the non-spectral, the human, is the very ground by which
we recognize them? In order to explain what a ghost is and what it is doing relative to
that which is not ghostly – people, for example – they must be situated through their
intersubjective relationship with that logical economy to which they are opposed.
My position is closely allied to that of the Lacanian philosopher and cultural
theorist Slavoj Žižek, whose current popularity, I suspect, is largely due to his
unapologetically Hegelian dialectical approach. Žižek’s entire critical enterprise can be
neatly summed up by the manifesto/forward to his self-described “magnum opus” of
2006, The Parallax View:
A short circuit occurs when there is a faulty connection in the network – faulty, of
course, from the standpoint of the network’s smooth functioning. Is not the shock
of short-circuiting, therefore, one of the best metaphors of critical reading? […]
What such a reading achieves is not a simple ‘desublimation,’ a reduction of the
higher intellectual content to its lower economic or libidinal cause; the aim of
such an approach is, rather, the inherent decentering of the interpreted text, which
brings to light its ‘unthought,’ its disavowed presuppositions and consequences.
(ix)
Interrogating these “short circuits,” Žižek suggests, will not only create new knowledge,
but will make such an ideal critical reader “aware of another – disturbing – side of
something he or she knew all the time” (x). In The Parallax View, the ‘short circuit’ is
ingeniously conceptualized as a “parallax gap” which “separates the One from itself” (7).
In a move that politically pits Žižek against both postmodern liberal demands for
plurality, tolerance and multiplicity, and conservative – which he routinely equates with
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“fundamentalist” – demands for a univocal Truth, Žižek offers a theory that he takes
through a dizzying array of multi-disciplinary paces (his examples of parallax in practice
range from the philosophical to recent scientific debates about consciousness, to the
political, spiced with his usual barrage of interpretive snap shots of popular culture), but
at its essence, is seductively simple: that which we call Truth is not the product of some
reconciliation or synthesis of Hegelian binaries, nor the universal sum total of
multiplicities. Rather, it is the very subjective gap in our observation of what we
perceive as these binaries that constitutes the One (whether we call it the Real, the Truth,
or the Universal) as such. Žižek’s Hegelian Lacanianism receives its clearest exposition
in this text, and as usual, it takes its cue from what Žižek regards as misreadings of both
Lacan and Hegel. As regards the Lacanian Real:
[It] is not the inaccessible Thing, but the gap which prevents our access to it, the
‘rock’ of antagonism which distorts our view of the perceived object without
perspectival distortion. The site of truth is not the way ‘things really are in
themselves,’ beyond their perspectival distortions, but the very gap, passage,
which separates one perspective from another, the gap […] which makes the two
perspectives radically incommensurable. (281)
Similarly, Žižek’s unique brand of Christianity is used to dispel the critique of Hegelian
dialectic as an apology for questionable notions of political “progress:”
[…] opposites are not reconciled in a ‘higher synthesis’ – rather, their difference
is posited ‘as such.’ The example of St. Paul may help us to clarify this logic of
Hegelian ‘reconciliation’: the radical gap that he posits between ‘life’ and ‘death,’
between life in Christ and life in sin, has no need of further ‘synthesis’; it is itself
the resolution of the ‘absolute contradiction’ of Law and sin, of the vicious cycle
of their mutual implication. (299)
To frame the question in a properly Žižekian manner: is not this “radical gap between life
and death” another way of looking at Wolfrey’s spectrality, which “speaks to the limits of
determination, while arriving beyond the terminal both in and of identification in either
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case (alive/dead)” without resorting to claims of an indeterminate, non-dialectical dead –
or rather, undead – end? In other words, does not Žižek’s conception of the parallax gap
effectively define a ghost within the framework of human subjectivity, and thus offer a
conception that does not lie achingly outside our hermeneutic range, but rather as an
explicit marker of how we interpret as such?
While Žižek does not offer an explicit definition of spectrality, his psychoanalytic
focus on the nature of fantasy and its reification in popular culture often brings him into
close contact with considerations of ghosts, and their undead relatives, zombies and
vampires. More importantly, his investigation of “the parallax gap,” which is his most
theoretically concise and compelling attempt to resuscitate Hegelian dialectics to date,
offers a fruitful alternative to Derridean models of what, precisely, is the nature of that
which is neither live nor dead, that which is ghostly. What Žižek supplies, in short, is an
implicit definition of ghosts that speaks directly to the culture that produces them: the
ghost not only resides in the gap between subject and object which describes the limited
whole that produces it, it is that gap. For Žižek, the parallax gap is not simply a void
between object and subject, but a transcendentalised object itself. This object is Lacan’s
famous objet petit a, the fetishized “Thing” which stands in as the object of desire.
Throughout Žižek’s career, he has taken the objet petit a through its paces. Of all the
Lacanian concepts he works with, it is this one he returns to most. In his first book, The
Sublime Object of Ideology (1989), Žižek anticipates the parallax gap in his reading of
Lacan’s concept of “the two deaths” developed in his 1957 seminar, The Ethics of
Psychoanalysis.3 The two deaths are, as Žižek puts it:
[…] the difference between real (biological) death and its symbolization, the
‘settling of accounts’, the accomplishment of symbolic destiny (deathbed
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confession in Catholicism, for example). This gap […] ‘between the two deaths’,
a place of sublime beauty as well as terrifying monsters, is the site of das Ding, of
the real-traumatic kernel in the midst of symbolic order. This place is opened by
symbolization/historicization: the process of historicization implies an empty
place, a non-historical kernel around which the symbolic network is articulated.
(150)
This gap is a structural fiction: it is created by the very symbolic, historicizing process
that defines the terms around it. What resides in the gap is the objet petit a, the
excremental remainder of the symbolic order as well as the obscure object of desire. It is
what I call the subjectivized object, which I would also call an operative definition for a
ghost. Isn’t a ghost, the thing/not-thing between two deaths, an object that has been
invested with some libidinal desire or anxiety (for Lacan, of course, the two are
inseperable), and thus subjectivized? For Žižek, this subject/object not only fills the gap,
it is the gap on account of the very agency it is invested with.
In this sense, the objet petit a is always a ghost. Consider the commodity
fetishism of Marx which transforms his famous wooden table into “a thing which
transcend sensuousness,” and “not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in relation
to all other commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain
grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own free will”
(Capital 163-4). This dancing table is, as Derrida points out, a thing that “becomes
someone” (Specters 188), but it is also the unassuming object which underwrites the
entire symbolic order of capitalism. The objet petit a, the subjectivized object, is, in
more ways than one, the Ghost in the Machine.
To define the ghost as subjectivized object offers a succinct definition of a
notoriously fluid concept, but it is admittedly general and abstract. It remains to specify
and localize these ghosts. To return to the question which spurred this discussion: why
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do the Victorians haunt us? If we seek to find out by examining particular ghosts, the
body of choice is formidable. The Victorians, after all, arguably invented the modern
ghost story, and most certainly developed it into an art. We will encounter a number of
them in the pages that follow. But I would suggest a broader order of ghosts exist outside
the more limited terrain of the fiction that brings them forth. After all, if a ghost is a
subjectivized object, it is, disturbingly, an entity no longer subject to the parameters of
fiction. Like Marx’s dancing table, they are, in a sense, real.
I am speaking of cultural phenomena which, in their singular manner of framing
the symbolic order that produces them, can offer a ghostly window into how those
symbolic structures operate. Just as the dancing table offers a ghostly illustration of
commodity fetishism, and by extension, capitalism itself, there are subjectivized objects
which culture sets apart, exceptionalizes, in order to draw the universal figure of its
symbolic order. Bram Stoker’s Dracula, for example, could serve as a model of the
ghostly thing which stands in for the Victorian as such (or, perhaps just as easily,
postmodernity). On a broader level, one could argue that films as such occupy a similar
position: cultural things that come to haunt the culture as a whole. In other words, we can
conceive of ghosts as icons, cultural metonyms that possess a power to define and
circumscribe the times they haunt. In this sense, Victoria herself can lay claim to be the
ultimate Victorian ghost: omnipresent in commercial culture as the face of the first
postage stamp, coinage, and later, as an advertising shill for numerous commodities
(becoming, in her way, a variation of the dancing table), all the while diminishing the
power of the monarchy to the vestigial state it enjoys today. Objet petit a indeed.
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The purpose of investigating such phenomena in light of their spectrality should
be obvious: if haunting is a performative manner of defining, then investigating ghosts
becomes a matter of understanding our cultural definitions – most of which, as a rule, we
take for granted. Who needs a dictionary once we presumably know what the word
means? The cultural phenomenon this study will investigate is one that could fairly be
described as the most pervasive and persistent of Victorian cultural icons: Christmas.
Even more than Dracula, Sherlock Holmes, and Victoria herself, Christmas is the most
enduring icon of the popular, if not the academic, conception of what the “Victorian” era
is, or was. It is also the phenomenon that seems least likely in need of a definition, and
therefore probably the most in need. There is probably no more adapted or well-known
text in the English language than Charles Dickens’ Christmas Carol, which, in the
popular and academic cultural consciousness is generally credited with inventing
Christmas. While Christmas itself obviously precedes the nineteenth century, it seems
impossible for the postmodern imagination to conceive of it without Victorian mediation.
In fact, debate both political and critical swirls around the degree to which Christmas is
something ancient, traditional, and by implication, natural; or something recent,
ideological, and, troublingly, invented. The parameters of these debates have been
largely defined by the recent “culture wars” staged for the outrage, or bemusement, of
cable news viewers, but the essence of them filters into more arcane academic discussion
of the relative influence of Charles Dickens. Of primary interest in this study is the fact
that such a univocally joyous and festive holiday is nevertheless the focus of such
debates. That there exists controversy surrounding something as seemingly innocuous as
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Christmas is a clue that there is more to be discovered in exploring the phenomenon of
Christmas than it has been previously afforded.
Consider, for example, a recent incident that was reported in December 2010, by
mock pundit and culture warrior Stephen Colbert regarding a strange dialogue that
emerged around New York City’s Lincoln Tunnel. The society of American Atheists
erected a billboard at the New Jersey entrance, proclaiming, “You KNOW it’s a Myth –
This Season, Celebrate Reason!” over an image of the nativity. In response, the Catholic
League put up another billboard at the New York entrance, with the claim, “You Know
it’s Real. This Season, Celebrate Jesus.” Colbert provided the requisite synthesis to
these seeming antitheses with the punchline: “These billboards have prompted the Tunnel
Authority to put up their own billboard: ‘Jesus Christ! Watch Where You’re Driving!’”
[Figure 2]
Setting aside the fact that billboards have never been known as ideal vehicles of
rational discourse, it is tempting to see in this exchange something elemental in our
cultural experience of Christmas. At the very least, it raises some interesting questions.
What would prompt a group like the American Atheists (who proudly note in their
billboard a legacy of being “Reasonable since 1963”) to instigate such a crudely
aggressive assault in such a manner? What converts could such simple-minded
sloganeering hope to gain? And what motive would compel the Catholic League to join
battle in kind? Does anyone – Catholic or otherwise – really need reminding that
Christmas is, as it were, “real”? What could this elephantine exercise in signification
hope to accomplish?4

23

Figure 2: Christmas Billboards (2010)
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The key to this exchange, I think, lies in Colbert’s retort: “Jesus Christ, Watch
Where You’re Driving!” Isn’t a statement of this kind demanded by the dueling
billboards? There is an inevitability of progression in this accumulation of signs: just as
something compels the reasonable atheists to hail us – “YOU know it’s a myth”: it is
impossible to avoid this kind of direct address – the atheist’s message cannot go
unanswered. YOU know it’s real. At this point, the emerging dialectic demands
development. Isn’t this, in a ludicrously simplified form, the Hegelian dialectic at work?
The myth thesis is impossible without the antithetical idea that it is not myth but history
we are dealing with: in order for Christmas to be a myth, it must be non-factual, and vice
versa. But of course, these positions cannot rest by themselves. Their inherent
contradictions must keep them moving, in this case, towards the rational avoidance of the
conflict they enact: the answer to the challenge posed by these antithetical positions is to
ignore them, and keep one’s eyes on the road. In the process, presumably, the spirit of
Christmas does its work, moving forward, perfecting itself, with and without our active
acknowledgement.
In other words, it seems that, in a very Hegelian sense, the spirit, or Geist, of
Christmas itself is erecting these billboards. What, after all, is the agenda of the atheists
and Catholics? If not immediate conversion, the answer seems simply to raise a
particular awareness of, and attitude toward, Christmas. Both signs use Christmas
without making it the object of their respective arguments. In framing their plea, the
atheists do not attack Christmas as such. They still urge “you” to celebrate your
humanity this season. The Catholic sign uses almost the exact verbiage; it merely points
out the spiritual “reality” of the “myth.” On a purely grammatical level, the signs could
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be read as saying almost the exact same thing. This seems to be inherent in Colbert’s
response: “Jesus Christ! Watch Where You’re Driving!” authorizes its sensible advice
with the name of the source of contention: the real-myth of the thesis/antithesis, Jesus
Christ. It takes both the blasphemous stance of the first ad by using the name of Christ as
an obscenity, and as the divine authority that backs up its command. The synthesis is
also present in the phrase “Watch Where You’re Driving!” The command asks that we
pay closer attention, but by ignoring the claims of the previous billboards. The common
element that drives the humor, intentional and unintentional, of this exchange is
Christmas itself. What is interesting is that once we isolate Christmas as such from the
arguments that swirl around it, the dialectical movement of the exchange suggests not
that we pay closer attention to how we celebrate Christmas, but that we take it as read.
In a way, Christmas problematizes itself in these billboards, only to reify itself as an
object beyond the necessity of interpretation.
In other words, there seems to be a fundamental confusion between Christmas as
object, and Christmas as subject. The ostensible object of these billboards is Christmas:
it is what is either real or mythic, depending on the sign, and you are the subject hailed to
read it. But at the same time, isn’t Christmas the speaking subject of these signs?
Notwithstanding the nominal sponsorship of the atheists and Catholics who paid for the
ads, the subject addressing us is Christmas itself, asking us to read it alternatively as myth
or reality, but in both cases, taking as read the demand that we celebrate it. Yes, the
atheists and Catholics appropriate Christmas to deliver their message, but the message
itself is neither atheism nor Catholicism as such – if it were, the arguments would
presumably be less absurd. In fact, they aren’t arguments at all: we are said in both cases
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to know the truth, and the fundamental truth – Christmas as a season to be celebrated – is
the same in both cases. The ostensible object which props up either side of each position
is really a universalized subject which props up both sides.
This strikes me as a uniquely Žižekian moment of parallax. While each side talks
past each other via inanities that can only exist because everyone supposedly takes them
as granted, the real ideological drama occurs below the surface, as it were, in the
disturbingly fundamental agreement of the two sides. An unseen univocity controls this
debate. The Spirit of Christmas can be said to determine and overshadow the nominal
“debate” that is the surface presentation of the hostility, anxiety, and absurdity that
characterize the exchange. What is perhaps most interesting is that, given the desire to
provoke, perhaps enrage, that these signs engage, no one could really claim to be shocked
by them, even though they use Christmas as the occasion for such a confrontational
exhibition. The banality of their message extends even to their sense of (and desire to?)
outrage, making a satiric comedy program the only appropriate vehicle to deliver that
message. In other words, isn’t this just another example of Christmas being used as the
occasion for cultural frustration and discontent?
Couldn’t we look at this story as a metaphor, or even a real life example of all
those Christmas movies that deal in neurotic suburban families engaged in ridiculous
competition to “out-Christmas” each other for the sake of family respect, inevitably
“ruining” the holiday in the process?5 It certainly raises the specter of the most reliable
of Christmas narratives: what I would call the “Apocalyptic Christmas,” in which the
holiday is so in danger of being corrupted or destroyed that the negative aspects of the
narrative threaten to overwhelm the holiday cheer the narrative is nominally there to
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dispense. Nearly every Rankin-Bass animated television special which ran from the midSixties to early-Seventies followed this formula, from the existential despair of ‘Rudolf
the Red-Nosed Reindeer,’ to the cheerfully satanic ‘Year Without a Santa Claus’6
[Figures 3 and 4]. But one really need go no farther afield than Dickens’ Christmas Carol
to see that the negative, the depressing, the horrific, never seem all that far from our most
cherished Christmas stories.
In fact, the central question of this study is one that is rarely asked: why is
Christmas, a season universally denoted as a time of joy and happiness, so often
portrayed as a time of anxiety, dread, and even horror? Why do we always hear
apocryphal reports of Christmas suicides? Why do Christmas movies so routinely tell the
stories of people who are doing anything but enjoying themselves? Why is there a “War
on Christmas?” Why is A Christmas Carol, that most beloved of Christmas narratives, a
ghost story? Sociologists and anthropologists have supplied reasonable answers to many
of these questions, but considering the narrative fecundity Christmas has occasioned
since the publication of Dickens’ Carol in 1843, there has been surprisingly little
attention paid to them by literary critics. If Christmas is, as I attest, a central – perhaps
the central – cultural marker of not only Victorian hopes and joys, but their anxieties and
fears, in short, the ultimate Victorian fantasy, and that fantasy has been passed down to
this postmodern age undimmed and undiluted, making it the ultimate postmodern fantasy
as well, and if that fantasy was created and perpetuated by the literary culture of the
nineteenth century – if, in short, Christmas is, effectually, a literary creation – then, it
seems to me the question of Christmas is one that needs to be addressed by literary
criticism in a manner it has yet to do.
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Figure 3: Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer (1964)

Figure 4: The Year Without a Santa Claus (1974)
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The remainder of this chapter will develop in more detail the background of the
ideas and questions posed above. I will proceed with an examination of what Christmas
is, or rather, does: how we experience Christmas, and how the historical development of
Christmas as an idea shaped the Victorian conception – or re-conceptualization – of it. In
the process, I will look at some key texts of pre-Victorian Christmas literature as a
prelude to offering some provisional markers of what constitutes a specifically
“Victorian” literary formulation of the holiday. I will examine some of the critical debate
surrounding the renaissance of Christmas as a cultural object of interest around the turn
of the nineteenth century, and consider the relations of that debate to the theoretical
models that will frame my conception of the Victorian Christmas.

III

The first thing that Christmas does is precede us. It is, in that tired but inevitable phrase,
always already there. This means that when we ask ‘what is Christmas?’ we are initially
in a position to accept just about any answer we’re given. For example, I do not
remember the first time I was told that Christmas was, effectively, “chestnuts roasting on
an open fire,” but by the time I attained enough reason to understand what chestnuts and
Christmas were, the answer was waiting for me. And that’s the second thing Christmas
does: it provides answers to questions we have yet to ask. Christmas hails us. Before I
ask myself what relationship between signifier and signified exists between chestnuts,
open fires, and Christmas, Nat King Cole and company inform me that “everybody
knows.” Everybody, myself included, knows what helps to make the season bright. It
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requires only the Socratic recollection of a song, this song, “The Christmas Song,” to
bring that knowledge forward. In fact, the entire structure of “The Christmas Song” is an
exercise in Althusserian interpellation, from the comforting yet questioning two note fall
with which it opens – two notes that, in their descent, sound the question the first line
answers – to the lyrical progress from the “everybody knows” that opens the chorus to
the “Merry Christmas to you,” which ends it. This seductive three minute invitation to
pleasure is addressed directly to me, and places me within a universe in which chestnuts
roasting on an open fire and Jack Frost nipping at my nose is self-evident reality.
Since “everybody knows,” I trust this song is known to you. Hasn’t every English
speaking subject between one and ninety-two heard it many times, many ways? Because
this is the third thing Christmas does: it repeats. As Christmas comes back the same time
each year, so does “The Christmas Song.” The song, in fact, returns and repeats far more
often than the day itself. Radio stations forgo their identifying formats and switch to
playing only Christmas music, often in mid-November, a full month before the holiday.
Public and private places and spaces trade in their usual sonic environments as well
during this time, and similarly become arenas for Christmas music. As there is a limited
repertoire of Christmas songs, and as primacy is given to the most popular tunes, there is
a very good chance that one will hear “The Christmas Song,” arguably the most popular
of modern Christmas songs, many times and many ways every day over a six week
period. The reason this omnipresence is perceived as pleasure rather than torture is, of
course, due to the fact that Christmas eventually goes away. Certainly there are those
(perhaps you are one of them), who feel a vague oppression at being subjected to songs
like “The Christmas Song” multiple times in a day (or in an hour, depending on
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circumstances), yet resist the temptation to complain or resist, knowing that the season is
short, and that this strange hegemony is fleeting and therefore special. Perhaps you
actually breathe a sigh of relief when “The Christmas Song” begins again, its
sophisticated opening notes a welcome respite from the more immediately, insistently
irritating songs like “Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer” or “Here Comes Santa Claus,”
which combine Gene Autry’s nasal drawl with simple repetitive structures to appeal to
the equally simple and repetitive sensibilities of children, who, we are told, the holiday is
really for. And, as you recollect your own childhood, and recognize “The Christmas
Song”’s place within it – how it used to be irritating, because it was so adult, and you
couldn’t wait to hear “Rudolph” again, one more time – you endure the repetition,
because it is, after all, another recollection. This moment, were it to repeat forever,
would, presumably, be a fair approximation of Hell. But by the very fact that it repeats –
that in repeating, it goes away again, makes the moment not only tolerable, but strangely
magical.
This is the fourth thing Christmas does, and is perhaps its most fascinating
function: it contradicts. Always already there and always coming back, it is present yet
absent. Completely self-evident yet utterly illogical, it is sublime nonsense. Composed
of equal parts nostalgia and anticipation, Christmas is the example par excellence of
Kierkegaard’s curious dialectic of recollection and repetition:
Repetition and recollection are the same movement, just in opposite directions,
because what is recollected has already been and is thus repeated backwards,
whereas genuine repetition is recollected forwards. Repetition, if it is possible,
thus makes a person happy, while recollection makes him unhappy… (Repetition
3)
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“Genuine repetition,” for Kierkegaard, is a moment where difference and similarity
impossibly fuse, the search for which is a “dialectical battle through which the exception
emerges from the universal” (77), and which is “as difficult as killing a man while letting
him live” (78). Kierkegaard’s metaphor is striking in suggesting a simultaneity of violent
event and merciful process, but perhaps more unnerving is the sense of agency it
suggests: who or what is it that is doing the killing and pardoning? Isn’t this sense of
agency an example of the en-ghosting parallactic movement which subjectifies the
object?
Freud appears to take up this issue of the agent of repetition in Beyond the
Pleasure Principle, while problematizing the distinction between happiness and
unhappiness central to Kierkegaard’s conception. In this text, Freud witnesses his young
grandson amusing himself by casting away a spool with thread tied around it and then
pulling it back again repeatedly: the famous “fort/da” game (fort and da means "gone!"
and "there!" in German). What fascinates Freud is the repetition involved, and the lack
the action of casting the ball aside produces. On one level, the casting aside is obvious: it
is the precondition of achieving the pleasure of getting the ball back. On another level,
and this gets to the heart of Freud's argument: why repeat the trauma of casting the ball
aside in the first place? As Freud is always looking for first causes, he relates the game
to a repetition of the trauma of losing direct access to the mother. The fort/da game, then,
becomes an example of the "return of the repressed," in which we take perverse pleasure
in repeating something unpleasant. Previously, Freud had accounted for human behavior
as the complex interaction of the pleasure principle and the reality principle: the pleasure
principle is, in a way, life itself: it is the drive for pleasure, or happiness, which is
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constantly running, and constitutes the main reason we operate in the world. Of course,
in a world of others, one must modulate one's drive to pleasure, and so the reality
principle intervenes, making sure we can follow our drive for pleasure in the most
economically viable way by not getting in trouble by violating the pleasure of others
(hence, "the law" as such). But since this basic dialectic does not account for taking
pleasure in pain by perversely repeating trauma, there has to be something else at work.
Derrida points out that in order for pleasure to be experienced as displeasure, and vice
versa, a structurating agency, a subjectivity, has to be in place:
Science as objective knowledge, for example, cannot formulate the question of
the quantitative evaluation of a qualitative – or to go quickly let us say
‘subjective’ – affect, one in which a subject is irreducibly engaged. As for the
philosophical or usual concept of experience, one finds presupposed within it a
knowledge or foreknowledge of what pleasure is, and of what ‘pleasure’ ‘means’;
to use this concept implies that the ultimate criterion of something like pleasure or
unpleasure, as well as their distinction, is conscious or perceptual experience,
experience itself […] (Post Card 287-8)
Someone or some subjectivized thing, in other words, has to exist and experience, in
order for these concepts to make any sense.
This is where Freud introduces the idea of the death drive: a quasi-biological
entropic force in which life seeks quiescence and inoperativity. The death drive is
basically the dark matter of psychoanalysis -- a negative function that completes the
tautology of the given discourse (just as dark matter and dark energy function in physics - we don't see it, we only account for its presence/absence based on filling in the holes of
what we think we see going on).
However hesitantly Freud introduces the concept in Beyond the Pleasure
Principle (1920), the death drive gradually takes center stage in Freud's work, until in
Civilization and its Discontents (1929), he essentially argues that society itself operates
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with a massive death wish (not a surprising conclusion, seeing when he wrote the book).
But even in this earlier text, Freud quickly becomes enamored with his idea: “The
manifestations of a compulsion to repeat […] plainly bear the stamp of drives, and
wherever they are in opposition to the pleasure principle they equally plainly exhibit their
daemonic character” (75, emphasis mine). Freud’s gift for mythmaking outpaces his
nominally scientific goals here. While Freud admits his biological reasoning may “sound
strange” (76), his personification of the death-drive as demonic requires no explanation.
In exploring the dialectic tension between the life-drives and the death-drive which
“presses [the human subject] ever onward, unbridled, untamed” (82), Freud quotes
Mephisto in Goethe’s Faust, as if his death-drive were the Devil himself.7 This
personification is the reconciliation of the contradictions of a drive which, operating
under the injunction that “the goal of all life is death, or to express it retrospectively: the
inanimate existed before the animate” (78), turns pleasure into displeasure, life into
death. One could read the death-drive and its repetitions as an inverse form of
Kierkegaard’s metaphor: “letting a man live, in order to kill him.” In this sense,
happiness is intimately tied to destructive impulses, and perversely becomes a
fundamental desire for displeasure. In order for this paradox to work, a psychologized
version of Maxwell’s Demon comes into existence: a diabolic agency that necessarily
arises in order to characterize and actualize otherwise unquantifiable drives and
structures.
Is it too much of a leap to suggest that Christmas could just as easily fill the
significatory personification Freud assigns to Mephisto in characterizing his death-drive?
Repetition, for both Freud and Kierkegaard, requires a leap. Christmas, which in recent
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times has taken on some of the characteristics of a children’s game, is an example of
fort/da writ large. It certainly comes and goes, but underwriting the repetition is a
fundamental principle: it has always been there.
Indeed, both mythically and institutionally, Christmas can be said to precede
itself. The Gospel of St. Matthew, textually the first account of Christ’s nativity, begins
with a genealogy. Christmas, in this sense, begins by following Jesus’s patrilineal
forbears. The Gospel of St. John, of course, trumps this genealogy: “In the beginning
was the Word; the Word was in God’s presence, and the Word was God” (1.1-2). Only
later does the Word become flesh. The event of the nativity is preceded by its sign – the
sign, in fact, is what creates the possibility of the event (1.3). The dialectical nature of
Christ is further illustrated in this striking verse: “John testified to him by proclaiming:
‘This is he of whom I said, “the one who comes after me ranks ahead of me, for he was
before me.’”’ (1.15). The Russian-doll structure of this verse embodies the simultaneity
of Christ’s omnipresence and repeated coming: each quote, encapsulating the next, leaps
toward the next idea while at the same time containing it. The oscillations between past
tense and present, the movement of the subject “after, ahead, and before” create repetition
while anchoring the contradictions within a single sentence.
The Gospels structurally situate Christmas as an event which, in preceding itself,
can lay claim to being always already there. A similar phenomenon occurs in the
formative institutionalization of Christmas as a holiday – an event to be recollected and
repeated – in the mid fourth century. The first written record of Christmas that pins the
birth of Jesus to December 25 is a Roman document from 354 called the Philocalian
Calendar.8 The appearance of Christmas as a formal holiday in Roman records shortly
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after the legalization of Christianity by the emperor Constantine is not in itself surprising.
The adoption of December 25 to mark the date of the nativity is, however, an interesting
development in the emerging dialectic of Christmas. In the first place, it is a clear
example of the unusual way in which Christmas precedes us. There is, of course, no
record that suggests that Christ was in fact born on December 25. And we have no record
of the first year in which December 25 was recognized as the date (what was
indeterminate for the fourth century Romans, is doubly indeterminate for us). For the
authorities that first institutionalized the date, there must have been at least a vaguely
blasphemous sense that, in decreeing a determinate number to reduce an indeterminate
field of possibility, this – the first December 25 to carry this weight of theological
meaning – was indeed the first Christmas. In simply assigning the number, Christmas
emerges from its uncanny state as an ahistorical event lurking somewhere in the midst of
history, to achieve an actual – if likely false – historicity. In becoming a fact, however
fictional, Christmas finally can be celebrated, for the first time, three hundred plus years
after it occurred.
However, as everybody knows, December 25 is not an arbitrary number. It
marked the birthday of the pagan sun god, Sol Invictus. The assignation of the date to
this god was no doubt inspired by the same convenience that attributed it to Christ, as
December 25 was also the date of the winter solstice. Bookending the solstice were two
pagan festivals: Saturnalia and Kalends, the latter a festival of the new year which
involved the giving of presents, feasting, and heavy drinking; the former also involving
feasting and even heavier drinking.
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As Christmas was being institutionalized in the western empire, The Feast of the
Epiphany was performing a similar function in the east. In a further dialecticization of
Christmas, the Council of Tours in 567 officially joined the two holidays. The Twelve
Days of Christmas run from December 25 to January 5, or from December 26 to January
6, depending on how it is counted, with Twelfth Night retaining the nickname “Old
Christmas” well into the nineteenth century in Britain.
The necessary collaboration of the new state religion with older forms of religious
celebration in order to ensure its own survival can probably be noted without further
comment. What is of interest here is the further complication of the dialectic of
Christmas that the institutionalization of December 25 adds to the nativity narrative.
Christmas now not only precedes itself, it repeats, in conjunction with the very religion it
replaces. This, as we will see, is not lost on the Puritans and their heirs, who find in
Christmas something to be suspicious of, rather than an occasion to celebrate. When we
see Christmas as the festival in which St. John’s logos, the universal Man-God, presides
over the drunkest day of the Roman year, it is somewhat easier to grant the Puritans may
have had a point.
The anxiety produced by the juxtaposition of the pagan and Christian, between
solemnity and unfettered revelry, in the emerging holiday of Christmas explodes in an
early example of Christmas literature in English, Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night.
Christmas, of course, is a festive time in this most festive and delightful of plays, but that
very festivity is the precondition of almost apocalyptic social chaos: women become
men, servants become masters, the wise are shown to be fools and the sane are made to
be mad. In one respect, this is the point of Saturnalia: the title makes clear that what we
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will see is a feast of misrule. But in indulging so fluently the paradoxes of misrule, the
play marks Christmas – as it is celebrated in the chaotic domestic space of Olivia’s house
-- as a site of transgressive, potentially criminal behavior that makes dangerously fluid
the demarcations between political, religious and cultural propriety.
Beyond the social chaos of Twelfth Night’s plot, there is a perhaps more
fundamental dialectic at work. As Barbara Freedman notes in her Lacanian study of
Shakespearean comedy, Staging the Gaze: “to read Twelfth Night is to take part in an
intriguing game of lost and found” (192), a game that both diegetically, and in the
reader’s interaction with the text, consists of multiple variations of fort/da. Separation
and return make up the contrapuntal movement of the play’s various parts, a movement
that seems to continue beyond the play’s ending. For all the apparent resolution of the
marriages, there is a sense of irresolution and contingency to the nature of them: Olivia
marries Sebastian thinking he is someone else, Orsino marries Viola in a spontaneous
moment, eager to “have a share in this most happy wreck” (5.1. 259), and Sir Toby
finally marries Maria in a pique of ennui following the torture of Malvolio. And these
returns are all balanced by separations that further question the closure nominally
provided by the marriages: Antonio, Sir Andrew, and Malvolio all leave Olivia’s house
empty-handed, to the tune of Feste’s lament that “the rain it raineth every day.” Feste’s
epilogue further complicates the sense of an ending in his final couplet: “But that’s all
one, our play is done,/ And we’ll strive to please you every day” (5.1.394-5). The
curious tense shift provides the parallactic sense of finality and continuity, a movement
from object (“our play”) to action (“we’ll strive”). As Feste’s final paradox, its fort/da
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structure encapsulates in two lines the play’s musical fugue of loss and return,
highlighting the melancholy core that drives the desire for pleasure.
It is easy to read Twelfth Night’s melancholy as the key to its beauty, a delicate
chiaroscuro that limns the play’s nonsense with ultimate meaning. As with roses and
women, that “die even when they to perfection grow” (2.4.40), so with Twelfth Night:
sublimely tautological in its dialectic of death and life, loss and return. But what elevates
the play above the status of an art object that offers a satisfyingly limited whole is its
awareness of the violence that attends such beauty. Malvolio, of course, is the distasteful
remainder which is expelled from the hermetic world of Illyria, and his abjectness,
constituted by both his otherness and the cruelty his otherness occasions, comes to
nauseate even the strong stomach of Sir Toby Belch. The true genius of Twelfth Night is
not that it resolves its dialectical tensions through ultimate harmony, but that it attains an
even greater sense of completion by including the discordant note that resides outside that
harmony. It continues beyond itself, not only in Feste’s epilogue, but in Malvolio’s
curse, which trumps the apparent universality of the revenges of “the whirligig of time”
(5.1.364): ‘I’ll be revenged on the whole pack of you’ (5.1.365). Malvolio’s outrage lies
outside everything, beyond “the whole,” and as such, makes the whole that much larger.
He is, as the excremental objet petit a of Illyria, Twelfth Night’s ghost. His pain is the
libidinal occasion for everyone else’s pleasure.
One is tempted to hear Malvolio’s cry for revenge in Milton’s “Nativity Ode” of
1629, in which an avenging newborn Christ consigns the “whole pack” of pagan gods to
Hell. “On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity” begins, classically enough, with an
invocation to the Muse, and proceeds to a vivid pastoral in which Nature and Heaven
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“Move in melodious time” (129), the heavenly spheres in “ninefold harmony” (131),
celebrating the Christ child who “lies yet in smiling infancy” (151). It is here that things
get scary:
With such a horrid clang […]
The aged earth aghast
With terror of that blast,
Shall from the surface to the center shake;
When at the world’s last session,
The dreadful judge in middle air shall spread his throne. (157-164)
This leap from Christmas to the End of the World is justified because it is, in fact,
simultaneous:
And then at last our bliss
Full and perfect is,
But now begins; for from this happy day
Th’ old Dragon under ground
In straiter limits bound,
Not half so far casts his usurped sway,
And wroth to see his kingdom fail,
Swinges the scaly horror of his folded tail. (165-173)
This sense of the end present in the beginning, as well as a shift in viewpoint from the
angelic to demonic, anticipates Paradise Lost, as does the strange ambivalence towards
the satanic that accompanies the adoption of the perspective of the damned: we are made
to hear the moans of the Roman household gods (191), the sullenness of Moloch (205),
the frustration of the Egyptian gods (211-220), and the terror and confusion caused by
“the dreaded infant’s hand” (222).
The apocalyptic fury of this poem is a mirror of the apocalyptic revelries of
Twelfth Night. The Puritan poet finds his voice here, echoing the expansiveness of
Shakespeare’s vision in creating a universe turned upside down. In both texts, “pleasure
will be paid” (2.4.69), and the abject will be outcast. In the “Nativity Ode,” however, it
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is the seemingly abject that casts aside the saturnalian universe itself. In both texts,
Christmas is parallactic: it is dialectically composed of simultaneously existing binaries:
birth and death, pagan and Christian, happiness and terror. Both texts also recognize that
the price of parallax is an indigestible, excremental remainder. As such, Christmas in
these texts sublates the negative in order to more firmly establish it: in celebrating a
whole, they also explicitly, paradoxically, take sides. The pleasure of Saturnalia requires
the expulsion of the non-festive Malvolio; the glory of Christ requires the expulsion of
the saturnalian. The parallax of Christmas in these texts is not the harmonic dialectic of
either/or. It is the discordant dialectic of the harmonic and either/or.
This is the secret of Christmas: exceptional and universal, temporal and
omnipresent, it cannot but be irreducibly exclusive. Like the Mephistophelian remainder
that haunts Freud’s fort/da universe, Christmas too, in its necessary creation of the abject
remainder that parallactically fills the gap between “gone!” and “there!,” must be, to
anyone celebrating it on either side of the parallax gap, intrinsically satanic. Twelfth
Night and the “Nativity Ode” revel, in their separate ways, in this demonic quality.
Christmas itself, from its institution in the fourth century, engages this dialectic: it is, for
centuries, either a saturnalian harvest festival, or an embarrassingly pagan vestige which,
in various times and places, is simply outlawed. If there is consistency in the history of
Christmas, it is that its practice is inconsistent, vacillating through the centuries as a time
for abandon, or, abandonment.
Until the nineteenth century.
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IV

Besides Puritan attempts to outlaw the Christmas holiday during the Interregnum, and
occasionally in the New England colonies, there is little mention of Christmas pro or con,
literary or otherwise, until the nineteenth century9. The relative absence of Christmas
during this period, and the subsequent explosion of Christmas texts that appear around
the publication of Charles Dickens’ Christmas Carol in 1843, has led to perhaps the sole
literary critical controversy currently surrounding the holiday: the claim that Dickens
“invented” Christmas. David Parker, in his valuable study Christmas and Charles
Dickens, notes:
‘The man who invented Christmas’ is a phrase coined by F. G. Kitton, just over a
hundred years ago. It has rooted itself in Anglo-Saxon consciousness with all the
uncompromising persistence of a computer virus. There is no getting it out, it
seems, without extraordinary pains, and it is always likely to come back. (ix)
Parker himself nevertheless spends much of his book attempting to root it out, despite a
sense that it may be “effort wasted anyway” (ix). Certainly Parker’s research, which
catalogues nearly every mention of the holiday in literature from the medieval period to
the Victorian era, is no wasted effort. However, the thesis his research is made to
support, that “Dickens was inspired to write by Christmas, and that his writings inspired
others to celebrate it” (14) does not seem to stray too far from the position he wishes to
refute. Indeed, his claim that “many want to believe that Christmas, or ‘the modern
Christmas,’ or ‘Christmas as we celebrate it today,’ was brought into being with little
help, out of nothing or next to nothing, by texts Dickens wrote” (14), rather begs the
question. Who are these fanatic Dickensians who claim he created the holiday ex
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nihilo?10 Parker’s stance seems more an attempt to open up a broader discussion of
Christmas as such than a serious call to reign in idolatrous Dickensians.
Mark Connelly’s Christmas: A Social History stakes similar ground, arguing
against claims that Dickens, or the Victorians as such, ‘invented’ the holiday:
Invention just seems too strong a word, even reinvention doesn’t quite fit the case.
Perhaps rediscovery could be used, but even that fills me with reservations. It is
the argument of this book that what Christmas became in the nineteenth century
was an inflation, a beautifully augmented season, but it was not invented. (2)
Connelly goes on to make the valid point that the word “invention” is an inaccurate and
reductive term that does a “huge disservice to the legion of antiquarians, folklorists and
historians who delved through muniments, listened to tales of people across the length of
the country, piecing the history of the English Christmas together. For them research and
evidence were everything: is that invention?” (2) Connelly’s question is of course
rhetorical, but it is worth considering. If we leave aside the convenience of opposing
such a reductive term as “invention,” it remains to be asked – particularly in light of the
vehemence leveled against the term by Connelly and Parker – to what degree is
Christmas, particularly the Victorian Christmas (if we allow such a distinction) an
invention?
I will make no claims in this study for Dickens as inventor, beyond the nearuniversal acceptance of his role as an inspirer, inflator, or embellisher of the season, but I
am very interested in the “invention” of Christmas, not least because the idea is so
repellent to so many experts of the holiday. We have seen the degree to which Christmas
appears a natural phenomenon: it precedes and interpellates us in a way that we are, in a
way, made to accept it. This may in part account for the resistance of some scholars to
read the holiday as being crudely “invented.” To place Dickens in the role of inventor –
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even if only in a catchy nickname – is to place him uncomfortably above Christmas, to
reduce Christmas in a way that makes a mockery of Connelly’s “legion” of scholars who
attempt to make sense of Christmas. The binary in play here could be framed as that of
discovery vs. invention. Surely on some level scholars “invent” in the activity of
structuring their research and evidence, but only as a discovery of knowledge, of
something that exists prior to the research and evidence can that invention be said to
count. In other words, the object of inquiry needs to precede the subject – it must at least,
on some level, appear to be natural – in order for it to be worth the attention of the
subject investigating it. For Christmas scholars, Dickens must be de-emphasized. And
for Dickensians (real or imagined), Christmas must be a creation of Dickens. That no
one on either side of this argument believes in the final implication of their respective
theses (Dickens invents Christmas ex nihilo; Christmas gains nothing from Dickens’
handling of it) is beside the point: there is something, somewhere, threatening Christmas
in the term “invention.”
In describing the relative lack of reference to Christmas prior to Dickens, Parker
interestingly characterizes the agents responsible for the holiday’s seeming decline:
For a century or so before 1812, many fashionable people had been behaving as if
the more secular customs of the festival, if not the religious ones, were
anachronisms, delighted in only by the vulgar, best forgotten, and soon to
disappear. Christmas did all but disappear from the literary record during much
of the eighteenth century. By the early nineteenth, some writers were beginning
to lament its decline and predict its extinction. Others, however, continued to
rejoice in the festival, but theirs are voices posterity has overlooked or neglected.
They spoke for the unfashionable majority. Christmas had become a festival
more plebian and bourgeois than patrician. It was looked forward to eagerly and
celebrated ardently more by the have-nots than by the haves. (15)
There’s something a little Nixonian in this narrative of a silent majority of “just folks”
quietly celebrating a traditional Christmas while “fashionable” elites sniffingly dismiss it
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as a vulgar vestige. There are good guys and bad guys here, the former include “some
writers” who “lament” the decline of Christmas and keep it alive. Characterized as such,
Parker offers a holiday that exists outside of history – in a way, it fills the role of history –
which is endangered by patricians who no longer have a taste for it, and is kept alive by
the “unfashionable” (read: real) people. Christmas exists outside of the actors who
celebrate or condemn it. It is the thing, a sign we read, rather than write. Parker admits
that the evidence for this thumbnail sketch of the state of Christmas at the turn of the
nineteenth century is “elusive and not always easy to interpret” (15), and indeed, there is
quite another way to interpret this historical moment.
Stephen Nissenbaum’s seminal 1996 study, The Battle for Christmas, offers a
different spin on the narrative. While the basic actors are the same, their various motives
are read quite differently. Nissenbaum’s book largely focuses on the rise of Christmas in
the United States (in the process largely avoiding the Dickens-as-inventor controversy),
but his account of how different classes react to Christmas has interesting parallels to
Parker’s narrative. Fashionable patricians, festive plebeians, and writers lamenting the
absence of Christmas are all present. However, where Parker sees an elite that wishes to
dispose of Christmas, Nissenbaum sees an elite that wishes to re-appropriate Christmas
from an increasingly dangerous working class. In fact, Nissenbaum sees a nexus point
between the creation of a working class as such, and the point at which feasts of misrule
cease to be celebrations and become, in the eyes of the elite, threats:
…traditional Christmas misrule did not ordinarily pose a significant threat to the
social order or to the authority of the gentry class. In fact, it actually served to
reinforce the existing order of things by providing a sanctioned opportunity for
the poor to let off steam; it was a safety valve that allowed them to express
resentments in a fashion that was generally apolitical. Indeed, the form that
misrule commonly took – that of inverting the ordinary social structure rather than
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simply ignoring it – may have served to confirm the legitimacy of the status quo
[…] But this would change as paternalism itself came to wither away as a
dominant form of social relations […] In this new setting, rituals of misrule began
to assume a more clearly oppositional form […] By the early nineteenth century,
with the spread of wage labor and other modes of capitalist production in England
and the United States, what I have chosen to call the ‘battle for Christmas’ entered
an acute phase […] The turn of the nineteenth century may have marked a historic
low point in the celebration of Christmas among the elite. (51-52)
The decline of Christmas among the elite, for Nissenbaum, is not simply based on
distaste for vulgarity, but on fear of the vulgar classes. Nissenbaum goes on to note that:
By 1820 Christmas misrule had become such an acute social threat that
respectable New Yorkers could no longer ignore it or take it lightly […] By the
1820’s bands of roaming young street toughs, members of the emerging urban
proletariat, were no longer restricting their street reveling to their own
neighborhoods; they had begun to travel freely, and menacingly, wherever they
pleased. Often carousing in disguise (a holdover from the old traditions of
mumming), these street gangs marauded through the city’s wealthy
neighborhoods […making] as much noise as they could, sometimes stopping
deliberately at the houses of the rich and powerful. (54)
In both Nissenbaum’s and Parker’s accounts, there is a danger, a threat, surrounding
Christmas. For Parker, the threat is to Christmas, in that it is in danger of becoming
extinct. For Nissenbaum, the threat is from Christmas, as it is celebrated by a new,
master-less working class. In both readings, the parallactic object, Christmas, is the focal
point for social and cultural confusion. In a sense, something that has not previously
existed – an emerging urban, industrial proletariat, to use the Marxist definition – is being
accounted for by something that is already there: Christmas.
This, I think, is the heart of the “invention” controversy. The question of what is
being invented – capitalism, or Christmas? – is problematized by the parallactic nature of
the object, Christmas. Is capitalism being reified by the threat of Christmas, as
Nissenbaum suggests? Or is Christmas an agent that will reify capitalism, as is implicit
in Parker? The dialectical contradictions of Christmas begin to confuse the relationship
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between subject and object: If, as in Parker’s model, Christmas is something always
already there, waiting to be re-discovered, then Christmas itself acquires an ersatz
subjectivity in being the agent of social change. If, on the other hand, Christmas is the
catalyst for working class mayhem, then it is, on some level, a tool, an invention, of the
urban proletariat. Either model is unsatisfactory as a univocal statement on the nature of
Christmas. If Christmas precedes and interpellates us: it cannot, strictly speaking, simply
be an object of invention. If it can be invented, used, celebrated, then it is a thing, and
not a subject. Parker and Nissenbaum’s accounts on the state of Christmas at the turn of
the nineteenth century illustrate the parallactic gap that both splits and joins the
dialectical subject/object that characterizes Christmas. Whether we use Christmas or it
uses us, whether we invent it or discover it, we encounter it. It produces an uncanny
intersubjectivity.
The strangeness of this encountering is aptly illustrated by Washington Irving’s
Christmas stories from The Sketch Book (1819). These vignettes describe the visit of the
narrator to Yorkshire during the Christmas season, and his stay at Bracebridge Hall with
a country squire who, contrary to other members of the gentry, is very enthusiastic in his
celebration of Christmas, “provided every thing was done conformably to ancient usage”
(927):
Here were kept up the old games of hoodman blind, shoe the wild mare, hot
cockles, steal the white loaf, Bob apple, and snap dragon: the Yule log, and
Christmas candle, were regularly burnt, and the mistletoe, with its white berries,
hung up, to the imminent peril of all the pretty housemaids. (927)
Much of the tales are made up of detailed descriptions of these games and traditions,
often with lengthy footnotes to describe their origins, and which emphasize that they are
widely practiced in England at the present. The presence of these footnotes raises the
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question: if these Christmas customs are so ancient and yet so widely and currently
practiced, what need then is there for explanatory notes at all? One could, of course,
argue their value to an American readership that is increasingly unfamiliar with its parent
country. Or perhaps, as Nissenbaum claims, because those customs were not being
widely and currently practiced:
It is, of course, an invention – ‘the invention of tradition,’ as the historian Eric
Hobsbawm has dubbed this kind of self-conscious re-creation of old customs –
and Irving knows that. In fact, he not only knows it, he even takes pains to let us
in on the secret. The narrator’s description of the squire’s Christmas celebration
is larded with such terms as ‘odd and obsolete,’ ‘quaint,’ ‘ancient,’ even
‘eccentric,’ and in a later edition of The Sketch Book Irving admitted that at the
time he wrote the ‘Bracebridge Hall’ stories he had never actually seen the kind
of Christmas he described in it. (58)
Irving actually seems to admit this in the opening of his first Christmas tale:
Nothing in England exercises a more delightful spell over my imagination, than
the lingering of the holyday customs and rural games of former times. They
recall the pictures my fancy used to draw in the May morning of life, when as yet
I only knew the world through books, and believed it to be all the poets had
painted it; and they bring with them the flavor of those honest days of yore, in
which, perhaps with equal fallacy, I am apt to think the world was more
homebred, social, and joyous, than at present. (911)
The holiday customs, which ignite his imagination, are themselves equated with his
fancy, and seem complicit in perpetuating ideals he is aware are fallacious. The passage
subtly suggests that the “honest days of yore” not only are no more, but never were. And
yet, something in England is exercising a real spell over him. It is a fantastic recollection
which stands in for a fallen present.
For Nissenbaum, Irving’s tales are in part an attempt to bring Christmas out of the
streets – where the poor, the drunk, and the unruly encroach on middle-class decency –
and into the home, a place, incidentally, where capitalism and the accumulation of
consumer goods can thrive. The domestic idyll of Bracebridge Hall is a pastoral fantasy
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that places the working poor – and the Christmas they celebrate – within a cozy domestic
confinement that is safely contained by the genial surveillance of Squire Bracebridge.
If this is not yet the invention of a distinctly Victorian Christmas, it is certainly
the beginnings of the discovery of it. The conversation between the past over the present,
the creation of domestic space as a metonymic stand-in for the broader world, all will
become hallmarks of Victorian Christmas literature. What is missing is an element that,
if not unique to Victorian Christmas literature, is surely representative of it: the ghost.
To whatever degree we accept that Charles Dickens invents Christmas, that is to
say, the Victorian Christmas, he does so via the introduction of two figures: the figure I
call the “Christmas hater” and the ghost. These are figures, like chestnuts roasting on an
open fire, which everybody knows. Because I will treat A Christmas Carol at greater
length in the next chapter, and because A Christmas Carol is arguably the most wellknown and oft-repeated story in the English language, I will gloss the central conceit of
Dickens story: Ebenezer Scrooge, a man who hates Christmas, learns to love it through
the redeeming powers of a quartet of ghosts. Scrooge, like Hamlet – another person
made to spend time among ghosts – is difficult to see with fresh eyes: he allows even
more improbable figures like the misanthropic grotesque, the Grinch, and the capitalist
waterfowl Scrooge McDuck to enter our cultural consciousness without much notice. He
also, I suspect, excuses those people we meet who casually refer to their own loathing of
Christmas, and lets us read them as harmless cranks. We read the Christmas hater
through Scrooge: we can’t take anyone’s claim that they hate Christmas seriously,
because we have to assume that, like Scrooge, deep down, they really love it. This is in
fact one of the defining characteristics of the Christmas hater: the nominal transgression
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of hating Christmas is precisely that which places the Christmas hater in a privileged
position. Paradoxically, the Christmas hater really loves Christmas more than the rest of
us. The Christmas hater initially separates himself from Christmas only to more fully
endorse it later. One can see a similar phenomenon in the comic book character
Superman: his status as an extraterrestrial is precisely that which makes him super. He is
the best of men because he is not, strictly speaking, a man at all. And he fights for “truth,
justice, and the American Way” because he is the most illegal of possible aliens.
In this sense, Scrooge is not merely the descendent of Twelfth Night’s Malvolio.
Malvolio certainly seems to hate Christmas (and we must assume he hates it even more
by the end of the play), but his hatred does not constitute the ground of his love. The
saturnalian Lords and Ladies of Misrule cast him out of Illyria, the play, and Christmas
itself. Here is the crucial difference between the Victorian Christmas narrative and that
which precedes it: rather than expunging the alien element of Christmas as Shakespeare
and Milton do: Dickens reincorporates the alien, making him representative of that
which he had previously opposed. Previously, the Christmas parallax is perceived from
its various perspectives: Saturnalia rules the world of Twelfth Night; Christ rules that of
the “Nativity Ode.” Both perspectives require an excremental remainder to be purged
from the system, whether it be Malvolio, or the host of pagan gods Christ has come to
replace. What distinguishes the Victorian Christmas is that the remainder is reabsorbed,
because the Victorian Christmas does not view the parallactic object from a relative
stance. Rather, it creates a parallactic subject which de-relativizes Christmas, making it
truly universal. The parallactic subject makes of the parallactic object a limited whole,
which, by collapsing the boundaries between dialectical opposites, makes the object –
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Christmas – impossible to escape. The parallactic subject here is the ghost: a figure that,
like Christmas, operates within the parallax gap: neither dead nor alive, present nor
absent, the ghost is a figure of transition which, in haunting its subject into an acceptance
of its own in-betweenness, collapses the relative position of the subject it haunts. In other
words, it makes Christmas haters like Scrooge into avatars of Christmas itself. The ghost
universalizes the relative, and makes the contradictory coherent. It bridges the past and
present, and nullifies the differentiating properties of time and space. If we conceive of
the dialectic as process and evolutionary movement, the ghost – in spectrally embodying
the dialectic itself – freezes that movement, and makes, for as long as it haunts, the
immanent absolute.
The figure of the ghost can be said to be a personification of the dialectic. This
can be seen not only in the title but the method of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit,
where, insofar as the process of thought can be described, it takes on its own character,
much as Kierkegaard and Freud invest it later. Geist, in the process of differentiation
itself from pure being, becomes, as it were, a ghost. Marx, repudiating Hegelian idealism
and philosophy as such for politics and economics, nevertheless does not give up the
ghost. “A specter is haunting Europe,” The Communist Manifesto famously begins,
positioning a ghostly communism against the uncanny fetishism of commodity
capitalism. The so-called “dialectical materialism” of Marxism cannot seem to avoid the
metaphor of the ghost.
As I have already suggested, the spectral is neither idealist nor material, but
parallactic. This distinction will allow us to avoid some of the nebulousness that has
characterized theoretical engagement with the spectral over the past two decades, a
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period in which the term “hauntology” has gone from a Derridean joke to a lively branch
of post-structuralist theory. Though Derrida coined the term “hauntology” in Specters of
Marx, his interest in ghosts and haunting goes back to the mid-seventies, when he
encountered the work of the psychoanalysts Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok, who
developed a theory of trans-generational haunting in numerous essays. Abraham and
Torok’s ghost is the product of unfinished business: it is created by the incorporation of
the psychic trauma of the patient’s ancestors (Abraham and Torok’s approach is mainly
clinical). Using Hamlet as an example, Abraham and Torok point out that Hamlet’s
problems stem not from his own psychic trauma, but that of his parents. In this sense, the
ghost complicates the Freudian notion of the return of the repressed: what is repressed is
often not the subject’s own Oedipal trauma, but the “crypt” formed in the patient to make
room for the trauma of ancestors. Abraham and Torok’s ghost both is and is not “real”:
It is a fact that the ‘phantom,’ whatever its form, is nothing but an invention of the
living. Yes, an invention in the sense that the phantom is meant to objectify, even
if under the guise of individual or collective hallucinations, the gap produced in us
by the concealment of some part of a love object’s life. The phantom is therefore
also a metapsychological fact: what haunts are not the dead, but the gaps left
within us by the secrets of others. (The Shell and the Kernel, 171)
The phantom is a foreign body that fills a gap, forms a crypt within the subject, and
“works like a ventriloquist, like a stranger within the subject’s own mental topography,”
and, “by their gratiuitousness in relation to the subject, they create the impression of
surrealistic flights of fancy or of […] verbal feats” (173).
It is the “verbal feats” of the phantom that capture Derrida’s imagination. In
particular, Abraham and Torok’s The Wolf Man’s Magic Word, re-opens Freud’s famous
case study of the polyglot fetishist Sergei Pankeiev by conducting a close reading of the
multi-lingual suggestiveness of the Wolf Man’s language describing his fantasies and
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nightmares. This excites Derrida’s own penchant for multi-lingual word play. For
Abraham and Torok, the “crypt” which houses the Wolf Man’s ghosts holds the key to
interpreting the gaps in meaning in the Wolf Man’s utterances. For Derrida, this crypt
takes on a much broader significance. In his foreword to The Wolf Man’s Magic Word,
Derrida takes up the idea of the crypt, and expands it in his typically diffusive manner. If
the crypt for Abraham and Torok is the fountain from which the Wolf Man’s singular
verbal play emerges, for Derrida, it becomes the locus for the problematization of
language itself. In asking what the crypt is, Derrida suggests that if Abraham and
Torok’s conception allows us to “no longer consider the name ‘crypt’ as a metaphor in
any ordinary sense, would perhaps to be to go on – starting with psychoanalysis and,
within it, starting from a new cryptology – to an anasemic retranscription of all concepts
[…]” (xiii). In other words, the crypt can not only help the psychoanalyst to interpret
and, as it were, “decrypt” the Wolf Man’s enigmatic words, but it can disrupt our sense of
meaning for all words. Cryptology effectively becomes another word for deconstruction.
Indeed, this is how Derrida will approach the subject of ghosts in his later
writings. In The Post Card, Derrida applies his conception of trans-generational haunting
to Lacan’s Seminar on the Purloined Letter, and its inspiring text Beyond the Pleasure
Principle, meditating on them in various genres. The first half of the book is a mockepistolary novel that obsessively ruminates on a post-card that pictures Socrates writing
while Plato speaks. This disruption in chronological and philosophical order – Plato
before Socrates??? -- provides the basis for his overarching critique of psychoanalysis,
and what he sees as reductive in Lacan’s famously gnomic claim that “a letter always
reaches its destination.” Here too, the ghost who haunts is a ghost who ultimately
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subverts our sense of the order of things, problematizing textuality and language.
Lacan’s project could be reductively described as decentering the subject in showing the
primacy of the structurating effects of language and signification, which, in effect call
into question the very idea of the subject. In effect, the subject is negated in that it is
always being constructed by an always moving (in Lacan’s 1970 seminar The Other Side
of Psychoanalysis, which explores the fluid position of the “master signifier,” this
movement is literally a rotation) process of subjectivity that constitutes the symbolic
order. In short, there is no subject, but endless subjectivity. Derrida certainly sees this as
reductive, and, in a sense, this is what gives birth to “hauntology.” For Derrida, the ghost
is a figure which moves outside of both subject and subjectivity.
In a way, Derrida’s appropriation of Abraham and Torok becomes his means of
dealing with Lacan. For Derrida, the Lacanian “letter” is the tyranny of the Big Other,
and the crypt and its ghost are, in their “anasemic retranscription of all concepts” the
antidote to this tyranny. As Ruth Parkin-Gounelas observes: “Non-present presence, preoriginary anteriority: in the spectre’s defiance of space and time, Derrida finds the
embodiment of his most consistent project, the deconstruction of the metaphysical desire
for presence and origin” (Ghosts: Deconstruction, Psychoanalysis, History 128). The
Lacanian master signifier is the very presence of that desire which so disturbs Derrida,
and constitutes the opposition he sets up between himself and Lacan throughout The Post
Card.
So, if Derrida is the touchstone of hauntology, he himself, in defining his notions
of spectrality around those of others, sets up other possible hauntologies. We have
Derrida vs. Abraham and Torok, and, of course, Derrida vs. Lacan. Colin Davis, in his
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study Haunted Subjects: Deconstructions, Psychoanalysis and the Return of the Dead,
outlines the theoretical boundaries of hauntology, and clearly marks the distinction
between Derridean spectrality, and that outlined by Abraham and Torok. For Abraham
and Torok, and for psychoanalysis in general, ghosts are insidious things, which can and
should be exorcised:
From its origins in the texts and the practice of Freud, psychoanalysis had been
directly concerned with haunting and the uncanny, with the ways in which we
continue to relate to the dead, and with our hidden endeavours, in love or in hate
or both, to preserve or to kill off the traces of past generations. Abraham and
Torok’s distinctive contribution to the understanding of psychoanalytic haunting
lies in their conception of the phantom as the traumatic remnant of an ancestor
about whom we may know nothing, and who survives in us because of unatoned
crimes which are not our own. It is not the repressed which returns to wreck our
lives, but the shame of others. And Abraham and Torok also give back to
psychoanalysis the positivist ambition which Freud entrusted to it from the
beginning, but which his own case studies only indecisively justify: the truth can
be known, and we will be better for knowing it; moreover it is possible to cast off
the bitter legacy of the dead in order to learn to live with them in love rather than
pain. (82-3)
But if Abraham and Torok’s ghosts can be de-crypted and exorcised, Derrida is interested
in doing neither. His aim “is not to reveal to the content of the ghost’s secret; rather, he
aspires to learn to attend to its mystery, to hear within it the rumbling of what has yet to
be understood” (88). Instead of dismissing the ghost, Derrida
[…] wants to allow the ghost to return, both as a legacy from the past which has
yet to be settled and as the promise of a future which remains to be conceived.
Abraham and Torok’s ghosts are liars to be denounced; Derrida’s ghosts cannot
lie because they cannot tell the truth, but they may be the mediators of new forms
of knowledge. To put it schematically, deconstruction is about learning to live
with ghosts, psychoanalysis is about learning to live without them. (88-9)
Hauntology, then, is split between two approaches, which, while intimately related, can
also seem mutually exclusive.
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As I suggested at the outset, Žižek’s theory of the parallax gap offers a third way
to theorize the spectral, which, while blending psychoanalytic and deconstructive
approaches, avoids the limitations of both Abraham and Torok’s clinical model, and
Derrida’s more abstract conception. If Abraham and Torok devise a theory largely
motivated and structured around the individual, and Derrida’s ghost operates as a kind of
metaphysical universal, the parallactic ghost inhabits a middle ground: neither universal
nor individual, it is itself the exception of the universal that offers the very short circuit
through which to read the universal. In short, the parallactic ghost is a specifically
cultural ghost, defined by the specific oppositions that create it, subjectivize it, and cause
it to objectify the subjective perspectives that engendered it. It is as tautological as the
Derridean ghost, yet it more directly reflects the environment that it haunts. More, the
universal exceptionalism of the parallactic ghost – the gap in the whole which, precisely
because of its negative relation to the whole, is in a unique position to define it – helps to
define the revolutionary shift in the meaning of Christmas in the nineteenth century. It is
the Victorian Christmas Ghost who, through the literature it haunts, defines the Victorian
Christmas we continue to celebrate today. If Christmas previously was a site that
expelled the objet petit a, or, if you will, exorcized its ghosts, the Victorian Christmas
incorporates the objet petit a, making the ghost the ideological spokes-ding of Christmas.
It is a Christmas composed in equal measures of joy and dread, anxiety and comfort: a
schizoid holiday which universalizes and univocalizes the revolutionary multiplicity of a
culture confronted with the specters of industrial capitalism, Darwinian evolution, and
innumerable social forces and fractures which repeat and resonate into our postmodern
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present. Christmas, in its Victorian formulation, becomes an ideological cultural
juggernaut: inescapable, and, in the Deleuzean sense, always reterritorializing.
In the chapters that follow, I will examine in more detail the cultural and
ideological implications of Victorian Christmas narratives and their ghosts, and how they
react to the social forces and pressures of the time, homogenizing them into something
we might call coherently Victorian. Each chapter will focus on a specific social problem
and its oblique refraction through the Christmas literature that addresses that issue. In
Chapter One, I will focus on the “inventor” of the Victorian Christmas, Charles Dickens,
and that inaugural, perennial text, A Christmas Carol. Here, I will explore how Dickens
created a new type of ghost, one that, in using Christmas to reconcile the contradictions
and horrors of industrial capitalism, revolutionized Christmas itself: transforming it from
a localized seasonal holiday to a universal commandment to “Enjoy!”
In Chapter Two, I will examine some of the results of this commandment, and the
price to be paid for living under a cultural injunction to be happy. The fluid dialectic
between joy and mourning, and its ghostly character will be explored in Christmas
literature that is suffused with uncertainty and anxiety both personal and social.
Christmas, precisely because of its universalizing pressure to enjoy, becomes a site of
mourning that makes the personal social and vice versa. It also becomes a site of dealing
with the disturbing implications of Darwinian evolution. The psychological landscape of
Christmas, in texts like Tennyson’s In Memoriam, comes to mirror the anarchic flux of
geological time.
In Chapter Three, I will explore the relationship between Christmas and one of the
more ubiquitous social issues of the Victorian period: “the woman question.” I will show
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how the universalizing tendencies of the Victorian Christmas collide with the
universalizing abstractions of femininity. If narrativized Christmas is a site of parallax
and spectrality, so is the narrativized woman: a ghostly exception with the uncanny
power to become indeterminately universal.
Chapter Four will consider the primary beneficiaries and nominal raison d’etre of
Christmas: children. If the Victorian period can be said to have contributed to the
invention of the idea of children, it also notoriously abused them. This distinction will be
shown to be less oppositional than it seems: the sinister side of Christmas ghosts will be
most evident in this chapter.
The reader will perhaps already discern an Oedipal frame determining these
chapters. This is not an accident. In both the Freudian and Deleuzean sense, the Oedipal
triad is the molecular structural unit of society. Even Margaret Thatcher’s notorious
claim that “there is no such thing as society” made due allowance for the existence of
families. As Hegel points out in The Philosophy of Objective Spirit:
The proper beginning and original foundation of states has rightly been equated
with the introduction of agriculture and of marriage […] This is accompanied by
the restriction of sexual love to marriage, and the marriage bond is in turn
extended to become a lasting and inherently universal union, while need becomes
care for the family and possession becomes family property. (203.a)
Leaving aside the contentious nature of Thatcher’s position (to say nothing of Freud or
Deleuze’s), the idea that the Oedipal structuration of the family unit not only is the
catalyst of civilization, and what we might go further to call culture and society, but the
mechanism which keeps it in operation, is perhaps the most parallactic, ghostly idea of
all. The family, Freud and Deleuze might both claim, albeit from different positions, is
where repetition starts. If anything can be said to be always already there, it is the family.
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It’s probably no accident that Freud is the primary theorist of both the family and the
ghost, for from the psychoanalytic perspective, they operate along very similar lines. If
generations of theorists keep returning to Freud – like Deleuze, promising nominal
attempts to bury him – it is because he has become akin to that primordial murdered
father from Totem and Taboo: an inescapable reference point whose fate is to haunt into
perpetuity. Perhaps that’s why, when we speak about Freud or ghosts, our initial impulse
is to rid ourselves of them. Are there two words with more power to arouse skepticism
when mentioned than “Freud” or “ghost”? As signifiers, they exist as spirits that, as we
consistently claim to disbelieve them, attest to our need to be exorcized of them.
Conversely, when we speak of family or Christmas, our impulse is hold onto them, to
pretend they are forever. Are there two words with more power to make us forget about
ideas like ‘structuration’ or ‘ideology’ than ‘family’ or ‘Christmas’? Yet is there a
greater, more uncanny shame than the secret wish we sometimes have to be rid of them
as well?
At its heart, it is our tendency to believe, and disbelieve, that is at issue here.
More importantly, the question of what makes us believe and disbelieve, and what makes
us desire to do so, is the fundamental impulse of this inquiry. The paradoxical sense that
we may not want to believe in what we profess to believe, and vice versa, is a question
that, I think, goes beyond purely ideological considerations and perhaps even
psychoanalysis. It is a question of hauntology.
If “family” often seems to be the Lacanian “master signifier” – the transcendent
sign which puts all others in their place, it is also, like Scrooge, decorated trees, carols,
cards, and Santa Claus, one of a multitude of Christmas memes that, though only a part of
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what we call Christmas, effectively define it. What is of interest here is how these
singularities come to define the universal, and how literature played a part in creating that
parallactic shift from exception to whole, from object to subject. If Christmas to date has
received little attention of this kind, it is perhaps because its claims to universality have
been appealingly cloaked in a charming package of exception, asking us only to enjoy it.
But Christmas, like family, has become an elementary structure, one so constitutive of
our reality that it seems hardly worth mentioning as an object of study. We already know
it. It is the hope of this study that taking a closer look at the familiar ghosts of Christmas
past will let us know differently, perhaps disturbingly, what we have for too long known
all along.
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1

See in particular: Nina Auerbach, Woman and the Demon.
The film is filled with silent-movie era in-camera special effects which, while not
Victorian themselves, draw attention to the movie’s manufactured ‘old-fashionedness.’
Much as many of the BBC adaptations of Jane Austen are often mistaken as “Victorian”
– in part because they often knowingly replace Regency fashions with Victorian ones,
postmodern visual culture seems to create a vortex of representation in which
neighboring periods are sucked into a cultural imaginary which denominates the
Romantics and Edwardians as generally “Victorian.”
3
Lacan’s reading of Antigone from The Ethics of Psychoanalysis is among the most
accessible and compelling in his body of work. Lacan anticipates not only hauntology,
but Giorgio Agamben’s related concept of homo sacer, and Alain Badieu’s theory of
Event in defining the axis point where Antigone’s peculiar power resides: at the point that
she removes herself from the symbolic order that Creon oversees, and symbolizes her
own death. Antigone is actualized, becomes potent, at the moment of her greatest selfvictimization:
[…] the moment she crosses the zone between life and death, that is to say, when
what she has already affirmed herself to be takes outward form. She has been
telling us for a long time that she is in the kingdom of the dead, but at this point
the idea is consecrated. Her punishment will consist in her being shut up or
suspended in the zone between life and death. Although she is not yet dead, she is
eliminated from the world of the living. (280)
Antigone makes herself a ghost: first she makes herself a corpse, and then she invests that
corpse with the meaning of her life. She turns herself into a subjectivized object in the
space between two deaths.
4
It poses a real challenge to the imagination to visualize a hypothetical commuter
emerging from either end of the tunnel transformed by these messages: is it even possible
for a New Jersey Christian to enter Manhattan a liberated atheist, or vice versa? One is
led to the disturbing prospect of a round-trip producing a harrowing existential whipsaw
of Christian-atheist-Christian to the most susceptible motorists.
5
This dubious genre seems to have gained its legs in the mid-nineties, with movies like
Jingle All the Way, and the more reputable Home for the Holidays. Deck the Halls and
Christmas with the Kranks are more recent examples. These movies tend to ostensibly
critique the consumer culture of the holiday, to the point of drawing the celebration of
Christmas itself into question, but invariably retreat to a final position that reifies the
“real” spirit of Christmas by the final reel. I am indebted to my colleague Eric Dunnum –
who shamelessly expressed a real regard for Christmas with the Kranks – for this
observation.
6
The sense of loneliness that pervades “Rudolph” struck me while watching it alone in a
hotel in Bruges on Christmas Eve, after flipping away from a documentary on the suicide
of Kurt Cobain. To be fair, such circumstances could suggest the downbeat in nearly any
text. Still, the trauma of Rudolph’s solitary bildungsroman, his encounter with the
forsaken souls of the Island of Lost Toys, and the background of an ailing and
ineffectual Santa Claus (a major theme in these Rankin Bass productions), validate, I
think, my reading.
2
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‘The Year Without a Santa Claus’ is less well known, but just as interesting. It
involves a kind of cosmological battle that arises between two sinister forces of nature,
the Heat Miser and his brother the Snow Miser, in the midst of a power vacuum left by
the absence of Santa Claus. Santa, of course, eventually affects a compromise between
the two parties, illustrating, as usual, the universalizing powers of Christmas.
The Cold War background of these programs is hard to miss, though it really
comes to the fore in one of the bleakest, if not the bleakest, Christmas specials ever
produced: 1964’s Rod Serling scripted ‘Carol for Another Christmas,’ an explicitly antiwar reading of A Christmas Carol that features a post-nuclear landscape as the setting for
Christmas Future.
7
Derrida makes much of Freud’s devil in The Post Card. He rightfully sees this devil as
akin to the sense of the diabolic which Freud theorizes in Das Unheimliche, and reads
him as a kind of ghost:
[…] the devil comes back [revient] in a mode which is neither that of an
imaginary representation (of an imaginary double), nor that of an apparition in
person. His way of coming back [revenance] defies such a distinction or
opposition. Everything occurs and proceeds as if the devil ‘in person’ came back
[revenait] in order to double his double. So, as a doubling doubling his double,
the devil overflows his double at the moment when he is nothing but his double,
the double of his double that produces the ‘unheimlich’ effect. (270)
In spite of some of the near-self-parodying Derridese, there is an exhilarating sense of the
indeterminate in these lines. However, since my purpose is to attempt a determination in
spite of indeterminacy, I break with Derrida in his claim that this ‘revenance’ lies outside
the opposition he poses: the numerous examples of Christmas ‘devils’ we will meet in
these pages refutes, I think, the idea that this conceptual ghost receives no imaginary
representation. Whether or not these representations appear ‘in person’ I leave to each
reader’s discernment as to the ‘reality’ of literary characters.
8
Historical information on this period is drawn from Bruce David Forbes’ Christmas: A
Candid History. Berkeley: UC Berkeley P, 2007.
9
Significant exceptions include Joseph Addison’s Spectator essay of 1712, “Christmas
with Sir Roger,” and Sir Walter Scott’s 1808 poem Marmion, both of which highlight
seasonal festivity.
10
Parker cites Peter Ackroyd’s 1990 biography as an offender. Ackroyd does use the
phrase (34), but in the context of describing how Dickens celebrated the holiday as a
youth, prior to writing the Carol. This in itself would seem to belie the extremism Parker
accords him. Les Standiford’s 2008 book, The Man Who Invented Christmas also is
clearly not shy of using the phrase, but his measured history is, despite a few
understandable lapses into hyperbole, arguably less Dickens-centric in its examination of
Christmas than Parker’s.
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Chapter One:
A Christmas Card Always Reaches Its Destination

But the flock sat on, divinely flustered,
Sniffing, methought, its dew of Hermon
With such content in every snuffle,
As the devil inside us loves to ruffle.
--Robert Browning, Christmas Eve

I
In late 1843, during the period Charles Dickens composed his Christmas Carol, Sir
Henry Cole, a successful businessman, inventor, and writer, was faced with a problem:
too many people to send Christmas greetings to, and not enough time to do so. Cole was
a man of unusual energy and accomplishment in a diverse field of endeavor, and in that
respect, can be considered a typical Victorian gentleman. As well as writing a series of
popular children’s books, designing the first postage stamp, and founding what would
become the Victoria and Albert Museum, Cole served as the first General Superintendent
of the Department of Practical Art, a tentacle of the burgeoning Victorian bureaucracy
Dickens would come to satirize in his later novels. Cole is most remembered, however,
for the creation of one of the most successful examples of practical art, the Christmas
card.
The creation of the Christmas card was occasioned by the same factors that have
sustained its popularity to the present day: the lack of time to communicate with friends,
family, and business associates during the holiday season. In order to keep up with his
social obligations, Cole made the principals of Victorian industrial capitalism work for
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him. He commissioned the London illustrator John Calcott Horsley to design and print
one thousand lithographed cards,1 enough to fill Cole’s needs, and to sell a large quantity
of remainders at one shilling each. Cole and Horsley’s Christmas card illustrates how art
and industry can work hand in hand: as both a cultural milestone and shrewd business
move, the card immediately inscribed Cole’s family, friends, and associates within a
narrative of Christmas pleasure that interpreted and narrativized Cole’s role as a
capitalist, while simultaneously increasing his capital.2 In this sense, the first Christmas
card can be seen as both a cultural artifact and an economic engine – factory and fabric.
The card’s compact yet complex visual field speaks to its recipients as both
private citizens and social subjects. In the center of the card, a middle-class family
presides over a table well stocked with food and drink. A formidable brood of children
dig in -- oblivious to the audience they have been drawn for, while a genial, balding
patriarch and his modest, smiling wife raise their glasses to the spectator. Their inviting
gaze is corroborated by a sign beneath them, proclaiming, “A Merry Christmas and A
Happy New Year to You.” The family portrait is flanked by images of a young man
bringing food to the poor, and a young woman clothing a destitute woman and her infant.
The effect of the whole suggests a secularized mediaeval triptych, as well as a compact,
yet broad visual call to enjoyment of the comforts of family, with an eye towards social
justice. The visual field of the card achieves a kind of spectatorial suture within its text:
present in the direct gaze of the father and mother, as well as in the specific-yetgeneralized appeal to “You” in the verbal content, is an invitation to intimacy. This
appeal is nevertheless belied by the blank lines after the words “To” and “From,” in
which the direct addressees of this mass produced artifact are, in effect, addressed as a
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mass. The card is therefore both public and private, and acquires a curious power in its
multivalent form of address. It seems likely – or at least, it is pleasant to imagine – that at
least one person celebrating Christmas in London in 1843 was in possession of both Cole
and Horsley’s Christmas card, and Charles Dickens’ newest literary production, A
Christmas Carol. Dickens’ book went on sale for five shillings; add to that the shilling
for the card, and the total cost would equate to roughly fifteen dollars today – certainly
enough to merit some reflection on the nature and use of these new productions. Our
hypothetical Victorian consumer might find in these texts occasion to muse on their
novelty in a manner quite different from consumers of today, who are part of a culture
that circulates 1.9 billion cards a year in the U.S. alone,3 and can expect new adaptations
and permutations of Dickens’ Carol yearly.
One strange quality our Victorian consumer might note in contemplating the first
Christmas card and the first edition of A Christmas Carol is the fact that both texts
purport to be something they are not. A Christmas card is by its very nature a substitute
for normal correspondence. It exists because it is not the letter it would have been had
the sender the time to write it as such. It can be defined by the fact that it is different
from a letter. It is tacitly understood today that the arrival of a Christmas card by a loved
one, or by someone we do business with (or from someone who would like our business)
is something that is simultaneously being received by someone else. Again, given the
normative role Christmas cards play in current holiday discourse, this is a fact that is
rarely elaborated upon. But for a recipient of the first Christmas card, one can imagine
that in seeing their name written on a blank line, overshadowed by the official “To” of
the printer’s ink, an uncanny sense of plurality, of multiplicity, descend upon her: this
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Figure 5: The first Christmas Card. Sir Henry Cole and John Calcott Horsley
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“letter” which speaks directly to me, which has been delivered to my home, is also
speaking to someone else, perhaps many others. The Christmas card makes explicit
what is implicit in the genre of the letter: this two-way circuit of communication between
us, this private intercourse, is being monitored – it has an audience which we are a part
of, but cannot see in its entirety, and do not, finally, know. As a letter that is also not a
letter – the agent of an apparently dialogic communication that is in actuality a mass
communication, the Christmas card occupies a cultural space that is both intimate and
diffuse. In proliferating its message, the suggestion to “Have a Merry Christmas”
becomes more of a command.
This is the conceit Dickens’ adopts in A Christmas Carol, both in its title, and in
the rhetorical moves of its narrator. Dickens offers this song in prose, with chapters that
call themselves staves, to an audience he seems to address personally. By the third
paragraph of the first stave of the book, liberal use has been made of the first and second
personal pronouns, a playful “To” and “From” that is unique to Dickens’ fiction, and, just
as the Cole/Horsley Christmas card seems to expand the audience of the letter, the Carol
seems to rhetorically contract the audience of the novel. The genre of the Carol is indeed
unusual for Dickens. He had written five and a half novels and innumerable stories and
sketches when he began the work, but the Carol itself was the first of what might
unsatisfactorily be called a “novella,” and he would only use the form four more times in
his career, all of which were Christmas books modeled to greater or lesser degrees on the
Carol. In calling the book, as a whole and in its parts, something it was not, Dickens
seems to be calling attention to the uniqueness – formally and stylistically – of its
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production. Like the Christmas card, A Christmas Carol achieves a polyvocal effect that,
in demanding intimacy and generality, makes of its appeal a kind of injunction.
If the structures of these texts seem to announce something strange and
contradictory, something new in the history of literary production, their narratives seem
also to advance meanings that are paradoxical and unsettling. If A Christmas Carol
explicitly raises “the Ghost of an Idea,” as Dickens’ has it in his Preface, that ghost seems
uncannily, simultaneously present in the first Christmas card as well. Let us consider
again Horsley’s triptych, with its drowsily contented family seated at a table of plenty, so
satiated they seem ready to burst out of a frame that surrounds them with images of
poverty and want. The idea of feeding and clothing the poor, while not one that is
mutually exclusive to a holiday family feast, does seem oddly juxtaposed here. The
cramped, brimming frame which seats the family is visually at odds with the austere
action transpiring about it. The family itself is oblivious to the good deeds going on
around them, almost defiantly so, given the way the mother and father address the
spectator. What is to be made of these seemingly contradictory messages? Are we to
feast with our family, or help those in need? Are we to be grateful for the blessings of the
season, or concerned with the suffering that blights it? The card does offer an answer to
these questions: Have a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year.
It is difficult to define, given the nature of the card, who precisely is delivering
this injunction to happiness. It might be Sir Henry Cole, though the fact that a number of
the cards were sold to other senders makes this less than definitive. It could be Horsley,
though his service at Cole’s behest makes his claim less than authoritative. We could go
by whatever name is printed in the line following “From,” though for reasons explored
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above, the sender, like the addressee, becomes less than fixed when multiplied. Perhaps
the greatest claim to authorship of the command to have a Merry Christmas is the blank
line itself. After all, if anyone can write one’s name in the blank, isn’t the blank itself the
more authoritative statement – the one that universalizes and transcends the hypothetical,
hand-written name it will couch? The line and the blank remain stable, while any name
could potentially fill the blank. The authority resides in the possibility of writing, rather
than the contingent writing that will ultimately fill the void. In this blank line we
discover another paradox of narrative: an author who is not an author, a sender who is not
a sender, a presence/absence. It is, in a Derridean sense, “not a living individual, not, as
one says, a real subject, but a specter…” (Specters 146). A ghost, then, offering a “Ghost
of an Idea.”
Readers of Lacan, particularly his “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter,” will likely
already have in mind a culprit for this ghost that marks its presence by way of absence;
namely: the floating signifier that, like Poe’s letter, hides in plain sight, and through its
potential power (readers of the story, as well as Lacan’s essay will be reminded that the
use of the information in the letter would nullify its power as a tool for blackmail) works,
as agent of the “symbolic order which is constitutive of the subject” (Ecrits 7) to inscribe
the subject into its discourse. In hauntological terms, the signifier is the ghost that haunts
the subject. As Lacan himself says, it “possesses” the subject.4 This possession is,
paradoxically, due to the lack of the signifier: it is, like Bunuel’s Obscure Object of
Desire, shifting, protean, unattainable:
For the signifier is a unique unit of being which, by its very nature, is the symbol
of but an absence. This is why we cannot say of the purloined letter that, like
other objects, it must be or not be somewhere but rather that, unlike them, it will
be and will not be where it is wherever it goes. (Ecrits 17)
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Both there and not there, it is what you want, but cannot have: its movement, like Poe’s
letter, always announces its absence to those who seek it. This is the objet petit a that
takes its subjects down an intersubjective train towards the transcendental signifier, The
Real, the ultimate lack.5 Lacan tells us: “a letter always arrives at its destination” (30) –
the symbolic always points to The Real: “the letter exists as a means of power only
through the final summons of the pure signifier” (23). And just as repetition compulsion
and the return of the repressed lead Freud to the death drive, so does Lacan’s analysis –
itself an attempt to visualize and narrativize Freud’s theory from Beyond the Pleasure
Principle. It shows us that the contingencies of the signifier lead us to the necessity of
the pure signifier, in other words, Death:
…my aim is not to confuse letter with spirit [esprit], even when we receive the
former by pneumatic dispatch, and that I readily admit that one kills if the other
gives life, insofar as the signifier – you are perhaps beginning to catch my drift –
materializes the instance of death. (Ecrits 16)
Lacan’s coyness hides in plain side the ominous (spooky?) message of the letter: it makes
real the presence of Death.6 This is, I will argue, the rhetorical thrust of the ghosts in the
chain of inter-spectral discourse in A Christmas Carol, and it underlies even the
injunction to enjoy that constitutes the Christmas Card: hiding in plain sight around the
table of plenty are the ragged and the poor, the figures of Ignorance and Want that spell,
according to The Ghost of Christmas Present: Doom. As Lacan shows in the Seminar,
the threat of death is part of what constitutes the power of the signifier. Lacan imagines a
plaintive question asked directly to the signifier:
‘What are you, figure of the dice I roll in your chance encounter (tyche) with my
fortune? Nothing, if not the presence of death that makes human life into a
reprieve obtained from morning to morning in the name of significations of which
your sign is the shepherd’s crook. Thus did Scheherazade for a thousand and one
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nights, and thus have I done…experiencing the ascendancy of this sign at the cost
of a dizzying series of loaded tosses in the game of even or odd.’ (28-9)7
In the case of the purloined letter, the signifier has the power to blackmail those in its
path. It becomes, as Lacan suggests, their fate. In the case of Christmas ghosts, their
reminders of death – their very being as revenants of death – serve to reify Christmas
itself, to make it the fate of those they haunt. They make, in other words, a necessity of
Christmas. They make sure that we follow the command on the card: Have a Merry
Christmas.

II

Jacques Derrida begins his appraisal of the legacy of Marxism, Specters of Marx, with
another ghost of an idea: “Someone, you or me, comes forward and says: I would like to
learn to live finally” (xvi). This hypothetical subject could well be Ebenezer Scrooge,
chastened by his long dark night of the soul, exhorting the Ghost of Christmas Yet To
Come: “I will live in the Past, the Present, and the Future. The Spirits of all Three shall
strive within me. I will not shut out the lessons that they teach” (117). Thus, the climax
of A Christmas Carol centers around a man who has, finally, learned to live. But, as both
Dickens and Derrida realize, the idea of “learning to live” is a problematic one:
But to learn to live, to learn it from oneself and by oneself, all alone, to teach
oneself to live (‘I would like to learn to live finally’), is that not impossible for a
living being? Is it not what logic itself forbids? To live, by definition, is not
something one learns. Not from oneself, it is not learned from life, taught by life.
Only from the other and by death. In any case from the other at the edge of life.
At the internal border or the external border, it is a heterodidactics between life
and death. (xvii)
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In other words, the finality of living, or the notion of living as an event, is necessarily
absent from the process of living. Within this dialectic resides the Derridean theory of
the ghost, and with a similar sense of paradox does Dickens raise the narrative of the
ghost in order to give a man the ability to “learn to live.” As Scrooge seems to recognize,
such learning is impossible without ghosts: it is their lessons, and their ability to give
Scrooge the semblance of a life lived multiply and simultaneously – “in the Past, the
Present, and the Future” all in the same night – that allows Scrooge to learn the meaning
of his life, and to enjoy it. Part of this paradox is that Scrooge will cease to be simply a
man once he has learned the meaning of his life and of Christmas (one and the same
thing, it turns out diegetically and heterodiegetically, in both the narrative of the Carol
and in its cultural afterlife, Scrooge will become practically synonymous with Christmas
itself): he will live with the Spirits striving within him; he will, in part, become a ghost.
It is precisely when the Ghosts cease to haunt him that Scrooge “becomes” Christmas: the
haunting really begins when the haunting ends. Dickens’ ghosts, like Derrida’s Specters
of Marx, are ontologically figures of repetition. The Ghost “begins by coming back”
(11).
This fundamental principle of “hauntology” is apparent in the first sentence of A
Christmas Carol: “Marley was dead: to begin with” (39). In both narrative and
grammatical senses, Dickens presents a man’s end as textual beginning: what begins is
what has already happened, and what has already occurred is a death. And Dickens
continues to press this point in the next three paragraphs of the text:
The register of his burial was signed by the clergyman, the clerk, the undertaker,
and the chief mourner…Old Marley was as dead as a door-nail…Mind! I don’t
mean to say that I know, of my own knowledge, what there is particularly dead
about a door-nail…But the wisdom of our ancestors is in the simile; and my

73
unhallowed hands shall not disturb it, or the Country’s done for. You will
therefore permit me to repeat, emphatically, that Marley was as dead as a doornail…Scrooge knew he was dead? Of course he did…There is no doubt that
Marley was dead. This must be distinctly understood, or nothing wonderful can
come from the story I am going to relate. (39)
Dickens’ epistemological concerns in this passage, conveying a humorous obsession with
relating the knowledge that Marley is indeed dead, and thus able to be a ghost, and
therefore not, strictly speaking, dead, illustrates the paradoxical ontology of the ghost as
both a liminal and repetitious figure. Syntactically and semantically, Derrida echoes
Dickens’ famous opening with his own account of the ontology of the ghost:
Repetition and first time, but also repetition and last time, since the singularity of
any first time, makes of it also a last time. Each time it is the event itself, a first
time is a last time. Altogether other. Staging for the end of history. Let us call it
a hauntology. (10)
Repetition enacts a crisis between process and event which acts as an invitation to a
haunting, an invocation of the ghost.
Both texts also begin by invoking the most prestigious of English literary ghosts:
Hamlet’s Father. “If we were not perfectly convinced that Hamlet’s Father died before
the play began,” Dickens tells us:
…there would be nothing more remarkable in his taking a stroll at night, in an
easterly wind, upon his own ramparts, than there would be in any other middleaged gentleman rashly turning out after dark in a breezy spot – say St. Paul’s
Churchyard for instance – literally to astonish his son’s weak mind (39-40).
This is a more conversational way of stating, as Derrida does, that “Hamlet already began
with the expected return of the dead King. After the end of history, the spirit comes by
coming back…it figures both a dead man who comes back and a ghost whose expected
return repeats itself, again and again” (10). Dickens and Derrida are both, of course,
using the ghost of Hamlet’s Father to validate ghosts of their own. Derrida’s post-
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Communist specters of Marx, and Dickens’ ghosts of Christmas, as disparate as they may
seem, both suggest alternative ways of speaking, seeing and knowing within the
triumphal discourse of capitalism. Dickens’ statement, however joking, of the threat that
“the Country’s done,” his image of St. Paul’s Churchyard – a London cemetery that,
given the iconography of St. Paul’s to Dickens’ London, could be read as London as
Cemetery -- suggest an implicit fear of that capitalism, and its systematic destruction of
the pre-industrial England that figures as an Eden in so much of his work. For characters
like Scrooge to deal with, to learn from, the horrors of a capitalist present that has
banished an edenic past and points to an uncertain future, Dickens must bring into play
ghosts that can refigure space and time itself, that both repeat cyclically yet possess the
singularity of a linear event. Like Hamlet’s Father, the ghosts of Christmas return from
an idealized past to make right a rotten state. Derrida’s epigram from Hamlet that opens
Specters of Marx: “The time is out of joint,” could be equally applicable to A Christmas
Carol. Like the ghost of Hamlet’s Father, Dickens’ Christmas ghosts complicate the
linear experience of time to expose a fallen present, as well as point to an end, a finality
of living.
Of course, the appearance of a ghost immediately constitutes a disruption in the
linearity of time. The mere presence of the ghost as revenant announces a past that is not
past, a past that exists uncannily, simultaneously alongside the present. A ghost
existentially demonstrates William Faulkner’s famous claim that “The past is never dead.
It’s not even past.”8 Faulkner’s statement is itself hauntological: the first sentence
suggests an eternal past, the existence of which is positively enunciated by its
transcendence of time itself, while the second sentence negates the idea of the past
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entirely. The meaning of these contradictory statements, of course, lies in the spectral
gap which occupies the space between the two: the past, as eternally present and nonexistent is, then, present/absent, dead/alive – undead.9
The first of the ghosts to haunt Scrooge, that of the seven years dead Jacob
Marley, is an embodiment of this spectral paradox. He appears to Scrooge as a fixed,
even constrained being, composed of constrictive verbs and heavy nouns: tightly fitted in
“his pig-tail, tights, and boots,” and wrapped in a chain “clasped” and “wound” about
him, made of “cash-boxes, keys, padlocks, ledgers, deeds, and heavy purses wrought in
steel” (51). Yet he is also transparent (51), can fly (57), and can transpose his visage at
will onto door knockers (48), and multiply it with ease onto every tile on Scrooge’s
fireplace (50). He is both “captive, bound, and double-ironed” and “travelling all the
time” (55). He is, one might say, the most stereotypically ghost-like of the spirits that
haunt Scrooge. Indeed, before Marley introduces himself to Scrooge, Scrooge hears his
chains rattling, and recalls that “ghosts in haunted houses were described as dragging
chains” (50). This ghost, at least, is to Scrooge already present before his arrival as a
cultural trope.
Marley is also quintessentially ghost-like in his role as a frightener, in adopting
the most traditional job of the ghost as one that scares the living. Unlike the Ghosts of
Christmas Past and Present, Marley’s Ghost is a figure of fear and dread. While his
immediate ghostly successors routinely deal in irony with the ironic Scrooge, Marley will
have none of it. When Scrooge protests that Marley is merely a figment of his own
distempered imagination, calling him – in Scrooge’s most famous repetition – a
“humbug,” Marley raises “a frightful cry,” and shakes his chain “with such a dismal and
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appalling noise,” that Scrooge cringes in terror (54). It is in this respect – as a Christmas
spirit, sent literally to scare the Hell out of its haunted subject – that Marley suggests the
most intriguing paradox of A Christmas Carol, indeed, of Christmas itself.
For Marley’s Ghost is both an emissary for Christmas, and from Hell. As Marley
himself makes clear, his is a damned spirit: “‘doomed to wander through the world – oh,
woe is me! – and witness what it cannot share, but might have shared on earth, and turned
to happiness!’” (54). Dickens’ cosmology here is an earthly one, as we will see, where
the spiritual is largely adjunct to the material, but Marley’s condition is unmistakable, for
he, like Milton’s Satan, brings Hell with him.10 As Marley departs, Scrooge is witness to
a remarkable vision, often absent from most adaptations of the Carol:
The air was filled with phantoms, wandering hither and thither in restless haste,
and moaning as they went. Every one of them wore chains like Marley’s Ghost;
some few (they might be guilty governments) were linked together; none were
free. Many had been personally known to Scrooge in their lives. He had been
quite familiar with one old ghost, in a white waistcoat, with a monstrous iron safe
attached to its ancle, who cried piteously at being unable to assist a wretched
woman with an infant, whom it saw below, upon a door-step. The misery with
them all was, clearly, that they sought to interfere, for good, in human matters,
and had lost the power forever. (57-9)
John Leech’s illustration of this scene, which accompanied the first edition, dramatically
renders the phantoms in Gothic chiaroscuro. The spirits have contorted, grotesque faces,
and are accompanied by a pointy-eared demon – not mentioned in the text – who laughs
at the spirits’ misery. The poor woman and her infant crouch in the lower right corner of
the illustration, completing the hell-scape, their pose an uncanny mirror of the woman
and child from Horsley and Cole’s Christmas Card, though here unaided by friendly
spirits. The message of Dickens’ and Leech’s earthly Inferno is clear: Hell is being
unable to help others, specifically the poor.
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Figure 6: John Leech Illustration from the 1st edition of A Christmas Carol.
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And yet, like Horsley and Cole’s Christmas Card, helping the poor is central to
the meaning of Christmas. This Marley makes explicit:
‘Mankind was my business. The common welfare was my business; charity,
mercy, forbearance, and benevolence, were, all, my business. The dealings of my
trade were but a drop of water in the comprehensive ocean of my business!’
It held up its chain at arm’s length, as if that were the cause of all its
unavailing grief, and flung it heavily upon the ground again.
‘At this time of the rolling year,’ the spectre said, ‘I suffer most. Why did
I walk through crowds of fellow-beings with my eyes turned down, and never
raise them to that blessed Star which led the Wise Men to a poor abode? Were
there no poor homes to which its light would have conducted me!’ (56)
Here, from the perspective of the damned, is the true meaning of Christmas. For as much
as Marley is a representative of Hell, he is also a representative of Christmas as such.
Besides being the herald of the “official” Christmas Ghosts, he seems to have special ties
to the holiday: he died on Christmas Eve, and suffers the most (and suffering is now his
official business) during the Christmas season. Though lost, perhaps because he is lost,
Marley’s Ghost is nevertheless an authoritative spokesperson for the saving power of
Christmas.
That Marley’s primary method of communicating this message is through terror is
not unique in Dickens. His first novel – or rather, his first extended piece of fiction -The Pickwick Papers, includes an interpolated story that provides a prototype for the plot,
characters, and milieu of A Christmas Carol. Chapters 28-30 relate Pickwick and
company’s famous Christmas visit to Dingley Dell. The episode has garnered much
critical attention for the ghost story Mr. Wardle tells the children on a cold, windy night,
“The Story of the Goblins Who Stole a Sexton.” Like A Christmas Carol, the story offers
a humorous tone to tell a harrowing tale. The sexton Gabriel Grubb is an ur-Scrooge: a
misanthropic, asocial man whose principal pleasure is gainsaying the pleasure of others.
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His alienated state is partly conveyed by a trope that appears in much of Dickens’ fiction:
a lonely walker who looks into lit windows at night, considering the multitude of separate
lives in progress behind them:11 “As he went his way, up the ancient street, he saw the
cheerful light of the blazing fires gleam through the old casements, and heard the loud
laugh and the cheerful shouts of those who were assembled around them” (396). This
panorama of lives behind windows is one that Scrooge himself will penetrate in the
Carol, supernaturally at first, and in reality at the end. For Grub, however, it simply lays
out the social horizon of which he is not a part. The story seems less concerned with
Grub’s redemption (though similarly chastised by his supernatural experience, Grub
never re-integrates into the social world) than in providing a blackly-comic
phantasmagoria. The bulk of the tale relates the taunting and bullying of the sexton by a
group of heckling, cavorting goblins. The playfulness of the goblins belies their practical
intent: to reform Grub through images of people both happier and more despondent than
himself.
The goblins play a role similar to Marley and his fellow doomed spirits in acting
as demonic agents of heavenly advice, but unlike Marley’s tactic of showing Scrooge an
invisible hell on earth, the goblins literally drag Grub down to Hell itself:
The sexton’s brain whirled around with the rapidity of the motion he beheld, and
his legs reeled beneath him as the spirits flew before his eyes; when the goblin
king, suddenly darting toward him, laid his hand upon his collar, and sunk with
him through the earth.
When Gabriel Grub had had time to fetch his breath, which the rapidity of
his descent had for the moment taken away, he found himself in what appeared to
be a large cavern, surrounded on all sides by crowds of goblins, ugly and grim; in
the centre of the room, on an elevated seat, was stationed his friend of the
churchyard; and close beside him stood Gabriel Grub himself, without the power
of motion. (401)
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Dickens’ pandemoniac scene illustrates a number of interesting paradoxes that will be
developed in A Christmas Carol. Grub occupies a privileged, panoptic position in which
he is as able to see everything, and through this seeing, learn; he is also, like the
characters in so many of Samuel Beckett’s hellscapes, severely restricted – he cannot
move. He occupies, like Scrooge, the uncanny position of both prisoner and warden, or
rather, he occupies the spectral gap between the two. This spectral gap is apparent in the
role of his captors/liberators: devils engaged in moral reform. While it is easy to
overlook the infernal aspects of these playful goblins, and read them as harmless sprites
rather than evil spirits, consider how closely the goblins mirror one of Dickens’ most
relentlessly malignant, satanic, creations: the dwarf Quilp. Like Quilp, the goblins are
constantly in motion, torture through humor, and even share the same taste in beverages:
‘Cold to-night,’ said the king of the goblins, ‘very cold. A glass of
something warm, here!’
At this command, half-a-dozen officious goblins, with a perpetual smile
upon their faces, whom Gabriel Grub imagined to be courtiers, on that account,
hastily disappeared, and presently returned with a goblet of liquid fire, which they
presented to the king.
‘Ah!’ cried the goblin, whose cheeks and throat were transparent, as he
tossed down the flame, ‘this warms one, indeed!’ Bring a bumper of the same for
Mr. Grub.’
It was in vain for the unfortunate sexton to protest that he was not in the
habit of taking anything warm at night; one of the goblins held him while another
poured the blazing liquid down his throat; the whole assembly screeched with
laughter as he coughed and choked, and wiped away the tears which gushed
plentifully from his eyes, after swallowing the burning draught. (401)
This scene is virtually repeated in The Old Curiosity Shop, as Quilp forcibly shares his
favorite drink, boiling grog, with his associate, Sampson Brass:
Mr. Quilp raised the hot saucepan to his lips, and deliberately drank off all the
spirit it contained […] Having swallowed this gentle stimulant […] he bade Mr.
Brass proceed.
‘But first,’ said Quilp, with his accustomed grin, ‘have a drop yourself – a
nice drop – a good, warm, fiery drop.’
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‘Why sir,’ replied Brass, ‘if there was such a thing as a mouthful of water
that could be got without trouble –’
‘There’s no such thing to be had here,’ cried the dwarf. ‘Water for
lawyers! Melted lead and brimstone, you mean, nice hot blistering pitch and tar –
that’s the thing for them – eh, Brass, eh?’
‘Ha ha ha!’ laughed Mr. Brass. ‘Oh very biting! and yet it’s like being
tickled – there’s a pleasure in it too, sir!’
‘Drink that,’ said the dwarf, who had by this time heated some more.
‘Toss it off, don’t leave any heeltap, scorch your throat and be happy!’
The wretched Sampson took a few short sips of the liquor, which
immediately distilled itself into burning tears, and in that form came rolling down
his cheeks into the pipkin again, turning the colour of his face and eyelids to a
deep red, and giving rise to a violent fit of coughing, in the midst of which he was
still heard to declare, with the constancy of a martyr, that it was ‘beautiful
indeed!’ (463)
The sado-masochistic relish displayed by Quilp and his victim casts an interesting light
not only the nature of Grub and his Goblins, but Scrooge and his ghosts, all of whom
employ torture to bring about the well-being and happiness of their victim. The fierce
ironies of the diction in this passage – the use of words like “nice,” “good,” “pleasure,”
“beautiful” -- underline the cruelty of the scene, and if Scrooge’s ghosts do not resort to
such crude methods as Quilp to gain assent from their victim, the gauntlet they prepare
for Scrooge does in its own way seem to say “scorch your throat and be happy!” Suffer,
and enjoy.
Quilp, the goblins, and Scrooge’s ghosts can all be included among the index of
Dickens’ gallery of happily satanic torturers, which raises questions as to their function as
reformers. After forcing Grub to drink liquid fire, they show him a happy domestic
family scene, which, in a temporal shift that anticipates those of A Christmas Carol, cuts
to the death of one of the children. Another jump forward in time shows the death of the
father and mother. These grim tableaux are softened, however, by a rhetoric which
stresses a social afterlife, both heavenly and sublunary. The death of the child is thus
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rendered: “[…] sleeping in rest and peace as the beautiful child seemed to be, they saw
that he was dead, and they knew that he was an Angel looking down upon, and blessing
them from a bright and happy Heaven” (402). And the survivors of the family after the
father and mother’s death are reported to leave their graves
sadly and mournfully, but not with bitter cries and despairing lamentations, for
they knew that they should one day meet again; and once more they mixed with
the busy world, and their content and cheerfulness were restored. The cloud
settled upon the picture, and concealed it from the sexton’s view.
‘What do you think of that?’ said the goblin, turning his large face toward
Gabriel Grub. (402-3)
These moral exhortations to both mourn and enjoy, to regard death, but to regard it as the
necessary byproduct of a “bright and happy Heaven”; to be a part of “the busy world”
which restores “content and cheerfulness; to regard the repetitions of history as both
tragedy and farce – these appeals are clear antecedents of A Christmas Carol. But if the
demonic goblins who revel in torture and terror are also antecedents of the Carol’s
Christmas ghosts, and are likewise engaged in the business of moral redemption, the
goblin’s question: “what do you think of that?” becomes interesting indeed. Why do
these devils trumpet the ideology of angels?
The goblins’ crude vacillations between grotesqueries of humor and pathos
nevertheless illustrate a complex, highly ambiguous sense of the ghost that will be refined
in A Christmas Carol. Marley’s ghost introduces us to these ambiguities, but the
appearance of The Ghost of Christmas Past seems to be a vision of ambiguity itself.
Reminiscent of some of the impossible imagery of gods and spirits and ideas in Byron’s
Manfred or Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound, The Ghost of Christmas Past, in its very
corporality, seems, like the paradoxical descriptions in Shelley’s poem, discontent to be a
part of the whole, but rather, an image of totality itself.12 In adaptations of A Christmas
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Carol, The Ghost of Christmas Past is usually the least memorable of the spirits, and it is,
interestingly, the most inconsistently portrayed. Adaptations take the most liberal
deviations from Dickens’ text in representing the Ghost of Christmas Past, most likely
because the ghost as Dickens describes it is so difficult to visualize.13 Revealingly, this
ghost is the only one not represented in Leech’s original illustrations. Dickens’
description is worth quoting at length, as it, like many other scenes in the Carol, tends to
be forgotten in the flux of our shared memories of adaptations that elide it.
It was a strange figure – like a child: yet not so like a child as like an old man,
viewed through some supernatural medium, which gave him the appearance of
having receded from the view, and being diminished to a child’s proportions. Its
hair, which hung about its neck and down its back, was white as if with age; and
yet the face had not a wrinkle on it, and the tenderest bloom was on the skin. The
arms were very long and muscular; the hands the same, as if its hold were of
uncommon strength. Its legs and feet, most delicately formed, were, like those
upper members, bare. It wore a tunic of the purest white; and round its waist was
bound a lustrous belt, the sheen of which was beautiful. It held a branch of green
holly in its hand; and, in singular contradiction of that wintry emblem, had its
dress trimmed with summer flowers. But the strangest thing about it was, that
from the crown of its head there sprung a bright clear jet of light, by which all of
this was visible; and which was doubtless the occasion of its using, in its duller
moments, a great extinguisher for a cap, which it now held under its arm.
Even this, though, when Scrooge looked at it with increasing steadiness,
was not its strangest quality. For as its belt sparkled and glittered now in part and
now in another, and what was light one instant, at another time was dark, so the
figure itself fluctuated in its distinctness; being now a thing with one arm, now
with one leg, now with twenty legs, now a pair of legs without a head, now a head
without a body: of which dissolving parts, no outline would be visible in the
dense gloom wherein they melted away. And in the very wonder of this, it would
be itself again; distinct and clear as ever. (61-2)
A thing, then, of contradiction: both light and dark, dull and distinct, young and old,
wintry and summery. The narrator’s diction is itself contradictory, as if in his excitement
to describe the indescribable, his haste gets the better of him. At first, the ghost is
described as masculine, but as feminine imagery comes into play (the ghost’s long hair
and delicate features, the dress adorned with summer flowers), the “he” becomes an “it.”
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The narrator attempts to cap his description with a superlative (“the strangest thing”),
only to negate it in the following paragraph (“Even this, though…was not its strangest
quality”). We are clearly supposed to regard the spirit as beautiful, but it is also a protean
monster: a thing with twenty legs, a headless shape-shifter which in its multifarious
nature recalls B-movie horror creatures as much as ineffable spirit.14
We tend to remember the Santa-like Ghost of Christmas Present for his verbal
repartee with Scrooge, and the Ghost of Christmas Yet-to-Come for his spooky silence.
Both spirits are visually memorable as well, and thus consistently represented in
adaptations. But the Ghost of Christmas Past is strangely forgettable, in spite of being, in
its very failure at visualization, perhaps the most deliriously imaginative character sketch
Dickens ever attempted. This is probably appropriate, as the ghost’s job is to show
Scrooge the life he has himself forgotten. And in not only showing Scrooge his past, but
effectively transporting him into it, the protean ghost makes of Scrooge another Proteus:
a being that is multiple and simultaneous. Standing beside his younger self, Scrooge
becomes, like the ghost, both young and old.
It is at this point that A Christmas Carol introduces a complication in the English
ghost story that is, I believe, partly, if not largely responsible for the continued and
unabated popularity of this text and its endless permutations and adaptations. Scrooge is
not simply presented a historical tableau in order to learn a moral lesson; he is sutured
into the history of his own life. This is one of the earliest, and certainly one of the
uncanniest, appearances of one of Dickens’ central conceits: a man confronted with the
specter of himself.15 While doppelgängers are not uncommon in fiction, the possibility of
confronting one’s own, younger self is one that still has the capacity to disturb readers
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and audiences used to what has become a subgenre of time travel narratives. The
Christmas narrative which the ghost constructs for Scrooge out of his past certainly
disturbs Scrooge, who alternates between nostalgic joy, meditative sadness, and outright
rage in witnessing it.
With good reason. If we look at the narrative the ghost has designed, separate
from Scrooge’s insertion within it, we see a decidedly manic-depressive design at work.
The whole vacillates (through fade outs and cuts that anticipate the cinema) between
scenes of sorrow and happiness. In fact, the scenario that suggests the narrative of
Scrooge’s Past is explicitly designed to force the spectator to whipsaw between emotional
extremes. After a spectralized Scrooge walks with the ghost through his wall and into his
own past, he is immediately flooded with hyper-Proustian involuntary memories: “He
was conscious of a thousand odours floating in the air, each one connected with a
thousand thoughts, and hopes, and joys, and cares long, long, forgotten!” (63) The
ensuing scenes will move Scrooge back and forth between these joys and cares.
His first sight upon entering this past world is a group of cheerful boys leaving
school for Christmas break. The narrator asks, with exclamatory punctuation which
destabilizes the interrogatory content: “Why was he rejoiced beyond all bounds to see
them! Why did his cold eye glisten, and his heart leap up as they went past! Why was he
filled with gladness when he heard them give each other Merry Christmas…” (64).
Heading toward the school, where Scrooge anticipates seeing his lone, younger self, he
sobs, and upon encountering himself, “wept to see his poor forgotten self as he used to
be” (65). Scrooge’s sadness lifts, however, when he sees out the school window living
representations of the characters from his youthful reading. In fact, Scrooge goes into an
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“ecstasy,” excitedly pointing out the beloved characters of his youth and crying
incoherencies (“Halloa! Hoop! Halloo!”), until, “with a rapidity of transition very foreign
to his usual character, he said, in pity for his former self, ‘Poor Boy!’ and cried again”
(66). The ensuing scenes evoke more violently contrasting emotional responses from
Scrooge, from the bittersweet reunion with his dead sister, to his return to Fezziwig’s Ball
(a favorite scene in many adaptations), to the heart wrenching scene of his broken
engagement to Belle, in which Scrooge renounces love for capital.
At this point, Scrooge reasonably asks the ghost, “Why do you delight to torture
me?” (74), and asks to be brought home. In response, the ghost shows him one more
scene, detailing the domestic bliss of Belle and her husband. The fact that this is the one
scene in which Scrooge was never present, seems, by highlighting Scrooge’s absence, to
bear out Scrooge’s accusation of torture. And like the torture of Gabriel Grub and
Marley’s Ghost, it is a torture based on domestic happiness. Whatever moral redemption
these ghosts have in mind, it is largely predicated on inflicting trauma on the redeemed
subject. Edmund Wilson’s famous diagnosis of Scrooge as a bipolar personality16 can
perhaps be attributed to the strange narrative therapy the Ghost of Christmas Past has
prepared for him.
That Scrooge would be manic-depressive is not surprising considering the
singular situation he is faced with. With the appearance of the Ghost of Christmas Past,
Scrooge is engaged in a complex interspectral chain: he is in communication not just with
the Christmas Ghost, but with the ghost of his former self, as well as a self that is
spectralized (invisible, incorporeal, all-seeing). No wonder Scrooge’s encounter with the
ghost is filled with such violence. Like Jacob and the angel, Scrooge’s instinctual
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response to the spirit is to physically attack it: “He turned upon the Ghost, and seeing that
it looked upon him with a face, in which in some strange way there were fragments of all
the faces it had shown him, wrestled with it” (76). It is the multivalent aspect of the
ghost, and his own experience with himself that drives Scrooge into a rage, yet, as
Scrooge will continue to find in his spectral intercourse, rage is impotent:
In the struggle, if that can be called a struggle in which the Ghost with no
visible resistance on its own part was undisturbed by any effort of its adversary,
Scrooge observed that its light was burning high and bright; and dimly connecting
that with its influence over him, he seized the extinguisher-cap, and by a sudden
action pressed it down upon its head.
The Spirit dropped beneath it, so that the extinguisher covered its whole
form; but though Scrooge pressed it down with all his force, he could not hide the
light… (76)
Scrooge will increasingly learn deference toward his spiritual betters over the course of
his long Christmas Eve, but then, the spirits that haunt him grow decreasingly protean as
the night goes on, until the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come appears as a mute black
cloak – an antithesis to the thousand faced Ghost of Christmas Past. It is interesting that
Dickens places the avatar of possibility and multiplicity in the past, and the spirit of blank
necessity in the future (supposedly the locale of a million Borgesian forking paths).
Dickens the social progressive routinely funnels energy and movement backward into the
past, and nowhere more visibly than in A Christmas Carol. Like many of his Victorian
peers, who extolled the ambiguous virtues of medieval feudalism in anticipating
progressive social change,17 Dickens fuels his brighter future with a surprising amount of
nostalgia. This is, in part, the vexing paradox of hauntology, and the visions of Marx and
Dickens: the future as future is, strictly speaking, impossible. For the future is already
inhabited by the ghosts of the past.
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This phenomenon can be readily seen with the appearance of Scrooge’s next
phantom visitant, The Ghost of Christmas Present. Given the fact that the three ghosts
appear in one night, Christmas Eve, even the name of The Ghost of Christmas Present is
problematic, since the time the spirit takes Scrooge to is Christmas Day, and therefore,
the future. The Ghost himself seems aware of his precarious position as an agent of the
fleeting present, as the first piece of information he offers Scrooge is that he is very
young, and has been preceded by over eighteen hundred siblings (80). This clever
personification of the artificial segmentation of time, and the resulting sense, or illusion,
of a “present” highlights not only Dickens’ famous inability to linger on a moment, his
vast energy, but the incredible weight he lays on the past. The Ghost of Christmas
Present will soon be but another dead number in an ever growing chronological family.
Dickens’ oft noted propensity to offer encyclopedic, satiric attacks on the follies
of the present, while offering few solutions for the future is on full display in this stave.
While the heartwarming scenes of Fred’s and Bob Cratchit’s family Christmas parties are
probably the most indelible images offered by The Ghost of Christmas Present, it is
interesting how unsentimental the spirit actually is. In many scenes, the ghost acts less
like a kindly projectionist, and more as a kind of panoptic policeman.18 In the midst of
one of Dickens’ most evocative scenes of London teeming with humanity, Scrooge
notices the strange power of the ghost’s torch:
And it was a very uncommon kind of torch, for once or twice when there were
angry words between some dinner-carriers who had jostled with each other, he
shed a few drops of water on them, and their good humour was restored directly.
For they said, it was a shame to quarrel upon Christmas Day. And so it was! God
love it, so it was! (84)
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This passage captures the flavor of spirit of much Victorian writing on Christmas. There
is a weary, almost desperate insistence of harmony here that makes all the more poignant
and powerful the absence of it. While the scene is ostensibly comic, the narrator cannot
help but sigh to Heaven over the necessity of the ghost to enforce good cheer. Here, as
elsewhere, the spirits’ demands for enjoyment and happiness serve to demonstrate its
absence.
Scrooge himself seems to pick up on this problem when he accuses the ghost of
supporting the Sunday Observance Bill, which placed many restrictions on the poor. The
bill was nominally meant to instill piety in an unruly, uncertain working class, but, as
critics like Dickens noted, seemed only to throw a damper on the poor’s one day off. As
Scrooge notes, the bill served to “cramp these people’s opportunities of innocent
enjoyment” and “would deprive them of their means of dining every seventh day, often
the only day on which they can be said to dine at all” (84). The ghost refutes Scrooge’s
charge, reminding him that
‘There are some upon this earth of yours…who lay claim to know us, and who do
their deeds of passion, pride, ill-will, hatred, envy, bigotry, and selfishness in our
name; who are as strange to us and all our kith and kin, as if they had never lived.
Remember that, and charge their doings on themselves, not us.’ (85)
Here again, the ghost reminds Scrooge of the difficult work of enforcing happiness, and
in the process, evinces the ambiguous question of who is responsible for the enforcement.
The pronouns the ghost employs heighten this ambiguity: “some,” “they,” “ themselves,”
are the shady hypocrites who violate the spirit of Christmas, while the true spirit of
Christmas is a shadowy, vaguely sinister (given the anger of the charge) “us.” The ghost
presents Christmas as a vast battleground,19 one in which the combatants are ill-defined.
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The vastness of the ghost’s surveillance of this battleground is wonderfully
imagined in a whirlwind scene, rarely adapted, which moves the scope of the Carol well
beyond the cozy domesticity it is famous for. Dickens’ talent for atmospheric painting is
on full display here, as the ghost whisks Scrooge to apocalyptic locales, barely lit and
hardly salvaged by meager, lonely celebrations of the season. Scrooge is taken to a mine
in Cornwall that seems like a landscape of Hieronymus Bosch:
And now, without a word of warning from the Ghost, they stood upon a bleak and
desert moor, where monstrous masses of rude stone were cast about, as though it
were the burial-place of giants; and water spread itself wheresoever it listed – or
would have done so, but for the frost that held it prisoner; and nothing grew but
moss and furze, and coarse, rank grass. Down in the west the setting sun had left
a streak of fiery red, which glared upon the desolation for an instant, like a sullen
eye, and frowning lower, lower, lower yet, was lost in the thick gloom of darkest
night. (92)
The nightmare imagery continues, as the ghost takes Scrooge out to sea, where Scrooge,
looking back, sees “the last of the land, a frightful range of rocks…his ears were
deafened by the thundering of water, as it rolled, and roared, and raged among the
dreadful caverns it had worn, and fiercely tried to undermine the earth” (92-3).
From the bowels of the earth to far out at sea, the ghost treats Scrooge to the these
epic visions, where Christmas songs vie precariously with darker elements:
The old man, in a voice that seldom rose above the howling of the wind upon the
barren waste, was singing them a Christmas song; it had been a very old song
when he was a boy; and from time to time they all joined in the chorus. So surely
as they raised their voices, the old man got quite blithe and loud; and so surely as
they stopped, his vigour sank again. (92)
And:
Joining their horny hands over the rough table at which they sat, they wished each
other Merry Christmas in their can of grog; and one of them: the elder, too, with
his face all damaged and scarred with hard weather, as the figure-head of an old
ship might be; struck up a sturdy song that was like a Gale in itself. (93)
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Christmas here is no laughing matter, or rather, laughing is inextricably linked with a vast
cosmic despair. “It was a great surprise to Scrooge,” the text tells us, and it is a surprise
to us as well, readers used to adaptations and a cultural shorthand that reduces A
Christmas Carol to domestic sentimentality, “what a solemn thing it was to move on
through the lonely darkness over an unknown abyss, whose depths were secrets as
profound as Death: it was a great surprise to Scrooge, while thus engaged, to hear a
hearty laugh” (93). The laugh Scrooge hears is his nephew Fred’s, spliced into this dread
vision by the cinematic sensibilities of his ghostly hosts. Scrooge and the ghost leap from
a montage of barren landscapes to the parlor games of Fred’s Christmas Party, and back
to territory more familiar to us, the heirs of the Carol’s cultural legacy. But it is
worthwhile to linger on what unfamiliar aspects there are of this, one of the most familiar
of tales. Perhaps nowhere is the link between cosmic terror and light comedy more
jarringly joined in Dickens’ fiction than in this artful jump cut. It is this link that speaks
darker truths about Dickens’ Victorian Christmas than Fred’s party alone can do. In
these passages, which deftly juxtapose the sublime and the domestic, one can see that
Dickens, as much as Tennyson, is an heir to the Romantic poets, and is haunted by their
ghosts.
Not just the ghosts of the sublime haunt Dickens’ imagery, but, perhaps more
familiarly, the gothic. Before the Ghost of Christmas Present leaves the stage to the last
of the spirits, he shares with Scrooge a nightmarish vision: two allegorical children of
poverty, akin to their fleshed out cousins Oliver Twist, Little Nell, Jo, and, of course,
Tiny Tim, but presented as prodigies painted by Fucelli:
They were a boy and girl. Yellow, meager, ragged, scowling, wolfish, but
prostrate, too, in their humility. Where graceful youth should have filled their
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features out, and touched them with its freshest tints, a stale and shriveled hand,
like that of age, had pinched, and twisted them, and pulled them into shreds.
Where angels might have sat enthroned, devils lurked, and glared out menacing.
No change, no degradation, no perversion of humanity, in any grade, through all
the mysteries of wonderful creation, has monsters half so horrible and dread.
(101)
Here, on the edge of the frame, are the poor, lurking on the outskirts of the family feast.
But unlike the first Christmas card, and unlike Dickens’ gallery of poor orphans, these
children are figures of horror, not pathos. They are meant to chill the blood, not warm
the heart, and they remind us of the “hammer blow” Dickens’ intended his Carol to be.
But, as noted above, the present is not Dickens’ preferred milieu. Nor is it the ghost’s,
who, like his creator, leaves the scene once he has had his say. There are no solutions to
the problems the ghost raises, just portents of doom (101). The ghost’s monstrous
children offer no program for change. Their terrifying silence seems at cross purposes
with the general message the ghosts are sent to enforce: Merry Christmas.
But such disturbing visuals are, in a sense, the message. The Ghost of Christmas
Present is, despite his talent for invisibility, deeply concerned with seeing.20 His first
words to Scrooge are “Look upon me!” (80) He often exhorts Scrooge to “See!” (92),
or: “Look here!” (99). These commands to witness are deeply tied to his ability to go
unseen, to seem detached from the web of being which he nevertheless has power to
monitor and control. He is, in a way, like Scrooge himself, divorced from humanity, yet
inextricably tied to it. This may account for the ghost’s rhetorical tendency to ironically
spit Scrooge’s words back at him (89-101): the verbal admonitions underline the
existential reality that Scrooge, however much he would like to see himself as removed
from the symbolic order, is essentially part of it, and therefore can – must – react and
respond to its needs. Like the warden of Bentham’s panopticon, one may have a vantage
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point in seeing the prisoners, but one must be in the prison oneself in order to do so.21
The visits to the Cratchit home and Fred’s party are not merely scenes of missed
invitation; they are reminders that attendance, in a very real sense, is mandatory.

III

Of all the aspects of literary creation, character, of course, is the one for which Dickens is
most celebrated. The Dictionaryof British Literary Characters holds Dickens responsible
for the creation of 989 of them (and these are just the ones with names!). Few, I imagine,
would count The Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come as central to that formidable
menagerie. Possessing none of the comic fecundity of a Micawber or Sam Weller, the
satiric venom of a Pecksniff or Skimpole, nor the psychological weight of a Paul
Dombey, John Jasper, or, for that matter, an Ebenezer Scrooge (not even the bland
decency of Nicholas Nickleby or David Copperfield), this ghost appears the least
Dickensian of all Dickens’ creations. Yet, as the silent catalyst of catharsis in this,
Dickens’ most popular work, The Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come is surely one of the
most recognizable and potent of his characters. I confess to holding a particularly high
regard for this shadowy entity, as the ghost’s terrifying aspect and vague authority held
me spellbound as a young child, and led me on that first reading long ago to ask a
question that is fundamental to this chapter, and this study as a whole: “Why does
Dickens make Christmas so scary?”
There is a simple answer to that question, of course; one that is clear to any child
who first encounters the work: Scrooge needs to be scared straight in order to properly
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enjoy Christmas. All of Scrooge’s ghosts evince a predilection for emotional torture as a
mode of moral reclamation, but the combined narrative strategy of the ghosts seems to
follow a staple theory of addiction: one needs to hit rock bottom before one can truly seek
help. After the physical violence and verbal wrangling with the Ghosts of Christmas Past
and Present, respectively, Scrooge is ready to begin to help himself. The silence of The
Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come allows Scrooge to begin to take ownership of his own
spiritual regeneration, and part of the narrative thrill of this stave is watching just how
close Scrooge is to finally becoming the hero of his own life, at least within the
Christmas-obsessed parameters of the narrative he inhabits.
But the absence of voice in the ghost is of interest in itself, particularly in relation
to its predecessors. From the protean Ghost of Christmas Past, to the rhetorically
dynamic Ghost of Christmas Present, we come to a remarkably withdrawn, visually
monochrome figure that marks the end of an arc from the wild, and as noted above,
paradoxical multivalency of the past, to the morbid necessity of the future. The ghost’s
silence forces Scrooge into an increasingly frantic interrogatory position, and his
questions call into doubt the very possibility of choice his questions raise. When Scrooge
famously asks the spirit, “Are these the shadows of the things that Will be, or are they the
shadows of the things that May be, only?” (115) we suspect, along with Scrooge, what it
is he is about to see in the churchyard. When he finally sees his name on the headstone
(one of the great reveals in narrative history – the twist that launched a thousand Twilight
Zone episodes), Scrooge reasonably asks, “Why show me this, if I am past hope?” the
narrator informs us that “For the first time the [ghost’s] hand appeared to shake” (115).
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It is interesting that here, with Scrooge’s fundamental question, the ghost begins
to show signs of character. Even more interesting is that Dickens, not one to shy away
from revealing a character’s motive, is unusually reticent here in explaining it. The
vividness of this scene is heightened by the sense that it has run away from Dickens’ own
penchant for rhetorical containment of narrative. Like Bill Sykes’ murder of Nancy and
the death of Little Nell, this is a scene of pictorial violence that resists Dickens’ usual
analytic detachment from his own fiction.22 The rest of Scrooge’s interaction with the
ghost deserves to be quoted at length, as it supplies perhaps the most dramatic and
psychologically revealing example of the desperation underlying Dickens’ vision of
Christmas:
‘Good spirit,’ he pursued, as down upon the ground he fell before it: ‘Your
nature intercedes for me, and pities me. Assure me that I yet may change these
shadows you have shown me, by an altered life!’
The kind hand trembled.
‘I will honour Christmas in my heart, and try to keep it all the year. I will
live in the Past, the Present, and the Future. The Spirits of all Three shall strive
within me. I will not shut out the lessons they teach. Oh, tell me I may sponge
away the writing on this stone!’
In his agony, he caught the spectral hand. It sought to free itself, but he
was strong in his entreaty, and detained it. The Spirit, stronger yet, repulsed him.
Holding up his hands in one last prayer to have his fate reversed, he saw
an alteration in the Phantom’s hood and dress. It shrunk, collapsed, and swindled
down into a bedpost. (116-7)
A great deal of Scrooge’s desperation here lies in his attempt to define the nature of the
inter-spectral relationship between himself and the ghost. He calls the spirit “good,”
though the only evidence he has for this evaluation is a trembling in the ghost’s hand.
The narrator seems to check Scrooge’s assessment in calling the ghost “kind,” but
Scrooge is pleading with the spirit to be good as much as he is recognizing it as such.
Scrooge’s uncertainty of the ghost’s nature is further displayed by his contradictory
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actions toward it: he attempts to physically detain it, and then prays to it. Though
Scrooge’s last words to the ghost amount to a definitive pledge of allegiance to
Christmas, his actions show that he is much more confused and terrified than his words
suggest. His pledge to “live in the Past, the Present, and the Future” seems scripted, and
given Scrooge’s mental agitation, smells of the compulsory.
But perhaps this is precisely why the “kind” spirit’s hand begins to shake: it is in
as unpleasantly compulsory a position as Scrooge is in. Like a sympathetic bounty
hunter, the spirit perhaps does take pity on Scrooge. But, given the fact that the spirit
“repulses” him, and “collapses” the moment Scrooge prays to him, there is no sense here
that Scrooge’s attempt to bargain with the spirit has yielded any result. Scrooge has
asked the spirit for hope, and the spirit has offered him none. No plea has been granted,
no future, apparently, reversed. Scrooge, after this encounter, is simply back in his bed,
where he started.
In order to make sense of Scrooge’s stunning reversal in character, one that has
led some critics – not to mention many of his fellow characters in the narrative – to judge
Scrooge insane, it may be helpful to remember the proximity of the last and penultimate
staves, to see the frightful encounter with the ghost and the hysterically happy ending as
juxtaposed rather than opposed. In other words, we need to see Scrooge’s ecstasy as a
symptom of his terror, rather than the result of it. To return to Scrooge and his own
headstone, to Scrooge’s encounter with a Christmas Ghost who seems related to, if not an
actual incarnation of, Death Itself, we may well ask what hope Scrooge has actually
received from his encounter. Scrooge asks the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come (if
somewhat indirectly) to sponge away the writing on his headstone. Yet surely no human
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being who has reached the age of reason would consider this a realistic, or even fair,
request. After all, what the ghost shows Scrooge is NOT what may be, but what indeed
WILL be. The ghost, in this respect, does not offer Scrooge the chance to change. He
does not offer Scrooge a choice between Christmas or Death; in every scene the ghost
presents, in every action the ghost performs, the offer is clear: Christmas AND Death.
When the narrator informs us that Scrooge “did it all, and infinitely more” and that Tiny
Tim “did NOT die” (123), our narrative pleasure is necessarily mixed with a sense of
being sold a false bill of goods. At best, the narrator’s claims can be considered a genial
form of paralepsis, for Tiny Tim, of course, WILL die; as will Scrooge, who, as a mortal
being, is clearly, at his age, incapable of doing “it all,” much less “infinitely more.” But
then, Death and Christmas are now to be lived as constants, ever present and always
dictating the action of Scrooge and his social world. As Andrew H. Miller notes: “The
elaborate machinery of A Christmas Carol, like that of séances, invites readers to
experience death not as a final event, but as a condition tempering our everyday lives”
(332).
The narrator appears to operate under the same happy delusion, or willful denial,
that the reformed Scrooge adopts: Christmas conquers death, and allows those who live
according to its precepts to live happily, and apparently, ever after. Theologically
speaking, this makes perfect sense, but we must remember that Scrooge has been visited
not by angels or saints, but by ghosts and damned souls. The narrator seems to share
Scrooge’s sigh of relief to be rid of them, informing us that “He had no further
intercourse with Spirits, but lived upon the Total Abstinence Principle, ever afterwards”
(125). This is a telling statement, for it seems to compare Scrooge’s spiritual encounters
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to a particularly nasty bender, the kind of Long Weekend rock-bottom experience that
necessarily leads to sobriety. It is also an ambiguous and ambivalent assessment: the toosober Scrooge now operates on a level of intensity that leads his clerk to think him fit for
a straight-jacket, and Scrooge himself admits to feeling “as giddy as a drunken man”
(118). The text is clearly sending mixed messages as to the nature of Scrooge’s
reformation, and by association, the spirits who have helped bring it about. Scrooge is a
better man, but also, in many respects, hardly a man at all. As Scrooge notes: “I’m quite
a baby. Never mind. I don’t care. I’d rather be a baby. Hallo! Whoop!” (119). Every
metaphor Scrooge chooses to describe himself indicates unsoundness of mind, or a
complete abnegation of responsibility. We, along with Scrooge, are in no doubt that this
is a “good” thing, but good in a purely ontological sense – es muss sein, the ghosts have
informed Scrooge, and so, obediently, he is happy. Indeed, his happiness and fanatical
love of Christmas appear to be the only guarantee that Scrooge will not be terrorized by
spirits again. Enjoyment is the price of exorcism.
And what, besides Christmas, is it that Scrooge must enjoy? As we quickly learn,
it’s money. Scrooge’s first act upon waking is to start spending the money he has been
hoarding so long. In fact, Scrooge’s first post-spectral intercourse with another human is
a crash course in capitalism:
‘Do you know the Poulterer’s in the next street but one, at the corner?’
Scrooge inquired.
‘I should hope I did,’ replied the lad.
‘An intelligent boy!’ said Scrooge. ‘A remarkable boy! Do you know
whether they’ve sold the prize Turkey that was hanging up there? Not the little
prize Turkey: the big one?’
‘What, the one as big as me?’ returned the boy.
‘Is it?’ said Scrooge. ‘Go and buy it […] I am in earnest. Go and buy it,
and tell ‘em to bring it here, that I may give them the direction where to take it.
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Come back with the man, and I’ll give you a shilling. Come back with him in less
than five minutes, and I’ll give you half-a-crown!’ (119-20)
Like a catechism, Scrooge asks his pupil where to buy, what to buy, how to buy it, and
even an injunction to “Go buy.” Scrooge also stresses the importance of making money
move quickly in order that more can be made. Scrooge’s first real Christmas opens with
a flurry of market activity.
The real beneficiaries of Scrooge’s capitalist turn are, of course, the Cratchit
family. From Tiny Tim’s medical bills to Bob Cratchit’s salary, Scrooge immediately
sets to work in furthering the enfranchisement of the middle class. This result of
Scrooge’s spiritual transformation has not gone unnoticed by critics.23 It is perhaps after
all unsurprising that the hero of the most popular of all Victorian narratives should
become a major champion of Victorian values. Of course Scrooge should be a good
capitalist. To paraphrase Chesterton, one suspects he was one all along. What is of
interest is why Christmas, and ghosts, are required to make Scrooge aware of this fact.
Here, we return to Derrida’s question in Spectres of Marx, how do I learn to live?
As Derrida points out, and as Scrooge demonstrates, not by living alone. Only a
heterodidactics of death and life can teach such a lesson. It takes, in short, a ghost to
learn to live. And death is the lesson Scrooge’s ghosts have to offer, a death that is as
necessary in its arrival as that of Christmas. And much of the strange power of A
Christmas Carol resides in its unsettling, but oddly liberating, equation of Christmas and
death. Scrooge seems to experience, in his spiritual rebirth, a kind of Nietzschean amor
fati, however unconsciously. Once the ghosts have drilled into Scrooge the fact that
celebrating Christmas is, after all, not a choice -- as, paradoxically, to deny Christmas is
tantamount to denying death and therefore, to be, like Jacob Marley, infernally
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unprepared for it – but a requirement for living properly, Scrooge can finally live like a
proper Victorian: one who moves money. For A Christmas Carol, like Marx, proposes
the inevitability, the necessity, of capitalism. It is as essential to the structure of the
Carol’s narrative as Christmas. And in uniting Christmas and capitalism in such a way,
Dickens makes Christmas as essential to the culture of his fellow Victorians as capitalism
itself.
It would be a mistake, however, to view A Christmas Carol as a mere celebration
of capitalism. Just as Christmas takes on a terrifying aspect in the Carol, so do the
effects of industrial capitalism. There is, in the numerous hauntological paradoxes the
narrative exposes, room to both celebrate and denounce capitalism, but that is not the real
lesson of the spirits. What Dickens’ narrative does is reify Christmas and capitalism – it
shows them as essential and necessary aspects of culture. Christmas in the Carol is rather
like capitalism as defined by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus:24
Concerning capitalism, we maintain that it both does and does not have an
exterior limit: it has an exterior limit that is schizophrenia, that is, the absolute
decoding of flows, but it functions only by reproducing and widening these limits
on an always vaster scale. The strength of capitalism indeed resides in the fact
that its axiomatic is never saturated, that it is always capable of adding a new
axiom to the previous ones. Capitalism defines a field of immanence and never
ceases to fully occupy this field. (250)
In other words, capitalism not only writes the rules of the game, it is the only game that
can be played. In Deleuzian terms, the only ones who seem to be able to not play the
game are the schizophrenics – and even they are constantly re-appropriated and redefined
within capitalism. The schizophrenic, the outsider – the manic-depressive Scrooge – can
only deny Christmas, and capitalism, for so long. Ultimately, Scrooge must play the
game. This may in part account for Chesterton’s insistence that Scrooge was never
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“really inhuman at the beginning any more than at the end. There is a heartiness in his
inhospitable sentiments that is akin to humor and therefore to humanity” (Charles
Dickens 130). Scrooge’s inhumanity is precisely what constitutes and defines his
humanity: Scrooge can’t really hate Christmas at all.
There is little room for movement within a realm that constitutes the very acts that
oppose it, and this Spinozistic aspect of Deleuze and Guatarri’s description of capitalism
can be seen in Deridda’s reading of what constitutes “the ghost” in Marx’s German
Ideology:
Gespenst No. 10: Everything. Marx will have succeeded in transmuting
everything, the All itself, into a ghost (‘Alles’ in ein Spuk zu verwandeln). So we
have to stop the counting. And the recounting. And the story, and the fable, and
the gothic novel. And the numerological occultism that puts on airs of
Aufklärung. One has to admit that, forthwith [séance tenante], ‘all enumeration
ends’ (alles Zählen aufhört) once everything comes back to haunt everything,
everything is in everything, that is, ‘in the class of specters’ (in der Klasse
Gespenster). (Specters of Marx 183)
If this rather extreme reading of what constitute ghostliness does not adequately describe
the specific and individuated nature of Scrooge’s ghosts (though it does suggest the
spectral qualities of The Ghost of Christmas Past), it does anticipate their message: as
Scrooge pledges, he will honor Christmas and “try to keep it all the year,” by living in the
Past, Present, and Future (117). Scrooge tacitly acknowledges the universality of the
spirits that haunt him, and the omnipresence of the Christmas they represent. For
Scrooge, it will be all Christmas, all the time – and thus his “story, his fable, his gothic
novel,” ends.
In Deleuzian terms, Dickens’ Christmas ghosts, and the outsiders they haunt, are
the schizophrenic limit of the capitalist universe, constantly widening the scope of
Deridda’s “everything”:
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…capitalism, through its process of production, produces an awesome
schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge, against which it brings all its
vast powers of repression to bear, but which nonetheless continues to act as
capitalism’s limit. For capitalism constantly counteracts, constantly inhibits this
inherent tendency while at the same time allowing it free reign; it continually
seeks to avoid reaching its limit while simultaneously tending toward that limit.
Capitalism institutes or restores all sorts of residual and artificial, imaginary, or
symbolic territorialities, thereby attempting, as best it can, to recode, to rechannel
persons who have been defined in terms of abstract quantities. Everything returns
or recurs: States, nations, families. That is what makes the ideology of capitalism
‘a motley painting of everything that has ever been believed.’ (Anti-Oedipus 34)
Thus the tension between Scrooge and his ghosts, thus the increasingly narrow limits of
possibility in the progression of spirits, from the miasmic multiplicity of the Ghost of
Christmas Past to the blunt necessity of the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come. Scrooge
and his ghosts work to recode and reify capitalism, and in the process of
reterritorialization, recode Christmas as capitalism, and Christmas as everything. This is
the achievement of “The Man Who Invented Christmas” and his creations: broadening
the scope of Christmas from religious and social festival into cultural imperative.
Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the schizo at work can be read as a summary of the
activities of Scrooge and his ghosts:
The schizophrenic deliberately seeks out the very limit of capitalism: he is its
inherent tendency brought to fulfillment, its surplus product, its proletariat, and its
exterminating angel […] In the schizo, the two aspects of process are conjoined:
the metaphysical process that puts us in contact with the ‘demoniacal’ element in
nature or within the heart of the earth, and the historical process of social
production as the limit of social production. (35)
Scrooge’s visit to the ends of the earth – the apocalyptic mine, and the ocean outposts –
and his encounter with the children Want and Ignorance, on whose brow is written
“Doom” (101) offer specific instances of this social and metaphysical production. In
reterritorializing Christmas, Dickens’ expands the horizons of capitalism itself, and its
eternal returns can be seen in every retelling of A Christmas Carol.
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That this endless reterritorializing is schizoid in nature can be seen in the
questions which rise in the very appearance of Dickens’ ghosts. They are never simply
outer manifestations that engage in dialogue with a human subject, but rather partly interspectral monologues within the subject himself. The question of the “reality” of a ghost
is intricately bound to its manifestation. As Michael Cox and Robert Gilbert note in their
introduction to The Oxford Book of Ghost Stories, a ghost story should take place in a
diegetic world where a ghost’s intrusion would be, paradoxically, improbable: “We must
feel this imagined world to be in its essentials a reflection of our own, making us anxious
witnesses to a sudden and often fatal violation of everyday reality by the supernatural”
(x). The central example of this is Henry James’ Turn of the Screw, where the question
of the actual existence, the “reality” of the ghosts is central to the interest of the text qua
ghost story. There is a general tension between whether narrative specters are to be taken
at face value; in other words, whether they are to be believed or not. One edition of the
Carol rather bluntly states in a brief introduction that the ghosts are “dreams” (Rackham
iii). Scrooge himself initially seems to subscribe to this view, chalking up Marley’s ghost
to “an undigested bit of beef, a blot of mustard, a crumb of cheese, a fragment of an
underdone potato” (52). Scrooge at first conceives of his ghost as very literally a part of
himself, however poorly digested that part might be. When asked outright whether he
believes in Marley’s ghost, Scrooge answers simply, “I don’t” (52). Scrooge’s disbelief,
and the skepticism that traditionally surrounds the appearances of ghosts in the very
stories where they can be reasonably believed in stems in part from the fact that a very
real part of the ghost stems from ourselves – a world “in essentials our own” – a schizoid
division of ourselves that in its manifestation creates a new whole. In other words, the
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relationship between our social selves and our ghosts is a spectral dialectic, a chain of
signification that seeps out of ourselves into the symbolic order and ties us to it.
Nowhere in Dickens’ fiction can this be seen more clearly than in his final
Christmas Book, and, after the Carol, his most intriguing, The Haunted Man. In this tale,
spectrality begins with a psychological split, and turns into a social epidemic. A
melancholy chemist and professor named Redlaw winds down another depressing
Christmas by wishing he could forget the painful memories of his life. A sinister
doppelganger appears:
As the gloom and shadow thickened behind him, in that place where it had been
gathering so darkly, it took […] an awful likeness of himself. Ghastly and cold,
colourless in its leaden face and hands, but with his features, and his bright eyes,
and his grizzled hair, and dressed in the gloomy shadow of his dress, it came into
his terrible appearance of existence, motionless, without a sound. As he leaned
his arm upon the elbow of his chair, it leaned upon the chair-back, close above
him, with its appalling copy of his face looking where his face looked, and
bearing the expression his face bore. (341)
Redlaw’s ghost is a mirror image of himself that seems to draw existence from the very
darkness of his mood. It is another Christmas ghost who draws its energy not from the
high spirits of the season, but from the morbid desire for oblivion of one who would be
done with Christmas altogether.
Redlaw’s phantom proceeds to grant his host’s wish for forgetfulness, though the
wish carries two horrific side-effects: in forgetting pain, Redlaw loses his capacity to feel,
and becomes blankly apathetic, a kind of moral zombie. Worse, his condition is
contagious, and everyone he comes in contact with begins to suffer the same effects. The
effect is eventually reversed by the impossible goodness of one of Dickens’ vast army of
angelic doll-women,25 but before it is, the reader is treated to rhetorically apocalyptic
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fireworks between Redlaw and his ghost. Like Scrooge, Redlaw comes to accept the
necessity of his conversion, or rather of his place in the symbolic order:
‘Phantoms! Punishers of impious thoughts!’ cried Redlaw, gazing around in
anguish. ‘Look upon me! From the darkness of my mind, let the glimmering of
contrition that I know is there, shine up, and show my misery! In the material
world, as I have long taught, nothing can be spared; no step or atom in the
wondrous structure could be lost, without a blank being made in the universe…”
(386)
Redlaw’s schizoid split, his infernal dialogue within himself, has led him to see how his
role in the world – in the universe – is not one of his own volition, but one of physical
and metaphysical necessity. Like Scrooge, his ghostly split with himself occasions his
resuturing into the social world. After hearing the “melancholy strain” (387) of
Christmas music, Redlaw pledges to his “Terrible instructor” that he will “obey without
inquiry” (389). The book ends with a quotation from Hamlet: Lord, keep my memory
green. As Dickens’ Christmas Books open with a nod to the most famous of literary
ghosts, so they end,26 circling back upon themselves with a strange prayer that effectively
asks: may I always be haunted, because then I will know that I am alive.

IV

Christmas would indeed haunt Dickens’ writing until the end of his life.27 After the
Christmas Books, Dickens continued to produce Christmas related stories in his journals
Household Words and All The Year Round. In his major fiction, Christmas rears its
fearful head twice more: during Pip’s anxiety and guilt-ridden Christmas dinner in Great
Expectations, and finally, it forms the unintentional center-piece of his unfinished
Mystery of Edwin Drood. We are informed that the eponymous hero (victim?) has a
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lonely, melancholy day of it, for “Something of deeper moment than he thought had gone
out of his life; and in the silence of his own chamber he wept for it last night” (175). The
only social intercourse we are made aware of is a meeting with a strange old woman, an
opium-eater who forebodes ill. “This is not,” we are informed, “an inspiriting close to a
dull day,” for Drood. “Alone, in a sequestered place, surrounded by vestiges of old time
and decay, it rather has a tendency to call a shudder into being” (179). Not inspiriting,
but ghostly nonetheless, particularly as this is the last time we will meet Edwin Drood,
who disappears from his text only to become a ghost that will haunt literary speculators
to this day. With this melancholy scene, Dickens says his last on Christmas. The
melancholy solitude that haunts this passage is of a piece with all his major Christmas
writing. For the disappearance of Drood suggests that, contra Redlaw’s epiphany, some
things can be spared, some things can be lost. The lack readers of Drood feel – the lack
of a complete text – is the lack that all of Dickens’ ghosts warn against, but ultimately,
can only proclaim. The transcendence that Dickens’ Christmas ghosts signify, for all
their solipsistic totalizing, is finally, in the Lacanian sense, the end of the line. Not
Christmas or Death, but Christmas AND Death. In terrifying their subjects into
wholeness, they highlight the most terrifying part of the whole: the blank line on the
Christmas card, the objet petit a which will one day be a headstone with an inscription.
And yet with ghosts, who always begin by coming back, death is never the end.
The absence of Drood, Dickens, and all ghosts, comes to signify their presence. Andrew
H. Miller reports that
During a séance in 1873, three years after Dickens died, the foreman of a a
Vermont printing office named Thomas P. James became conscious of a ghostly
figure “seated beside him with a sad grave face, his head resting thoughtfully on
his hand” (Doyle 723). Assuming the pose familiar from the various images of
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the author during his life, this spirit was, we are told, that of Dickens himself.
Pulled back even farther from his desk, his pen far from his hand, Dickens has
risen to walk abroad among his fellow men and, more practically, to ask James to
be the instrument for the completion of his earthly work, the unfinished Mystery
of Edwin Drood. (334)
The ghost completes and then continues, the chain of signification goes on, the symbolic
order holds. The message proliferates. A Christmas Card always and never arrives at its
destination, again and again, year after year.
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1

Richard Kelly, ed. A Christmas Carol, Broadview, 2003. Inverloch Historical Society
claims the number was closer to 2500, and that the date the card was issued was 1846.
2
The most influential discussion of the intersection between art and industry remains, of
course, Walter Benjamin’s seminal 1935 essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction,” which considers the social implications of mass-produced
cultural texts, from lithographs and photographs to cinema. Mass-produced art,
according to Benjamin, “changes the reaction of the masses toward art” (234), and
therefore has and will be a powerful tool as an object of fascist manipulation or
progressive socialism. If Benjamin’s Fascism/Communism dualism has not aged
particularly well, his insistence on the political power of mass-produced art has come to
be taken as read by contemporary cultural critics. The interest to this study of
Benjamin’s essay lies less in his Messianic hopes for the potential of mass-produced art
than with the fiercely dialectical approach with which he charts its development.
Benjamin’s notion of “aura”: the quality of art “which withers in the age of mechanical
reproduction” (221), yet can be sensed as a phantom outline or “shadow” (223) of that
which recedes from us, suggests a proto-hauntological metaphor for the absence/presence
of Derrida’s concept of spectrality and Žižek’s theory of parallax.
3
http://www.greenyour.com/lifestyle/events/greeting-cards
4
“While the letter may be en souffrance, they [the subjects] are the ones who shall suffer
from it. By passing beneath its shadow, they become its reflection. By coming into the
letter’s possession – an admirably ambiguous bit of language – its meaning possesses
them” (Ecrits 21).
5
Slavoj Žižek offers this visual metaphor to describe the objet petit a’s function within
the fabric of the real:
…in order to appear as a consistent whole, external reality has to be ‘sutured’ by a
subjective element, an artificial supplement that has to be added in order to
generate the effect of reality, like the painted background that confers on a scene
the illusion of ‘reality.’ And interface takes place at this level: it is the internal
element that sustains the consistency of the ‘external reality’ itself, the artificial
screen that confers the effect of reality on what we see. This is the objet petit a
for Lacan: the subjective element constitutive of objective-external reality. (The
Fright of Real Tears 55)
This revenant, outside of, yet endemic to reality, in dialogue with, yet inherent to, the
subject itself, is as we will see, as good a definition of a ghost as any.
6
Žižek again:
…‘a letter always arrives at its destination’ equals what ‘meeting one’s fate’
means: ‘we will all die.’ A common pretheoretical sensitivity enables us to detect
the ominous undertone that sticks to the proposition ‘a letter always arrives at its
destination’: the only letter that nobody can evade, that sooner or later reaches us,
i.e., the letter that has each of us as its addressee, is death. We can say that we
live only in so far as a certain letter (the letter containing our death warrant) still
wanders around, looking for us. (Enjoy Your Symptom! 24-5)
Very like a ghost.
7
Lacan’s invocation of Scheherezade and the 1001 Nights is of perhaps more than
coincidental interest to this chapter. The Arabian Nights is, of course, Dickens’ favorite
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literary allusion, one he employs in A Christmas Carol to show Scrooge’s lone childhood
pleasure. The reminder of death implicit in Scheherezade’s predicament is mirrored in
Scrooge’s own spirit-haunted nights.
8
William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun. Novels 1942-1954 eds. Joseph Blotner and Noel
Polk. New York: Penguin Putnam, 1994, 535.
9
An instance of parallax which Žižek himself uses as an example in The Parallax View:
Kant introduced a key distinction between negative and indefinite judgment: the
positive judgment ‘the soul is mortal’ can be negated in two ways: when a
predicate is denied to the subject (‘the soul is not mortal’), and when a nonpredicate is affirmed (‘the soul is non-mortal’)—the difference is exactly the same
as the one, known to every reader of Stephen King, between ‘he is not dead’ and
‘he is un-dead.’ The indefinite judgment opens up a third domain which
undermines the underlying distinction: the ‘undead’ are neither alive nor dead,
they are precisely the monstrous ‘living dead.’ (21-2)
10
Paradise Lost, 4.20-3:
The Hell within him, for within him Hell
He brings, and round about him, nor from Hell
One step no more then from himself can fly
By change of place.
11
Master Humphrey relates in the opening to The Old Curiosity Shop his reasons for
taking up the habit of walking alone at night: “it affords me greater opportunity of
speculating on the characters and occupations of those who fill the streets. The glare and
broad hurry of broad noon are not adapted to idle pursuits like mine; a glimpse of passing
faces caught by the light of a street lamp, or a shop window, is often better for my
purpose than their full revelation in the daylight” (1). In A Tale of Two Cities, the
narrator similarly muses that “every human creature is constituted to be that profound
secret and mystery to every other. A solemn consideration, when I enter a great city by
night, that every one of those darkly clustered houses encloses its own secret; that every
beating heart in the hundreds of thousands of breasts there, is, in some of its imaginings,
a secret to the heart nearest to it! Something of the awfulness, even of Death itself, is
referable to this” (10). The voyeurism of these passages, and the dark imagery that
attends them, reflect the panoptic qualities of Scrooge and his ghosts in A Christmas
Carol. As we will see, this kind of voyeurism leads to considerations of the “awfulness,
even of Death itself” in that text as well.
12
Consider Panthea’s description of the sleeping spirit within the Earth in Act IV:
A sphere, which is as many thousand spheres,
Solid as crystal, yet through all its mass
Flow, as through empty space, music and light:
Ten thousand orbs involving and involved,
Purple and azure, and every space between
Peopled with unimaginable shapes
Such as ghosts dream dwell in the lampless deep
Yet each intertranscpicious (238-46)
13
Paul Davis sees The Ghost of Christmas Past as an epistemological spirit, one that
shows Scrooge a rational, rather than empirical reality:
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The confrontation with Marley cracks Scrooge’s icy empiricism and turns his
attention away from external experience. In the darkness before the arrival of the
Spirit of Christmas Past, Scrooge, without sensory input, is still actively
conscious: “Scrooge went to bed again, and thought, and thought, and thought it
over and over, and could make nothing of it. The more he thought, the more
perplexed he was; and the more he endeavored to think, the more he thought” (p.
23, emphasis added). Consciousness of “nothing” is nonetheless preoccupying
consciousness. The Spirit of Christmas Past will teach Scrooge how to increase
his knowledge by adding the inward truths of memory, thought, and reflection to
the fragmentary facts from external experience. (The Lives and Times of Ebenezer
Scrooge 32)
14
I am reminded in particular of the hideously protean alien in John Carpenter’s The
Thing, whose shape-shifting ability causes panic among a group of people stationed at an
Antarctic research post. The panoptic omnipresence of the alien, and the paranoia it
arouses among the victims it haunts (and kills), offers a visceral (at times, sickening)
variation on the theme of the ghost.
15
See Sydney Carton/Charles Darnay in Tale of Two Cities, and Barnaby/Hugo in
Barnaby Rudge for two particularly memorable instances. In Our Mutual Friend, the
supposedly dead John Harmon lives a double life as John Rokesmith, whose pacing in an
upstairs apartment is described as “stumping overhead in the dark, like a Ghost” (208).
He is also referred to as “the living-dead man” (373), an indicator that the double in
Dickens is clearly to be regarded as a hauntological phenomenon.
16
From “Dickens: The Two Scrooges,” in The Wound and the Bow:
Shall we ask what Scrooge would actually be like if we were to follow him
beyond the frame of the story? Unquestionably he would relapse when the
merriment was over – if not while it was still going on – into moroseness,
vindictiveness, suspicion. He would, that is to say, reveal himself as the victim of
a manic-depressive cycle, and a very uncomfortable person. (316)
17
The Pre-Raphealites, the “Young England” movement of “radical conservatives,” and
the Oxford movement are famous examples of this trend. One even detects a note of
wistfulness in Marx’s depiction of the pre-alienated Medieval laborer in this passage
from The German Ideology:
In the towns the division of labor between the various guilds was quite natural; in
the guilds themselves it was not all carried out among the individual workers.
Every worker had to be well versed in a whole round of tasks and had to be able
to make all things that could be made with his tools […] Every man who set out
to become a master craftsman had to be proficient in the whole of his craft. The
medieval craftsmen still exhibited an interest in their special work and their skill
in it which could develop to a certain limited artistic extent. For that very reason,
however, every medieval craftsman was completely absorbed in his work…(135)
Just a hint of nostalgia (Marx’s general disdain for the Middle Ages equaled his contempt
for industrial capitalism), but a difference in degree rather than kind to William Morris’s
vision of a communist utopia in News From Nowhere (1891), in which a future classless
England looks a lot like an idealized medieval past.
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18

D.A. Miller’s The Novel and the Police examines the role of the police in Bleak House,
and its collaborative role with Chancery which drive the novel’s plot. Miller notes that
the police “not only repress but also, profoundly, satisfy the desire to which Chancery
gives rise” (73). Chancery is, in part “an all-pervasive system of domination” (63) in
which “the binarisms of inside/outside, here/elsewhere become meaningless and the
ideological effects they ground impossible” (62). Such a conception seems to me
applicable to the semiotic regime of Christmas in the Carol, in which the spectral
dislocations of time, place, freedom and necessity both reify the ideology of capitalism
while pointing out the unbearable side-effects it creates: poverty, alienation, and greed.
In this analogy, all the Christmas spirits are cops of a kind, though the actions of the
Ghost of Christmas Present most readily fit our associations. His magical torch manages
to both repress and gratify the subjects it touches. In line with his role as an agent of
binary-busting spectrality, the ghost, of course, is both “good cop” AND “bad cop” in his
dealings with Scrooge.
19
The Battle of Life is the title of Dicken’s penultimate Christmas Book. As Peter
Ackroyd notes:
The Battle of Life was a phrase which meant a great deal to Mid-Victorian
Englishmen: it was even something of a truism in a world for which struggle and
domination were the twin commandments, where the worship of energy and the
pursuit of power were the two single most important activities, where there was a
constant belief in will, in collision, in progress. Darwin and Malthus both
described “the great battle of life” and “the great battle for life”… (Dickens 514)
Darwin and Malthus’s differing prepositions aside, the phrase suggests the grim
intersection between biology and economics which would become more notoriously
mixed as the century progressed. Dickens begins his book with a description of an idyllic
countryside that was once a “fierce and bloody battle-ground, where thousands upon
thousands had been killed in the great fight” (250). The battle Dickens so apocalyptically
describes is unnamed, but like the darkness that suffuses all of the Christmas Books, the
ghost of Malthus can be regarded as a source of it: all five of the books, haunted by the
prospect of poverty and extinction, are unmistakable products of the Hungry ‘40’s, when
Malthus’ theories seemed more like simple fact. The Ghost of Christmas Past, a hearty
giant who appears to Scrooge surrounded by food, and yet whose wards are starving
children, can be seen not only as a warning of Malthusian collapse, but as its very
personification.
20
Audrey Jaffe’s “Spectacular Sympathy: Visuality and Ideology in Dickens’ A
Christmas Carol” connects the text’s preoccupation with seeing and visuality as an
example of Althusserian interpellation into the capitalist discourse of the time:
In its detailed attention to and elaboration of surfaces, its reliance on contrasts
between darkness and light, its construction as a series of scenes (a structure
reproduced in the images the spirits exhibit to Scrooge) and particularly its
engagement with a dynamic of spectatorial desire, the story is an artifact of, and
an exemplary text for understanding, the commodity culture Guy Debord terms a
‘society of the spectacle’; the mechanism of Scrooge’s conversion is, after all,
spectatorship. (254)

112

21

Like the Foucauldian panopticon, the Lacanian signifier is equally constrictive and
constitutive. There is no vantage point outside the symbolic order.
22
Even the first-person narration of the autobiographical David Copperfield begins on a
detached note. Copperfield himself is surprisingly non-committal as to whether he will
even be the hero of his own book – delegating the burden of proof to the text itself.
23
Refering to Edmund Wilson’s claims that Scrooge suffers from bipolar disorder, Elliot
Gilbert points out that “It is impossible to get into a serious discussion of Charles
Dickens’ A Christmas Carol without sooner or later having to confront “the Scrooge
problem”; i.e. the realism (or lack thereof) of Scrooge’s conversion. Citing the
reservations of Humphrey House, Edgar Johnson, and Joseph Gold, Gilbert analyzes the
cognitive disconnect the text’s denouement arouses in readers:
…there is a measure of discontent in even the most positive emotional response of
the serious reader of the book. It is a discontent arising from the obvious disparity
between the way in which moral and psychological mechanisms operate in the
story and the way in which they seem to the reader to work in the ‘real
world’…(Ceremony of Innocence 22)
Gilbert’s concern with the disparity between mimetic representation and reality can be
partly assuaged by Lacanian theory: Scrooge’s only reality is that constructed for him by
the symbolic order. The only sign that points to the Real is Christmas.
24
Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, the first, more polemical part of their two
volume exploration of the constrictive structures of capitalist society: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia, critiques the Oepidal straitjacket psychoanalysis forces on its analysands,
and expands that critique to include the ever-expanding, yet-ever limiting, boundaries of
capitalist ideology. Just as psychoanalysis forces the so-called mentally-ill to codify their
madness within a tyrannical Father-Mother-Me triad, so does capitalism ceaselessly
annex, or “re-territorialize,” areas of freedom and creativity that lie on its boundaries in a
similarly bourgeois, imperialist fashion. In both volumes of Capitalism and
Schizophrenia, Delueze and Guattari employ a flamboyant style, a vast and eclectic range
of literary, scientific and sociological references, and a studied disregard for the norms of
philosophical discourse in an attempt to diagnose, and to whatever degree possible,
circumvent, what they see as the fascistic structures that mark the limits of thought,
expression, and freedom. In their attempts to disable the normative social centering of
the subject – indeed, in their attempt to destroy the idea of the subject as such – and posit
a world of multiplicity based on pure difference, Deleuze and Guattaru speak directly
(and entertainingly) to the dialectical representations and paradoxes that underlie the
concept of spectrality, and their work will therefore be central to my own hauntological
investigations.
25
A line that proceeds from Oliver Twist’s Rose Mayley to Kate Nickleby and Little
Nell, to Florence Dombey, Dora, and Little Dorrit. Generally read as ghosts of a kind
proceeding from the traumatic death of Mary Hogarth, Dickens’ teenage sister-in-law,
they dominate the representations of femininity in Dickens’ work until A Tale of Two
Cities, where Dickens’ women start to become unattainable, and, like Great
Expectations’ Stella, frigid rather than virginal. This shift is almost universally attributed
to the appearance of Ellen Ternan in Dickens’ life, and the subsequent dissolution of his
marriage. While Dickens’ representation of women and sexuality is, as suggested above,
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certainly available to hauntological analysis, it lies outside the scope of this work.
Interested readers will have no trouble finding critical work dealing with this topic;
particularly perceptive and readable considerations can be found in John Carey’s classic
study The Violent Effigy, and Phyllis Rose’s penetrating biographical study of Victorian
marriage, Parallel Lives.
26
This observation is noted in John Bowen’s insightful essay, “Uncanny Gifts, Strange
Contagion,” from the book Contemporary Dickens.
27
It is often pointed out that the public readings Dickens embarked upon in the final
years of his life ruined his health and precipitated his end. As those readings were often
headlined by readings of A Christmas Carol, it may not be too glib to suggest that the
enactment and commodification of Christmas killed Charles Dickens.
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Chapter Two:
Mourning Becomes a Christmas Tree
‘…Though miserably weak and utterly shattered, my spirit rises when I think any wish or
plan of his [Prince Albert’s] is to be touched or changed, or I am made to do anything.’
She ended her letter in grief and affection. She was, she said, his ‘ever wretched but
devoted child, Victoria R.’ And then she looked at the date: it was the 24th of December.
An agonizing pang assailed her. And she dashed down a postscript. – ‘What a Xmas! I
won’t think of it.’
--- Lytton Strachey, Queen Victoria

I
The Christmas tree is surely the strangest of cultural artifacts. It is both process and
thing, multiplicity and unity, branching into countless directions, yet sitting blunt and
slightly abject in the middle of our living rooms. Bright and ornamental, to all
appearances full of life, the Christmas tree arrives in our homes already dead. Executed
in its prime, it comes as a revenant, a simulacrum of life. Though dead, we decorate it
with phantasmic lights and hanging totems, reminders of Christmases passed, investing it
with an uncanny life built on our memories. Those who find Christmas trees beguiling
and haunting, have good reason. They are, among other things, beautiful ghosts, standing
silent sentinel to loss. A legend concerning the origins of the Christmas tree suggests that
loss: in 723, Boniface, an English monk, was on a mission in pagan Germany. When
Boniface stumbled upon a winter sacrifice taking place beneath a huge oak tree, he fell
into a rage, grabbed an axe, and chopped down Thor’s oak, reportedly with one blow.1
The pagan Germans, expecting the disagreeable monk to be struck down by Thor’s wrath
at any moment, instead became increasingly impressed with the Englishman’s God with
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each moment Thor’s wrath failed to materialize, and with each illustration the monk gave
them of this strange religion. Boniface’s signifier for Christianity was another tree: “a
young fir tree growing at the roots of the fallen oak, with its branches pointing to
heaven…” (45). Boniface further explained that the triangular shape of the tree could be
read as a symbol of the Trinity – a “tree of the Christ child who brought eternal life”
(45).2 According to some accounts, the dead oak tree was chopped up and built into a
church. Whatever became of the tree, the lesson to the pagans was clear: old trees must
die in order for new ones to grow. To those grief-stricken pagans, waiting in vain for
Thor's answer, one imagines it must have been a hard lesson indeed.
So goes the legend. Another Englishman in Germany, Samuel Taylor Coleridge,
offers a more historically verifiable account of the Christmas tree. During a stay at a
pastor’s home in Ratzeburg, Coleridge witnessed one of the strange local customs, which
he describes in an essay from The Friend, “Christmas Within Doors”:
On the Evening before Christmas Day one of the parlours is lighted up by the
Children, into which the parents must not go; a great yew-bough is fastened on
the Table at a little distance from the wall, a multitude of little Tapers are fastened
on the bough, but not so as to burn it until they are nearly burnt out -- & coloured
paper etc hangs and flutters from the twigs. – Under this bough the Children lay
out in great neatness the presents they mean for their parents. (300)
Coleridge’s account of domestic anthropology achieves a sense of the uncanny in its
reversal of the now traditional arrangement in which parents give gifts to children, rather
than the other way around. His description heightens our sense of the Christmas tree as a
site of inter-generational exchange:
Then the Parents are introduced – and each presents his little Gift – and then bring
out the rest one by one from their pockets, and present them with kisses and
embraces. -- Where I witnessed this scene, there were eight or nine children, and
the eldest daughter and the mother wept aloud for joy and tenderness, and the
tears ran down the face of the father, and he clasped his children so tight to his
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breast – it seemed as if he did it to stifle the sob that was rising within him. – I
was much affected. (300)
Like the pagans of the St. Boniface legend, the children prepare a sacrifice for the absent
father, whose eventual appearance (if we allow that Boniface and his God are stand-ins
for the missing Thor) marks a show of great emotion, and a lesson in the proper mode of
exchange. Though the actors and signifiers change, both Boniface and the German pastor
use the Christmas tree as a site of emotional catharsis and as a school for correct training
in a new dispensation of social and cultural economy.
Coleridge’s oft-cited encounter with the Christmas tree begins a forty year period
of Christmas tree sightings among historians of the holiday,3 which reaches its apotheosis
in 1840, the year Prince Albert brought the Christmas tree to Windsor Castle. Coming
on the heels of his marriage to Victoria, an event which had a salutary effect on the new
queen’s sagging popularity, the institution of this ritual “turned the Royal Family’s
Christmases into semipublic events” (150).4 The association in the public mind of Albert
as the Father of the Christmas tree was firmly set with the appearance of an iconic
illustration of the royal family gathered around a tree in the December 23, 1848 edition of
the Illustrated London News, variations of which appeared in British and American
journals in the following years.5
While the patriarchal subtext of the Christmas tree during its reification under
Albert can be easily seen, the ritual as emotional catharsis is less easily imagined. An
uncrowned king in a strange land, Albert was a most ambivalent father figure to his
adopted country, then and now. Strachey’s portrait of him suggests an unlikely candidate
as a Father Christmas:
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Figure 7: The royal family’s Christmas tree, Illustrated London News (1848)

118
For in spite of everything he had never reached to happiness. His work, for which
at last he came to crave with an almost morbid appetite, was a solace and not a
cure; the dragon of his dissatisfaction devoured with dark relish that ever-growing
tribute of laborious days and nights; but it was hungry still. The causes of his
melancholy were hidden, mysterious, unanalysable perhaps – too deeply rooted in
the innermost recesses of his temperament for the eye of reason to apprehend.
There were contradictions in his nature, which, to some of those who knew him
best, made him seem an inexplicable enigma: he was severe and gentle; he was
modest and scornful; he longed for affection and he was cold. (284)
Here is a sphinx-like Hamlet, a man whose country, whose closest friends, seem to be at
a loss to categorize, much less idolize. But this is a portrait of the man as he lived.
Albert as icon, as father to the nation, would have to wait until he was dead.
Upon his death, due to a potent mix of typhoid fever and medical incompetence, the
violently emotional component of Albert was duly supplied by his wife, who, among
other accomplishments, became the most famous grieving widow in the world. As
Stanley Weintraub reports, “Christmas, following so soon after the funeral in Wolsey’s
Chapel, was darkened everywhere by official mourning” (306). It is in the absence of the
father that emotion is finally unleashed. For the queen herself, her already fanatical
devotion to Albert would take on a new cast. In a letter written on “the dreariest
Christmas Eve of her life,” Victoria plans her future: “I am…anxious to repeat one thing,
and that one is my firm resolve, my irrevocable decision,… that his wishes – his plans –
about everything, his views about every thing are to be my law!” (307) In losing a
husband, it would appear that the queen gained a god.
If Victoria’s grief immediately calls to mind the Freud of Beyond the Pleasure
Principle in its blunt anticipation of, and indeed willingness to indulge in, the
phenomenon of repetition compulsion, it also suggests the Freud of Totem and Taboo, in
which he outlines his alternative legend of original sin. As anthropology, Freud’s
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account of the primal murder of the father, and its attendant guilt-ridden rise of law,
religion, culture, and art still has the power to make readers scoff at his claims to science,
but as myth-building, it remains a triumph of imagination. Like the legend of St.
Boniface and the first Christmas tree, it presents a realistic, if factually suspect account of
the evolutionary shift between social orders. In the former case, a swift act of arboreal
violence constitutes the shift from pagan to Christian; in the latter, the boiling over of
Oedipal violence marks the shift from pre-history to history, from animism to religion,
from dead father to living God. Both accounts explain the rise of a totem out of taboo: in
Freud, murder gives way to ritual sacrifice – later, ritual sacrifice itself will give way to
Christmas trees. But from apemen to Albert, the absent father lies like a shadow behind
all ritual. Thus we can understand how the German pastor’s tears of joy in Coleridge’s
account may be mixed with something more ambivalent. For Freud, the totem is a
projection of deep emotional ambivalence (63), arising as it does out of taboos that arise
from cataclysmic social violence. The totem is a marker, a transitional form, which
makes apparent the evolutionary structure of trauma upon which all culture is based.
The Christmas tree as cultural totem is a site, much like its cousin the crucifix, of
mourning as much as joy. This can be seen in “A Christmas Tree,” an essay by Dickens,
written over ten years before the death of Albert, in which “a merry company of children
assembled round that pretty German toy” becomes the occasion for one of his most
elegiac and melancholy pieces. The narrator of the piece looks back with nostalgia upon
the Christmas tree of his youth, decked in its ascending (or descending – the narrator,
looking back, views his tree as growing “downward towards the earth” [169], a product
of his memories reminding him of his own deathward descent) branches with various
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toys. The essay takes an unusual turn, as the narrator’s recollections turn to horror upon
remembering a “ghastly” cardboard man, and a “dreadful” mask, which calls to his mind
“some remote suggestion and dread of the universal change that is to come on every face,
and make it still” (170). Just thinking of the mask, the narrator tells us, “the mere
knowledge of its existence anywhere, was sufficient to wake me in the night all
perspiration and horror, with, ‘O I know it’s coming! O the mask!’” (170). The higher the
narrator’s memory ascends the tree, the more his memories shift from terrible toys to his
favorite stories, including Scheherazade’s death-deferring 1001 tales, and numerous
ghost stories which he relates at length. At the highest reaches of his tree, the narrator
sees:
a prodigious nightmare […] In connection with it I descry remembrances of
winter nights incredibly long; of being sent early to bed, as a punishment for some
small offence, and waking in two hours, with a sensation of having been asleep
two nights; of the laden hopelessness of morning ever dawning; and the
oppression of a weight of remorse. (174-5)
The breathless wistfulness with which the narrator climbs his tree is filled with
impressions like these – shadows of forgotten punishments, guilt and mourning. The
narrator praises the tree, which, he claims, casts “no gloomy shadow” (182). But this
conclusion seems mitigated, if not outright contradicted, by the impressions and images
he has shown us in his memory. The Christmas tree is a constant reminder of horrors, of
punishments, of death. It points upward to a past that is lost, and downward to a future
that is lost in shadow. The tree, for all its happy associations, finally justifies itself to the
narrator echoing the words of Christ in the Last Supper: “as it sinks into the ground, I
hear a whisper going through the leaves. ‘This, in commemoration of the law of love and
kindness, mercy and compassion. This, in remembrance of me!’” (182) Clotilde de
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Stasio finds in this tree an especially “disquieting character” (7), “disturbing” in its
“oscillation[s] between the festive and the depressive” (5). Citing the “uncanny
metamorphic quality of the tree, its ghostliness and ghastliness,” de Stasio observes that
“both the tree and the objects on it are continuously changing, from real to unreal, from
distinct to indistinct: ‘Everything is capable of being changed into Anything’” (7). This
Christmas tree, like others we will examine, exhibits a deeply disturbing evolutionary
quality, and a schizoid nature that is pulled between an injunction to enjoy, and a
command to mourn. Oscillating between these poles, ascending and descending, the tree
ultimately can only find closure in an appeal to the ultimate law, the transcendental
signifier. The Christmas tree becomes the crucifix.
Whether dispensing joy or terror, the Christmas tree is a sentinel of the symbolic
order, an avatar of the law, and an invitation to remember and repeat. It issues a call to
mourn that, if less loudly stated than Victoria’s, nevertheless makes of its branches a site
of “extreme emotional ambivalence” and deep ambiguity. In reminding us of the law to
love, it also reminds us of Freud’s dictum: “What no man’s soul desires calls for no
prohibition, it automatically excludes itself. The very emphasis on the commandment:
Thou shalt not kill, makes us certain that we are descended from an endless series of
generations of murderers who had the lust to kill, as we perhaps do ourselves, in their
blood” (190).6 In other words, having to be made to love, requiring a law to love,
reminds us of how hard it is for us to do so. It may even suggest, as it does to Freud, that
all our filial obedience, and totemic respect of the law constitute the social mask of
humanity, and like Dickens’ mask, a reminder of death as well as a disguise for the
murderous creatures to whom we owe a peculiar and unsettling debt of kinship.
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Freud’s account of the rise of civilization, despite his conclusion in Totem and
Taboo that “In the beginning was the deed” (158), is by necessity a metaphor, a totem in
itself. Freud’s primal narrative, compelling as it is, is of course unprovable, and
therefore, resides in a netherland between fiction and fact. It therefore takes on the
character of a figure of speech, a signifier, an example of the very law it seeks to explain.
Gillian Beer sees Freud’s categorization of the “three blows” human narcissism has
suffered at the hands of science as a “mythopoetic” (9) exercise. The decentering of the
human subject, according to Freud, was wounded first by Copernican astronomy, second
by Darwinian biology, and thirdly (and, presumably, lastly) by Freudian psychology.
Beer argues that “Freud’s assertion arrests history. The magical number three belies the
possibility of a fourth great wound” (9), revealing a hidden teleology in Freud’s
assumptions. With Freud’s “magic number,” we arrive at a conclusion of sorts, a place to
make the ceaseless chain of signification stop. As Beer suggests, human narcissism has
not been completely destroyed, as there is enough left of Freud’s to account for the loss
of the rest. Even though Freud has helped to undermine the structural underpinnings of
civilization’s narcissistic assumptions, the hint of a solution inherent in his ordering and
narrativizing of the destruction of those assumptions keeps the totemic chain going,
despite the implications of an end to human innocence (and presumably, the start of a
more enlightened road of human progress). Freud’s use of the “magic number” three
gives the game away: as a structuring device that has underpinned much of the structural
narratives of western civilization from the taxonomies of Aristotle to the geometry of
Christianity, the ordering of civilization’s “wounds” -- the word itself a metaphoric
structuring device – (not to mention the ordering of as miasmic a realm as the
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unconscious into the neat triptych of id, ego, and superego,) is itself a teleological totem
that seeks to limit the chaos of endless multiplicity.7
Freud gives partial credit for his metaphoric narrative in Totem and Taboo to the
second great “wounder,” Charles Darwin, and his consideration of the role of patriarchal
polygamy in the concluding chapters of The Descent of Man. But for Darwin, there is no
magic number. If Freud smashes outdated teleological models to replace them with his
own, Darwin’s project seems content to dispense with teleology as such. As Beer argues
in Darwin’s Plots, “Darwinian theory will not resolve to a single significance nor yield a
single pattern. It is essentially multivalent” (6). The difference between Freud and
Darwin can be seen in the manner in which Freud himself takes up Darwinism. In
attributing his theory of original sin to Darwin, Freud states in Totem and Taboo that
“Darwin concluded from the habits of the higher primates that mankind, too, first lived in
small hordes within which the jealousy of the oldest and strongest male prevented sexual
promiscuity” (126; emphasis mine). But readers of The Descent of Man will note that
one of the salient characteristics of the book is to avoid the appearance of conclusivity.
Indeed, in the chapter to which Freud refers, Darwin offers the scenario of patriarchal
polygamy as one of several possibilities; at one point it is considered as a conditional
negative to a previous point in the same paragraph (“Or he may not have been a social
animal…”) which itself begins with a qualification that the “most probable” state of
aboriginal humanity was monogamous (659).8 Qualifying language abounds in Darwin;
in part, perhaps because he is describing a system without limits: the very idea of natural
selection is circumscribed by its capacity to describe continuous change. Therefore,
despite the linguistic concessions to positive progress and hints of ontology in The Origin
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of Species,9 Darwin’s theory can only describe a state of being: the eschatology of
extinction and the ontogeny of mutation are no more privileged positions within
Darwinian discourse than any other point on what still is often considered a “chain” of
being. But unlike Freud, Darwin is not tracing a chain of guilt, he is describing a tree of
being.10
But if Darwin’s tree frees us from the idea of progress, it still retains the chains of
an order of signification that is always already present – perhaps more so, as there is no
totemic prohibition to structure it. Darwin’s theory is, after all, still based on a law. And
while the laws of natural selection suggest the absence of a designer, a god, a father – the
absence of that father paradoxically suggests the non-presence of the father even more
than Freud’s patricidal narrative does. It is, despite its lack of ontology – perhaps
because of that lack, inevitably hauntological. The list of ghosts that haunt The Origin of
Species is a long one, ranging from evolutionists like Darwin’s grandfather Erasmus
Darwin, through Lamarck, Malthus, Lyell, and Alfred Russell Wallace, whose concurrent
discovery of natural selection was a direct prompt to Darwin to hurriedly compose The
Origin in 1859. All were gentlemen naturalists whose increasingly close reading of the
beauties of the natural world were paving the way for Darwin’s great discovery, and
setting the tone for a cultural and religious clash that is still being waged today. As J.W.
Burrow memorably puts it: “Bug-hunting was the Trojan Horse of Victorian
agnosticism” (19).
The most troublesome ghost was that of William Paley, whose Natural Theology,
published in 1802, was studied by Darwin at Cambridge, and whose argument of creation
by design still haunts those who find in Darwin an occasion to mourn. Paley’s famous
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argument of the watch which presupposes a watchmaker, and the stone, which, by
analogy, presupposes a God, presented conclusions which were widely believed to be, in
Paley’s own words, “invincible.” Any other conclusion would be atheism, a conclusion
Paley equates with “absurdity” (43). In large part, Darwin’s argument in The Origin of
Species is an attempt to refute Paley’s conclusions without resorting to absurdity.11 From
Paley’s perspective, and for those who are sympathetic to Paley’s conception of a creator,
Darwin’s theory is a direct attack on God. The success of that theory would mean the
death of that God, and the absurd victory of atheism.
Here then, is the tension between the linear chain of causality, and the multiplying
branches of the tree at its most blunt. That tension still frames the debate that doggedly
clings to Darwin’s theory, and to Darwin himself. As Gillian Beer notes: “there is still a
sense in which we hold Darwin responsible for his history of the world, as though he had
created rather than simply recorded the processes he describes” (95). This sense of
responsibility seems to have been felt by Darwin himself. James Moore and Adrian
Desmond note that, when The Descent of Man was about to be published, Darwin became
increasingly nervous: “Darwin dreaded these times of publication. A stream of selfdeprecating letters went off to disarm critics. It will ‘disgust you,’ he warned an old
Beagle shipmate; while from Mivart [a colleague and Lecturer in Comparative Anatomy]
‘execution’ was the least he anticipated for such capital blasphemy” (l). He suffered
from violent headaches, vomiting, “hysterical crying,” and “dying sensations” (xl), that
have often been attributed to a sense of guilt for the oblique metaphysical and cultural
violence he was unintentionally committing.12 Parts of The Origin read like a eulogy, an
effort to console his audience:
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All that we can do, is to keep steadily in mind that each organic being is striving
to increase at a geometric ratio; that each at some period of its life, during some
season of the year, during each generation or at intervals, has to struggle for life,
and to suffer great destruction. When we reflect on this struggle, we may console
ourselves with the full belief, that the war of nature is not incessant, that no fear is
felt, that death is generally prompt, and that the vigorous, the healthy, and the
happy survive and multiply. (129)
One gets the sense in this passage that the clergy might not have been an entirely missed
calling for Darwin. His diction, comprised of words like “striving,” “suffer,” “console,”
and “belief,” sounds more redolent of the pulpit than the laboratory. He is not merely
presenting a theory; he is teaching his readers how to cope with it.
This concern for the sensibilities of his readership can be seen in the structure –
the narrative structure, to follow Beer – of The Descent of Man as well. While the thesis
of Darwin’s long-delayed book argues for the evolution of humanity out of “lower” life
forms, and thus, finally making explicit human’s troubling place within the evolutionary
chain (which Darwin was purposely silent about in the Origin), it does so by the most
roundabout of means. Sixty percent of the text does not speak of humans at all, but rather
provides hundreds of pages of detail about the mating habits of animals, beginning with
invertebrates, and proceeding “upwards” from insects to fish to birds to mammals. Each
chapter is rigorously formulaic, treating each animal’s fighting habits, vocal talents,
mating rituals, and ornamental displays in the same order, creating a sense of inexorable
repetition that nevertheless creates an oddly compelling spiral effect as the order of
animals treated becomes more and more complex. When Darwin does speak of humans
in the final chapter, we arrive with a sense of déjà vu: The structure of the chapter is
exactly the same as the preceding chapters, and the rhetorical impact of this final,
structural repetition is perhaps greater than anything Darwin actually says: Darwin need
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not explicitly call humans monkeys when the structure and diction of the chapter on
humans essentially repeats that of the preceding chapter on apes. The structural tree
Darwin has composed to ease his readers into the unsettling implications of his unsettling
thesis is ultimately the most compelling aspect of his argument. Always concerned about
the effect his argument will have on his audience, Darwin adopts a strategy of genteel
anthropomorphism in his treatment of his animal’s behavior.13 His description of the
apparently monogamous loyalty of a pair of land-snails (303-4) is one of the more
touching and comical examples of Darwin’s approach: his snails, however clinically
observed, would not seem out of place in one of Lewis Carroll’s fantasies. When
speaking of birds (his obvious favorites), Darwin cannot resist speaking of their mating
habits in terms of “love,” “charm,” and “joy” (461-4). The Descent of Man is as much a
cultural text as a scientific one, as creative in its depiction of evolution as it is
compelling. The tree of descent which Darwin composes is one equally concerned with
assuaging the sensibilities of his Victorian readership as it is with overturning them.
Darwin’s tree, then, is not simply his theory of natural selection, but the cultural
context that leads up to, and circumscribes, that theory. It is a progressive narrative of
loss, and despite the “forms most beautiful and wondrous” being evolved, the
interconnections it marks between man and nature also mark a severance of man from
God. Darwin effectively kills the father years before Freud conducts the autopsy. In the
evolutionary climate of the Victorian period, the tree of life itself becomes a site of
mourning. For the hyper-fecundity of the evolutionary tree is built as much on death and
extinction as much as it is on the ceaselessly ramifying force of life; indeed, the creative
forces of life are impossible without the destructive mechanism of extinction. As the
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stark mechanics of evolution became more and more apparent to Darwin and the culture
that produced him, it became increasingly clear that God was no longer to be seen in the
gears of Paley’s waylaid watch. Over the course of the nineteenth century, gentleman
naturalists content to find God in the static, beautiful artifacts of nature would be forced
into a new profession: that of the scientist, ceaselessly mining new veins of specialization
in the pursuit of extracting meaning from meaningless processes. It would be left to the
poets to search for lost fathers flitting like a ghost between the branches of the Darwinian
tree.

II

On the surface, it would seem there could be no one less fitting to conduct such a search
than that most Eeyore-like of poets, Alfred Tennyson. In one of the more amusing
instances of damning praise, W.H. Auden famously observed of Tennyson that “there
was little about melancholia that he didn’t know; there was little else that he did” (222).
Modernist dismissals of Victoria’s poet laureate as depressive bump on a log aside, there
is much in Tennyson’s music and imagery to suggest kinship with the stupidly granitic
immobility that constitutes the poet’s popular stereotype. In the early poems “The
Kraken” and “Mariana,” Tennyson paints striking pictures of stasis. In “The Kraken,” an
enormous beast rests at the bottom of the sea: “There hath he lain for ages and will lie /
Battening upon huge seaworms in his sleep” (11-12). The leviathan eventually moves to
the surface, but only to die. Tennyson’s Mariana is similarly entombed in her “lonely
moated grange” (8), indulging in a self-imposed exile punctuated by her repeated lament:
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“‘I am aweary, aweary, / I would that I were dead!’” (11-12). Auden’s description of the
poet’s “large, loose-limbed body” with “huge bricklayer’s hands” (222), complemented
by his “stupid” melancholy, itself seems a grotesque combination of the Kraken and
Mariana. Much like the Victorian Age for which Tennyson was brought to account by
his Modernist critics, he comes off in Auden’s sketch as a clumsy monster, faintly
comical in his mourning, luxuriating in a premature rigor mortis brought on by
mechanical repetition. Hardly a figure to give poetic voice to evolutionary change, much
less to the great scientific and cultural metamorphoses of his age.
But it is precisely the immobilized half-lives Tennyson explores, as well as his
obsessive repetitions, that constitute Tennyson’s ability to see his age as process, to seek
faith in the very gaps that suggest its lack, and which makes his poetry so paradoxically
dynamic. It is, after all, the cyclopean paralysis of the Kraken that makes its eventual
movement so apocalyptic. And it is precisely in the repetitive interplay between the
death-driven agoraphobia of Mariana and her claustrophobic environment that a dramatic
dialectic occurs:14 where static isolation becomes, as Herbert F. Tucker puts it, a
“virtually ritual movement of anagnorisis” (362), the very engine of discovery and
epiphany. Repetition and paralysis, anxiety and melancholia, become poetic tools with
which Tennyson seeks the contingent, the lost, and the impending. Tennyson’s poetry
moves through stasis, reaching towards what Tucker calls “an epiphany of the inevitable,
with a rhythm, at once cardiac and astral, to which the whole creation moves” (20). That
inevitability, of course, suggests a looming presence in absence, the moving trace of the
ghost.
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If we accept Derrida’s theory of spectrality, all of Tennyson’s poems can be
regarded as ghost stories of a kind: their dialectic of anxiety and melancholy, of subject
turning into object (enacting Isabel Armstrong’s conception of the “double poem”) create
a uniform atmosphere of haunting. But no poem in Tennyson’s oeuvre, perhaps no work
in English in the nineteenth century, is as haunted – by loss, by ghosts, by haunting itself
– as that great accretive epic malgré lui: In Memoriam, A.H.H. On the surface a diary of
grief and an intimate elegy to Tennyson’s gifted college friend Arthur Hallam, who died
suddenly of a cerebral hemorrhage in Vienna in 1833, In Memoriam became, through
seventeen years of composition, more a study of mourning than an immediate expression
of it. Indeed, in expanding the scope of his personal grief to encompass cosmic anxieties
of evolution, ten years before Darwin published The Origin of Species, Tennyson
captured the unease of a nation. The publication of In Memoriam made him poet
laureate, and in later years, Victoria would return to the poem to assuage her own grief at
the loss of Albert. Tennyson became Victoria’s Virgil, and it may not be too much to
suggest that In Memoriam, not least in its obsessive harrowing of the underworld in quest
of the lost Hallam, became a Victorian Aeneid. It is, at the very least, among the
strangest and most poignant of Victorian ghost stories.
Like any ghost story, In Memoriam thrives on contradictions as it conducts its
impossible dialogue between the living and the dead, the self and other, faith and doubt,
being and nothingness. In form, it presents a linear chain of interlocking stanzas
consisting of a central couplet circumscribed by two rhyming lines, compressed into a
self-limiting tetrameter. These stanzas coalesce into numbered clusters, inexorably
counting upward from one to one hundred and thirty one, the cantos themselves enclosed
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by a prologue and epilogue. But the circular and linear process described by the form is
complicated by the thematic ramifications of the ceaselessly questioning speaker. On one
level, the poem can be said to describe the speaker’s ascent from despair and grief, on
another it can be said to diagram the ebb and flow of emotional and intellectual
turbulence the speaker undergoes. In other words, while the poem charts a Dantean rise
from a spiritual hell to a hard-earned peace – a kind of truce with heaven – moving, as it
does, from a funeral to a wedding, its singular power stems from its ability to represent
mourning as a process: an unpredictable accrual of moments, images, and ideas that arise
from particular circumstances within the poem, rather than from any determining
structure. A late stanza, describing the nebular evolution of geologic time, could also
serve as a description of the poem itself:
In tracts of fluent heat began,
And grew to seeming-random forms,
The seeming prey of cyclic storms,
Till at the last arose the man (cxiii, 9-12)
There is progress at work here: beginning with the “fluent heat” of grief, we eventually
arrive at a risen man; but in between the bookending couplet is a vivid image of the
arboreal labyrinth the poem as a whole becomes: a tangle of “random forms” which are
the product of emotional “storms.” The adjectives work to undermine each other: the
linear “began” and “last” are undercut by “random” and “cyclic”; pluralized “tracts” of
heat become singular: “the man.” The uncertainties of these contradictions are further
embellished by the repetitive use of the qualifier “seeming”: like Darwin, Tennyson’s
vision of the natural world is highly conditional.
The struggle between contraries in In Memoriam is both characteristic of the
poem’s content, and constitutive of the poem itself. Formally and thematically, the
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poem presents a definite beginning and ending, a line segment that rises from a final
point of death to a somewhat more ambiguous finality (however conclusive it is for to the
poem as such) in the marriage of the epilogue. Visually, a simple line, pointing skyward:

The poem also, through its formal and thematic repetitions, describes a “circle moaning
in the air” (xii, 15) the metaphoric “cyclic storms” which make up so much of its shape:
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If we see this cyclonic form “rising,” moving toward “one far off event” horizon, we can
invert it, and juxtapose it with our linear model:

It would not require a great imaginative leap to see in this diagram of formal contraries a
structure; to make of this semiotic field a signifier. In the spectral gap between linear
progression and cyclic repetition one can make out an arboreal ghost: a Christmas tree.
As glib or wayward as this diagram may appear, it reflects a common critical
consensus that In Memoriam revolves around its three “Christmas sections.” A.C.
Bradley’s Commentary on Tennyson’s In Memoriam cites no less an authority than
Tennyson himself that “the divisions of the poem are made by the Christmas-tide
sections,” and that the “most obvious sign of definite structure in In Memoriam consists
in the internal chronology” (122), of which the Christmas poems are “the most prominent
instance” (124). Bradley sets up a linear, chronological table illustrating the poem’s
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progression (123) around which the thrice repeated comings of Christmas spiral. Sarah
Gates, in analyzing Tennyson’s unique abba stanza form, sees spirals as well:
The fourth line does gesture back to the first, but it does not enact a complete
return, for it can only do so after the reader has passed through the two middle
lines whose couplet form gives so much strength to their rhyme. Thus, the outer
rhyme a a- -a is distanced; the second ‘a’ recollects only dimly the first ‘a,’ which
by then has become a faint echo and seems, in spite of the rhyme, to have been
something different from the ‘a’ we are now reading […] The second ‘a’
‘returns,’ but it also leads ‘beyond’ because it is different from the middle
couplets and only faintly recollects its partner […] Rather than characterize this
movement as a circle, I would call it a spiral, a figure that includes the backward
forward gesturing of vacillation, the repetition risking stasis (the central
concentration), but also the outer diffusion, the movement beyond. (508-9)
Both the macrocosmic structure of the poem taken as a whole, and the microcosmic
world of the stanza form a multi-cyclonic architectonic which is entangled with the more
linear aspects of chronology (the seasons, anniversaries, Christmases) and numerology
(the ascending numbers that form the various stanzas into individual “poems”) that drive
the poem forward, inexorably, to the proverbial “tree topper:”
That God, which ever lives and loves,
One God, one law, one element,
And one far-off divine event,
To which the whole creation moves. (epilogue, 141-4)
Both line and spiral funnel upwards, towards a univocal signifier, the absence-presence of
which has previously made up the body of the poem-tree, but now, in its ending,
dissolves all questions of difference and repetition into one shining point.15
Like other Christmas trees, In Memoriam is arborescent, evolutionary; its
flowering is dependent on the death of an other, and is haunted by the other’s death.
Every aspect of In Memoriam, its very existence, is predicated on the death of Hallam.
Its growth is marked by the revenant of Hallam: as long as Hallam is remembered, and
mourned – as long as he remains, and repeats, as a ghost, the branches of In Memoriam
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continue to grow. It is only when Hallam is finally and definitively equated with “That
God, which ever lives and loves” that the tree reaches a point, and the poem can stop. As
in A Christmas Carol, it is only when death and life reach a univocal point, when the
chain of signification reaches the terminal signifier, that “all is well, tho’ faith and form/
Be sunder’d in the night of fear” (cxxvii, 1-2). This is the apotheosis of the murdered
father in Totem and Taboo, in which the fearful specter of the dead becomes the triumph
of eternal law; this is the transformation of Prince Albert from German house-husband to
a kingly sublime object of national mourning, a transformation Tennyson was often
accused of abetting. The Poet Laureate’s willingness to indulge the queen’s grief is most
notoriously on display in his Idylls of the King, which Swinburne dubbed “Le Morte
D’Albert.” In his “Dedication” to the Idylls, Tennyson offers the mourning queen an
Albert much like Hallam – transcendent, universal:
Break not, O woman’s-heart, but still endure;
Break not, for thou art Royal, but endure,
Remembering all the beauty of that star
Which shone so close beside Thee that ye made
One light together, but has past and leaves
The Crown a lonely splendor.
May all love
His love, unseen but felt, o’ershadow Thee (43-9)
This benevolent shadow, which is, through metaphoric cross-connection simultaneously
Albert, Arthur, and, finally, God, is also a return of the shadow of Hallam, who himself is
absorbed into God in In Memoriam. Like the ghosts of A Christmas Carol, Tennyson’s
ghosts are panoptic, omnipresent, and, spiraling as they do to “one far-off event,”
inevitable.
This inevitability is not without its problems. The missing king, the dead father,
are felt first as an almost unbearable lack. Tennyson first mourns the dead king Arthur

136
(though not yet Albert) in “The Epic,” a frame poem for the surviving fragment of his
first attempt at a twelve book epic on Arthurian themes, “Morte D’Arthur.” The poem
takes place
At Francis Allen’s on the Christmas-eve,-The game of forfeits done – the girls all kissed
Beneath the sacred bush and passed away –
The parson Holmes, the poet Everard Hall,
The host, and I sat round the wassail-bowl,
Then half-way ebbed: and there we had a talk,
How all the old honour had from Christmas gone,
Or gone, or dwindled down to some odd games
In some odd nooks like this […] (1-9)
Even for Tennyson, this is a bleak opening. More than half of the first ten lines
express loss of some kind. The verbs alone are relentless in their sense of abandonment:
“done,” “passed,” “ebbed,” “gone,” “dwindled.” Everything about this Christmas has left
before it has even started -- the holiday so torpid that the speaker’s first action is to fall
asleep (13). He wakes to talk of the “decay of faith” (18) and varieties of extinction,
natural and cultural: Everard has burned his draft of an epic of King Arthur because he
“thought that nothing new was said, or else/ Something so said ‘twas nothing” (30-1) and
asks “Why take the style of those heroic times?/ For nature brings not back the
Mastodon,/ Nor we those times” (35-7). In “The Epic,” Tennyson provides a dry run for
the structure of In Memoriam: a Christmas of loss, determined by the death of the king.
The lack of this transcendent signifier casts a pall on everything, until, of course, Hall
reads his poem of the death of Arthur, effectively raising him from the dead. The speaker
imagines “‘Arthur has come again: he cannot die’” (296). The speaker describes a host
of others calling for the return of the king, a repeating call that turns into the peal of
church-bells on Christmas morning (297-303). It is this phantasmic appeal to a ghostly
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dead/alive authority to make of a dismal, nihilistic Christmas a happy one that not only
presages In Memoriam, but marks a central thematic trope in the Victorian Christmas
narrative: it is the same command to enjoy in the face of non-existence, to celebrate in the
midst of death, that defines the movement of A Christmas Carol, and underlies the myth
of the Christmas tree.
In Memoriam illustrates, like “The Epic,” the command to enjoy in the wake of
mourning that seems strangely constitutive of the Victorian Christmas, but its complex,
repetitive structure continually, both explicitly and implicitly, raises the question: “What
is the authority that commands?” We have seen in the last chapter how Christmas
becomes a transcendental signifier, a focal point of social power that commands
enjoyment. In this sense, and indeed, as Dickens makes explicit in his personifying
spirits, Christmas is itself a “ghost of an idea” that through surveillance and intervention,
operates as a normative site of power-knowledge, to use Michel Foucault’s term16. In A
Christmas Carol, which ostensibly casts a critical eye on arch-capitalist Ebenezer
Scrooge, we see how Christmas in fact reifies capitalism by making Scrooge a better
capitalist. Four ghosts confront Scrooge with the emerging cultural discourse of
Christmas, and Scrooge is transformed into a good man. What is fascinating is what does
NOT change: Scrooge’s role as an economic power player. In fact, Scrooge’s first act
upon his reformation is to hire a member of the working class to buy commodities for his
lower-middle class employee, Bob Cratchitt. Scrooge’s heart may have changed, but his
business acumen has not. In fact, what the invocation of Christmas has ultimately
accomplished is a vindication, and normalization, of the discourse of capitalism it was
originally employed to combat. As Margaret Atwood has wittily observed:17
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Scrooge’s big sin was to freeze his money; for money, as all students of it
recognize, is of use only when it’s moving (99) […] Scrooge is set free from his
own heavy chain of cashboxes at the end of the book, when, instead of sitting on
his pile of money, he begins to spend it. (98)
The happy ending of Dickens’ Carol involves upward economic mobility for all
concerned, and solves the troubling problem of an unpleasant capitalist by triumphantly
actualizing his capitalism.
In Tennyson’s In Memoriam, Christmas is once again put to seemingly
paradoxical work, this time combating, and then co-opting, the violent and horrific
implications of biological and geological evolution. As in “The Epic,” Christmas is a site
of mourning, but it is also a social discourse that interferes with the speaker’s grief,
forcing him to reconsider not only that grief, but the terrifying observations of the
Darwinian natural world he often indulges as a result of it. Consider Poem 28, which
describes Christmas not as a comforting psychological alternative to mourning, but as a
powerful social prescriptive that commands his allegiance:
The time draws near the birth of Christ
The moon is hid, the night is still;
The Christmas bells from hill to hill
Answer each other in the mist.
Four voices of four hamlets round,
From far and near, on mead and moor
Swell out and fail, as if a door
Were shut between me and the sound;
Each voice four changes on the wind,
That now dilate, and now decrease,
Peace and goodwill, goodwill and peace,
Peace and goodwill, to all mankind.
This year I slept and woke with pain,
I almost wish’d no more to wake,
And that my hold on life would break
Before I heard those bells again;
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But they my troubled spirits rule,
For they controll’d me as a boy;
They bring me sorrow touch’d with joy,
The merry, merry bells of Yule. (xxviii, 1-20)
From “hill to hill” and through “four voices of four hamlets round,” Christmas surrounds
the speaker, and the use of repetition in these stanzas suggests the oppressive weight of
these bells, “merry, merry” though they might be. The speaker, wishing only to doze
indefinitely in a fetal position, is recruited by the discursive force of Christmas, which
controls him as much now as it did as a boy, though with a much more ambiguous power.
Though on one hand, the bells pull the speaker out of a state of suicidal contemplation,
the power of the Christmas bells is one that “brings sorrow,” and, rather than dispel
troubled spirits, they “rule” them. Christmas here does not so much bring joy and rescue,
but rather annexes and redefines feelings of dread. Christmas does not bring relief, but
demands submission.
The sense of Christmas in these poems as a force that demands compliance is
often suggested by the speaker’s feeling of being watched – of being, as it were, under
surveillance. Note the panoptic gaze suggested in Poem 30, in which the speaker’s
family undergoes Christmas rituals as if under armed guard:
With trembling fingers did we weave
The holly round the Christmas hearth;
A rainly cloud possess’d the earth,
And sadly fell our Christmas-eve.
At our old pastimes in the hall
We gamboll’d, making vain pretense
Of gladness, with an awful sense
Of one mute Shadow watching all. (1-8)
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The imagery here suggests a family under siege. “Trembling,” the speaker submits to
Christmas rituals, as a “rainy cloud” which “possess”-es the earth overshadows
everything. The family pretends to have fun, as if in dread of offending the mute shadow
that watches them. On one level, of course, the “Shadow” is A.H. Hallam, but the
deification-by-capitalization of the word suggests a more powerful, even omnipotent
force. As in A Christmas Carol, the holiday is personified not so much by the spirit of
Christ, but by a ghostly force that operates with social purpose, here a panoptic shadow
rather than the watchful committee of spirits in Dickens’ novella. In both cases, the
power of Christmas – whether personified by agents who offer their own powers of
surveillance to those in need of the Christmas spirit (as with the ghosts of A Christmas
Carol), or by an omnipresent, all-seeing shadow – can be seen as something of a terrible
gift given to those who, like Scrooge and the speaker of In Memoriam, have placed
themselves on society’s margins. It is a gift that reintegrates these characters back into a
social structure governed by the normative beneficence of Christmas itself. The agency
of Christmas also forces these characters to see and be seen, to accept the social world
and its terrors, and to mitigate those terrors through the rhetoric of Christmas cheer, and
through voluntary self-surveillance. The world of Christmas in Victorian narrative can
largely be seen as one in which everyone watches each other. More importantly,
everyone must learn, no matter how unpleasant the lesson, to enjoy doing so.
If this reading seems something of a stretch for the elegiac In Memoriam,
compare the speaker’s diction and tone with that of the more famously controversial
speaker of Maud, a poem in which Tennyson gives us a speaker so inscribed in the
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discursive practices of Victorian England that the only way he can voice his rebellion
against them is to embrace them:
And it was but a dream, yet it lighten’d my despair
When I thought that a war would arise in defense of the right,
That an iron tyranny should now bend or cease…
Nor Britain’s one sole God be the millionaire.
No more shall commerce be all in all, and Peace
Pipe on her pastoral hillock in a languid note…
And myself have awaked, as it seems, to the better mind.
It is better to fight for the good than to rail at the ill;
I have felt with my native land, I am one with my kind,
I embrace the purpose of God, and the doom assign’d. (3.18-20, 22-24, 56-59.)
Here, the speaker differentiates between oppressive economic forces and the glories of
military service. Tennyson sees the irony of that distinction by voicing it from the
perspective of a manic-depressive recently discharged from a lunatic asylum, which is
why the similarity between that poem and In Memoriam striking: the latter poem’s
speaker makes the same rhetorical moves Maud’s lunatic does, but without irony. Note
the similar emphasis on waking and dreaming, the oppressive tone in describing the
monotonous rhythms of “peace,” the final ambiguous acceptance of “oneness.” Critics
have taken Tennyson, and Maud, to task for equating “the purpose of God” with a
jingoistic defense of the Crimean War,18 but the speaker’s resignation of God’s will as a
“doom assign’d” suggests a capitulation rather than an embrace, one that mirrors the
speaker of In Memoriam’s submission to Christmas. Both speakers seek to exorcise
private ghosts, and both find it possible only by reluctantly joining the society they still
seem in part to abhor.19
For it is not easy to catch the Christmas spirit. As it took four spirits to
indoctrinate Scrooge in the necessities of Christmas cheer, the structure of In Memoriam
requires the repetition of three Christmases to make the speaker come to terms with his
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existential terror and dread. In the first Christmas, the speaker flatly asks: “How dare we
keep our Christmas-eve […] In dance and song and game and jest?” (xxix, 4, 8) Still,
custom demands compliance:
Yet go, and while the holly boughs
Entwine the cold baptismal font,
Make one wreath more for Use and Wont,
That guard the portals of the house,
Old sisters of a day gone by,
Gray nurses, loving nothing new;
Why should they miss their yearly due
Before their time? They too will die. (xxix, 9-16)
The speaker’s cynicism towards the “old sisters,” “Use and Wont,” suggest a barely
concealed rage: the traditions which seem to trap the speaker in “guarding the portals of
the house” will get their due, if not his respect. But he dismisses them threateningly:
“they too will die.”
The second Christmas shows softening in the speaker’s tone, and if he does not
find joy in the Christmas ritual, he is more willing to accept them:
Again at Christmas did we weave
The holly round the Christmas hearth;
The silent snow possess’d the earth,
And calmly fell our Christmas eve (lxxviii, 1-4)
While the speaker allows that this Christmas is calm (an advance, perhaps, upon the
Christmas Eve that falls “sadly” in Poem 30), compliance is again the reigning tone here.
The numerous repetitions of this stanza seem to supply the almost uttered “weary” in the
stuttering repetition “we weave.” The word “Christmas” itself becomes leaden in its
repetition, surrounded as it is by single syllabic words with smooth vowels. The
speaker’s sarcasm in Poem 29 seems to linger here in the spitting consonance of
“Christmas” which brings the poem to a crude stop each time it is spoken. In its vocal
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effects, the spiral weaving of the holly becomes a Sisyphean chore, and though the
“ancient games [and] dance and song and hoodman-blind” (lxxviii, 10,12) are ritually
performed, grief and sorrow, though seemingly absent, remain “mixt with all this mystic
frame” (lxxvii, 18): mourning is inextricably mixed with pleasure’s outward show. In
fact, the connection between grief and enjoyment is metaphysically cemented: the
“mystic frame,” an ambiguous referent which could mean the speaker, Christmas, or
being itself, is suffused in “all” by distress, sorrow, and grief (lxxvii, 13-16). When the
speaker asks if this grief can “be changed to less” (a prospect the speaker finds as horrific
as the grief itself: “O last regret, regret can die!” (17), the answer is definitive: “No” (18).
The third Christmas again repeats the lines “The time draws near the birth of
Christ” and the adverbial formula that ends with “falls our Christmas-eve” in Poems 104
and 105, but in the interim, the speaker has moved, and his father has died. “Our father’s
dust is left alone/ And silent under other snows” (cv, 5-6), but this disruption, rather than
add to the speaker’s grief, becomes an occasion to re-evaluate it. The speaker declares
that this Christmas:
No more shall wayward grief abuse
The genial hour with mask and mime;
For change of place, like growth of time,
Has broke the bond of dying use.
Let cares that petty shadows cast,
By which our lives are chiefly proved,
A little spare the night I loved,
And hold it solemn to the past. (cv, 9-16)
In these two stanzas, it appears that the speaker is done with grief. He rather shockingly
calls his cares “petty shadows,” which seems a repudiation of the primary metaphor the
speaker has been using to indicate the ghostly presence of Hallam. Grief itself is
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rendered an imposter that “abuses” Christmas by pretending to be absent. “Strangely”
falls this Christmas Eve indeed (cv,4). Here, the differentiating adverb works against the
call to the end of grief, and suggests the paradoxical contradictions at work in this poem.
For immediately after excoriating his grief, the speaker calls it back:
But let no footstep beat the floor,
Nor bowl of wassail mantle warm;
For who would keep an ancient form
Thro’ which the spirit breathes no more? (cv, 17-20)
Though there will be no more pretence of joyful ritual sullied by hidden grief, there will
also be no rituals at all – unless the “spirit” breathe through them. In other words, the
shadow of Hallam is to be dispelled, but only if the spirit of Hallam remains. By this
point, the speaker has clearly identified Hallam as “the Spirit himself” (xciii, 6), and has
begun to make peace with his natural despair by substituting a ghostly plane in which
“Spirit to Spirit, Ghost to Ghost” (xciii, 8), the speaker and Hallam can commune. The
speaker has in fact summoned Hallam to
Descend, and touch, and enter; hear
The wish too strong for words to name;
That in this blindness of the frame
My Ghost may feel that thine is near. (xciii, 13-16)20
As the speaker increasingly seeks Hallam on this phantasmal level, the natural world
becomes increasingly “strange,” resulting in the numerous contradictions of Poem 105.
What begins as a plea to stop movement, a desire for stasis -- “To-night ungather’d let us
leave/ This laurel, let this holly stand” (cv, 1-2) – ends in a call for the stars, the “rising
worlds by yonder wood,” to “run out your measured arcs, and lead/ The closing cycle
rich in good” (cv, 25-28). The speaker wishes simultaneously to exorcise and invoke his
ghosts, to still them, and set them spinning.
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This confusing metamorphosis in the speaker’s reaction to Christmas can be
further seen in Poem 106, in which the speaker once again engages the panoptic bells
which brought him “sorrow touch’d with joy” in Poem 28:
Ring out the old, ring in the new,
Ring, happy bells, across the snow;
The year is going, let him go;
Ring out the false, ring in the true.
***
Ring out a slowly dying cause,
And ancient forms of party strife;
Ring in the nobler modes of life,
With sweeter manners, purer laws.
The speaker approvingly anticipates new manners and new laws: the discourse of
Christmas has apparently made such a revolution in power-knowledge possible. But
what has changed? The bells are still ringing, echoing the forceful rhythms of the first
Christmas the speaker is reluctantly confronted with. There has not been a repudiation of
the evolutionary science which has tormented the speaker throughout the poem: nature is
still “red in tooth and claw,” only the speaker’s attitude has changed:
…The fortress crashes from on high,
The brute earth lightens to the sky,
And the great Aeon sinks in blood,
And compass’d by the fires of Hell,
While thou, dear spirit, happy star,
O’erlook’st the tumult from afar,
And smiling, knowing all is well. (Poem 127)
Indeed, here evolutionary forces are rendered more apocalyptic than ever, but those
forces are outranked by an overseeing intelligence. This intelligence is nominally God
(or Hallam - the speaker seems to conflate them at times), but it has been made operable,
and the speaker has been inscribed into its discourse, by the social rhetoric of Christmas.
Nothing has changed except the speaker’s compliance – though that compliance, like
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Scrooge’s, makes all the difference. As surely as it removes the fangs from capitalism,
Christmas removes the meaningless terror of evolutionary time and scientific discourse
by absorbing those terrorized by them into its merry gaze.

III

In his 1884 post-apocalyptic novel, After London, Richard Jefferies imagines a world
given back to nature after some half-remembered catastrophe:
The old men say their fathers told them that soon after the fields were left to
themselves a change began to be visible. It became green everywhere in the first
spring, after London ended, so that all the country looked alike […] Hawthorn
bushes sprang up […] and, protected by the briars and thorns from grazing
animals, the suckers of elm-trees rose and flourished. Sapling ashes, oaks,
sycamores, and horse-chestnuts, lifted their heads. Of old time the cattle would
have eaten off the seed leaves with the grass so soon as they were out of the
ground, but now most of the acorns that were dropped by birds, and the keys that
were wafted by the wind, twirling as they floated, took root and grew into trees.
By this time the brambles and the briars had choked up and blocked the former
roads, which were as impassable as the fields. (1-2)
Jefferies describes a world where evolution has gone out of control, where the hyperfecundity of vegetation has broken the superstructure of an industrial society that has
retreated into myth. London itself has devolved into a stratified layer of toxic sludge, the
very air surrounding it death to breathe (science fiction, to a point). Royalty as such is no
more: with no central government, the small clusters of human habitation have selfstyled, usually incompetent “kings” that ceaselessly war with each other. Literature from
before “The Change” has been lost – at least that literature immediately preceding The
Change; presumably, Victorian literature. The remnants of humanity prefer Sophocles,
because his texts are short and to the point (102). The novel’s hero, whose voyage to the
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surreal hellscape of London makes up much of the narrative, seems to be on the verge of
a strategic military breakthrough that could change the balance of power in the agrarian
world, and bring a form of centralized government back to England, but he is plagued
with a day-dreaming nature that luxuriates in his natural surroundings, a trait that is
indulged by the narrator, whose lovingly exhaustive descriptions of the natural world
make the novel a strange mix of Mad Max and Walden. The reader, like the protagonist,
is unsure whether to make of this world a nightmare or an arcadia.
The world of After London could be accurately described as a post-Darwinian
dystopia like those of H.G. Wells, but it could also be fairly characterized as a utopian
model of the de-structured, rhizomatic world of strata Deleuze and Guattari conceptualize
in A Thousand Plateaus. The world of After London is fragmented, de-centered, forgetful
of its past, endangered only by the encroachment of nature and roving packs of animals
and nomads. The rhizome of Deleuze and Guattari is an “antigeneology. It is a shortterm memory, or antimemory. The rhizome operates by variation, expansion, conquest,
capture, offshoots” (21). It is “an acentered, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system
without a General and without an organizing memory or central automaton, defined
solely by a circulation of states. [It] is always in the middle, not at the beginning or end”
(21). Jefferies’ world is in the middle, after the end, forgetful of its origins and
unconcerned with its eventual fate, and thus, despite, its dangers, rather inviting.
Nonsignifying and antimemory, it is a world that cannot mourn because it cannot
remember what it has lost.
And yet there is something ominous in Jefferies description of the encroaching
trees, and this may be simply because they are trees. In After London’s opening pages,
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the proliferating trees offer a kind of judgment on the fallen civilization. If the narrator,
stuck in a future present that can’t make sense of the past, can view the trees
dispassionately, even affectionately, the reader, situated within the past that the text has
marked as dead, has little choice but to see in this hyper-fecund arboreality a meaning not
present to the future describing it: the trees are our first visual marker in the text of the
death of our own civilization. As such, we read the trees as markers of beginnings and
endings, the agents of memory, and therefore, mourning and loss. In the rhizome,
Deleuze and Guattari find a suitable arch-enemy of trees, which have “dominated
Western reality and all of Western thought, from botany to biology […] theology,
ontology, all of philosophy” (18). They trace “the structure of Power” (17). Regarding
trees, Deleuze and Guattari warn: “Make rhizomes, not roots, never plant! […] Don’t be
one or multiple, be multiplicities! Run lines, never plot a point!” (24) Such hostility to
trees may not be the most constructive approach to dealing with their presence, but
Deleuze and Guattari make a trenchant, if flamboyant, point about the nature of trees:
they tend towards a point, and that point, as we have seen in the Christmas trees of this
chapter, can be a singularity of pain. The unfettered, hippie-radical rhizome, can seem
relatively comforting in comparison: an escape from the totalizing umbrella of the
signifier, a line of flight from the monarchical, hierarchical tyranny of memory.
On this point, however, Victorian literature and post-structuralist pyrotechnics
differ. In Darwin, Dickens, and Tennyson, evolution is always threatening to become
rhizomatic, stratified, a multiplicity of plateaus. It is through trees, not rhizomes, that
evolution is brought to heel, its implications of endless and meaningless ramification
contained. In mourning, in remembering and repeating, the proliferating rhizome spirals
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upward to a point, the “one far off event” of the transcendental signifier: the ghostly,
ghastly last hope of the return of the lost. Indeed, the terrors of the age, even the
“Dragons of the prime/ That tare each other in their slime” (lvi, 22-3) could themselves
be structured, tapered, and trimmed; changing from arboreal threat to spiraling promise.
Everything, in a manner of speaking, can fit under the tree. The theological evolutionist
Teilhard de Chardin may well have been speaking for the striving, metaphysically
apologetic Victorians when he observed:
Space-Time must be given whatever form is most appropriate. Caught within its
curve, the layers of Matter (considered as separate elements no less than as a
whole) tighten and converge in Thought, by synthesis. Therefore it is as a cone,
in the form of a cone, that it can best be depicted. (81)
Everything that rises must converge: a cosmological cone; an eschatological Christmas
tree. A curiously triumphant Whole, containing everything; yet somehow sadly
constricted, in that there is nowhere to go but up.
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Forbes, Christmas: A Candid History
Much like the artificial Roman tree of Christ’s adulthood. The Christmas tree is
effectively the crucifix of the holiday. Both are master signifiers that encapsulate the
faiths they signify.
3
Stephen Nisssenbaum’s Battle for Christmas provides the most thorough and
theoretically interesting account of the rise of the Christmas tree in America.
4
Stanley Weintraub, Victoria.
5
Forbes, 64.
6
From “Timely Reflections on War and Death” in Murder, Mourning and Melancholia.
Freud’s argument here is repeated from Totem and Taboo, which was itself derived from
Frasier’s Golden Bough.
7
The “magic number” is of course, at work in A Christmas Carol, as well: the univocity
of time itself divided and represented by three anthropomorphic entities.
8
A recent book, Sex at Dawn, offers a spirited polemic against what the authors call “the
standard narrative:” that humans are biologically monogamous. The authors argue that
the rise of agriculture, and subsequently, private property, led to a social reification of
monogamy that has been widely mistaken as biological, and that humans are naturally
promiscuous. The authors claim that Darwin himself mistook humans as biologically
monogamous, but again, the conclusions the authors reach regarding Darwin are not the
conclusions Darwin draws himself. In fact, Darwin considers at length in Descent of
Man the idea of promiscuous, or “communal” sexual practices without offering definitive
judgment.
Edward Pusey, an Anglican cleric and member of the Oxford movement, was
unimpressed with Darwin’s penchant for qualification: “Never probably was any system
built upon so many ‘perhaps,’ ‘probably,’ ‘possibly,’ ‘it may be,’ ‘it seems to be’ (
Darwin 32)
9
The famous last paragraph of The Origin of Species offers a “happy ending” of sorts to
what is essentially an impersonal, unending process:
There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been
originally breathed into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has
gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning
endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being,
evolved. (459-60)
There is a rhetorical tendency in this sentence to supply agency, ontological ground, and
anthropomorphic meaning to the concepts under discussion: life was apparently
“originally breathed into” “simple” forms that are “beautiful” and “wonderful.” But it is
life itself that is invested with several powers, the agency which originated life goes
unnamed (indeed plays no grammatical role in the sentence), and is further hedged by the
fact that the original breath of life may or may not have gone into a single, original form
– it may well have been a few. The concessions Darwin makes here to an audience he is
well aware may find his theory deeply disquieting are both strangely touching and deeply
ambiguous. What, precisely, constitutes the “grandeur in this view of life?” In a view of
life devoid of magic numbers, perhaps the grandeur arises from what in a way amounts to
a repudiation of numeration itself.
10
As Gillian Beer notes in Darwin’s Plots:
2
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…Darwin fastens on the image of the tree to express evolutionary organization.
In doing this he rebuts the Lamarckian idea of a chain of progression – and with it
the older hierarchical organization of the ‘great chain of being,’ its ascending
orders of existence each working like a substitute, a more earthbound version of
its own platonic idea. The idea of the great chain places forms of life in fixed
positions which are permanent and immobile. (33)
The degree to which notions of progress or completion can be ascribed to a tree, however
metaphorical, will be considered at greater length in this chapter.
11
J.W. Burrow argues that “It is because Darwin, in order to undermine the doctrine of
special creation, had to provide another answer, that The Origin reads in places like an
answer to Paley” (22).
12 Particularly among creationists, who find in Darwin’s mystery illness a prelude to
divine retribution:
Psychologically there can be little doubt that Charles Darwin suffered from
feelings of guilt. These undoubtedly arose from his desire to escape from God and
from the force of Paley's arguments about design in his Natural Theology […]
Darwin knew that this was an idea which could and would destroy the faith of
millions of believers—and he was the one who was about to unleash it on an
unsuspecting world. But what if he was wrong? How could he accept the
responsibility for what it would do to others? It is little wonder that he ‘broke out
in boils,’ referred to the Origin as ‘my accursed book’ and seems to have thought
of himself as a ‘Devil’s Chaplain.’ (Grigg, Creation 17.4 (1995) 28-30)
The author is conspicuously un-Darwinian in his lack of conditional language in
describing not only Darwin’s psychological states, but in his reliance on the “force” of
Paley’s argument, which is apparently so compelling, one can only hope to “escape”
from it.
13
See Beer 33-6, and 44-70: “The need to please his readers as well as to unsettle and
disturb them is as vital to Darwin as it was to Dickens” (35).
14
See Isabel Armstrong’s Victorian Poetry: Poetry, Poetics, and Politics. Armstrong
sees in “Mariana” a model of the Victorian “double poem,” a lyric constructed such that
…in a feat of recomposition and externalization the poem turns its expressive
utterance around so that it becomes the opposite of itself, not only the subject’s
utterance but the object of analysis and critique. It is, as it were, reclassified as
drama in the act of being literal lyric expression. To re-order lyric expression as
drama is to give it a new content and to introduce the possibility of interrogation
and critique. (12)
15
My reading of In Memoriam revolves around the premise that the Christmas sections
provide a unifying structure to what appears on the surface a collection of fragments.
This kind of approach to the poem is not without its critics. Christopher Ricks, in
particular, is memorably skeptical of readings he sees as overdetermined:
Literary criticism since Tennyson’s time has become more flexible in its ideas as
to artistic unity […] But it has also become more skilled at imagining some such
unity where it may not exist, and […] more skilled at exculpating works of art that
deserve the higher compliment of not being whisked away into the irreproachable.
Tennyson himself did not make large claims for In Memoriam as a unity; his
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sense that the Christmases provided a serviceable division of the poem should not
be taken as a warrant for believing that a poem on the scale of In Memoriam, and
with such large concerns, could be adequately unified by such links and crossconnections as modern criticism rightly delights in and wrongly pretends can be
structurally crucial. The Christmases, or the imagery of dark and light, of water
and of the human hand: these do much in the way of ‘weaving them into a whole,’
but it remains weaving, not growing or building. (Tennyson 202)
This is a prudent warning against a certain kind of reading, but I do not see the same
negative connotations in “imaginative” reading that Ricks does. On the contrary, what
interests me most in this passage is the implied work as a whole that Ricks is defending:
In arguing against attempts to see “unity where it may not exist,” which falsely
“exculpate[e] works of art that deserve [a] higher compliment,” Ricks himself is
appealing to an imaginary, ghostly construction – a suggestive “work” as a whole that
stands as an evaluative counter-point to the imagined unities Ricks is wary of. One might
ask what ghostly agency Ricks is appealing to that invests these poems with the right to a
“higher compliment” in the first place. What constitutes an “adequate” unity, and at what
point do “links and cross-connections” become “structurally crucial”? That Ricks resorts
to a spurious hierarchy of metaphor (“weaving” vs. “growing” – why one and not the
other?) in order to achieve his point underlines the imaginative “lack” that is perhaps
ultimately constitutive of all readings of this or any other “work.” Its unity is by
definition an imaginative, speculative, and spectral function. It is therefore only through
metaphor that one can hope to access the unity which, in some respect, any reading
already takes “as read.” It is from this angle that I am investigating the poem’s “treeness.”
16
From Discipline and Punish:
[…] power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power
relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, not any
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power
relations. These ‘power-knowledge relations’ are to be analysed, therefore, not on
the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power
system, but, on the contrary, the subject who knows, the objects to be known and
the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these
fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical
transformations. (27-8)
In this sense, Christmas is not a simply a reflection of or reaction to the dominant
ideology of Victorian England, it is that ideology, in respect to the epistemological power
it carries in diffusing the content of that ideology.
17
Payback: Debt and the Shadow Side of Wealth. Toronto: Anansi, 2008.
18
Christopher Ricks provides a tidy rebuttal of these critics:
The poem ends, not with Maud’s embrace, but with God’s […] It was therefore
vengeful of G.W. Foote to insist that ‘the hero of Maud rants about himself until
we begin to hope that the Crimea will really settle him.’ Similarly, it was hasty of
Goldwin Smith not to distinguish at this point the poet and the character: ‘We do
not, like the nations of antiquity to whom Tyrtaeus sung, literally go to war. We
send our hired soldiers to attack a nation which may not be in need of the same
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regimen as ourselves. To most of us, the self-sacrifice involved in war with an
enemy who cannot get at us consists in paying rather more taxes.’ A legitimate
point against some of Tennyson’s patriotic poems, but not a legitimate point
against Maud. (Tennyson 248-9)
19
Herbert F. Tucker, in Tennyson and the Doom of Romanticism, beautifully illustrates
the ambiguity of the speaker’s capitulation: “the merciful ground of culture has opened to
swallow the hero up. He has fallen into the bliss of the state” (428). Tucker’s ominous
verbs and sweet adjectives aptly describe the paradoxical nature of the field of powerknowledge in which the speaker is inscribed.
20
As Jeff Nunokawa points out, it is difficult to read these lines “without thinking that
the wish too strong for words to name is the love that dare not speak its name” (427).
Much has been written on the homoerotic content of In Memoriam, from Tennyson’s
contemporaries to recent currents in queer theory, of which Nunokawa’s essay, “In
Memoriam and the Extinction of the Homosexual” is a fine example.
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Chapter 3:
Wuthering Lights, or: Yes, Virginia, There Is Such a Thing as Woman
Often rebuked, yet always back returning…
--Emily or/and Charlotte Brontë

Let thy courage be equal to thy love, and thy love shall be rewarded. On the night
preceding Christmas, take a hatchet and saw; cut boldly into the body of the bronze rider
who stands in the Corte, on the left side, near the waist. Saw open the body, and within it
thou wilt find the silver effigy of a winged genius. Take it out, hack it into a hundred
pieces, and fling them in all directions, so that the winds may sweep them away.
--Vernon Lee, “Amour Dure”

I

Perhaps the most beautiful of Christmas traditions is the display of holiday lights, a
practice that has arisen in direct proportion to the domestication and proliferation of
cheap electricity. Those rows of suburban houses and city streets, swaddled by thousands
of multi-colored lights, bathing their neighborhoods in a sublunary galactic glow, are a
distinctly twentieth- century phenomenon, but their roots, like so much of what we
collectively call Christmas, lie in Victorian Britain. Prior to technological advances of
the late nineteenth-century, the practice of ornamental lighting arose side by side with
that of the Christmas tree. As the figure in the last chapter illustrates, these lights were
no more than candles tied or glued precariously to dead and extremely combustible tree
branches. The inevitable fires that resulted from this practice naturally helped lead by the
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end of the century to the development of the strings of miniature electric bulbs we know
today. If we grant Marshall McLuhan’s claim that the electric light bulb is “pure
information” (Understanding Media 8), we could say that to a great extent, the message
of this medium is containment. If there is something comforting in the glassy glow of
Christmas lights, it is that their form and function is defined by the fact that they reduce
the risk of conflagration: their cozy hominess is a direct result of their intrinsic assurance
that they will not burn the house down. If we further grant McLuhan’s thesis that media
– including the seemingly message-free light bulb -- are best understood as extensions of
ourselves, the furthering of the human body and mind by technological means, we can
begin to see the schizophrenic nature of the Christmas light: a device that, due to its
ability to perfect and normalize a peculiarly domestic and interiorized form of
entertainment – namely, specialized in-house lighting – capitalizes on its domestic utility
by proliferating outside the home, replicating virus-like into the streets, and ultimately
colonizing entire cities.
Reading the Christmas light as an extension of ourselves, which is another way of
reading it as ourselves, we see an instance of the burrowing, necessarily internalizing
process of domestication turning outward and expanding at the very moment it perfects
its domestic function. In other words, much like literary representations of Christmas in
the nineteenth century, the light bulb tells a schizoid story of simultaneous retraction and
expansion: just as Ebenezer Scrooge’s transformation into a universalizing icon of
Christmas is effected through secretly peeping into the private domestic dramas that
punctuate London like so many singularities, the Christmas light illuminates private
space while making it unprecedentedly public. Isn’t the Ghost of Christmas Past a kind
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of spectral Christmas light that Scrooge attempts, but fails, to extinguish? On one level,
the training that Scrooge’s Christmas ghosts offer him is one in correct domestic
deportment: the misanthropic bachelor who cannot heat his home or office properly
learns not only the value of Christmas, but reasonable household economy. Tellingly, his
last words of dialogue in the text are a request to put more coals on the fire (A Christmas
Carol 123). And that request, like everything else about the newly domesticated
Scrooge, is made at much greater volume. Nearly every sentence Scrooge utters in the
last stave of the text is punctuated by exclamation points. Scrooge’s entry into the
properly domestic realm ends with him shouting in the street at everyone within ear shot
(this may again be an appropriate place to remark on how Bob Crachitt’s initial reaction
to his reformed boss is to think that he has gone insane). Scrooge, like the Christmas
light, is a vessel whose destructive properties require containment, but the act of
containing them results in greater conflagration. Scrooge’s shifting attitudes toward light
and heat seem to reflect McLuhan’s diagnosis of the volatility of domestic media:
Clothing and housing, as extensions of skin and heat-control mechanism, are
media of communication, first of all, in the sense that they shape and rearrange
the patterns of human association and community. Varied techniques of lighting
and heating would seem only to give new flexibility and scope to what is the basic
principle of these media of clothing and housing; namely, their extension of our
bodily heat-control mechanisms in a way that enables us to attain some degree of
equilibrium in a changing environment. (Understanding Media 138)
The qualifiers “seem” and “some degree,” with which McLuhan prefaces his claims to
flexibility and equilibrium suggest the unsettled and unsettling behavior of the reformed
Scrooge. After all, “seeming flexibility” and “some degree of equilibrium” could be read
as polite ways of noting mental imbalance – which is how Scrooge is initially read by
those who encounter him after his ghostly domestication. The price Scrooge pays for his
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extension, for his adoption of the media of light and heat, is a certain degree of
schizophrenia.
Perhaps a key to the schizoid evolution of the Christmas light lies in its oddly
gender specific cultural development. As Graeme Gooday points out in Domesticating
Electricity, the use of the miniature electric bulb was not only designed for safety in the
home, but “as a form of ‘decoration’ to be worn specifically by women, either upperclass ladies or theatrical performers,” the purpose being to “yield some kind of aesthetic
benefit, primarily, but not exclusively, for male observers” (106). This feminized light
show had an auspicious premiere at the first Gilbert and Sullivan opera to open at
Richard D’Oyly Carte’s new Savoy Theatre, Iolanthe. Audiences at that performance in
November of 1882 were treated not only to a typically topsy-turvy and vaguely
misogynistic W.S. Gilbert plot and another catchy Arthur Sullivan score, but to a startling
advance in theatrical special effects. In the final scene, The Fairy Queen and her retinue
were fantastically decked out with electric stars in their hair. The usual Savoyard
collision between a world of women and a gang of institutionalized men, charged with
absurdity through a strange combination of misrecognition and barely bottled sexual
energy, received an additional shock through the introduction of controlled electricity.
The lights, even more than the opera, were a hit. To this day, Christmas lights in Britain
are known as “fairy lights,” after their adornment by the unpredictable, unreadable fairywomen of Iolanthe.
How are we to read this strange intersection of scientific advancement and gender
construction? Physicists and feminists have certainly dissolved much of the mystery of
their respective concerns: the twentieth-century scientist and cultural theorist have

158
provided answers to certain nagging questions. Is light a wave or particle? Is woman
essential or constructed? Both, as it turns out. But it is perhaps easy to see how less
heteronormative times could find it difficult to arrive at such a polyvalent answer. Here
as elsewhere, nineteenth-century attempts to domesticate and extinguish the danger of
conflagration – whether that danger resided in the scientific problems of electricity or the
social role of women – led, paradoxically, to proliferation.
Miniature lights adorning the female body come to encircle houses, and wind up
lighting a city. Similarly, the ideological attempt to stabilize and define the female only
generates other definitions. The cosmic and the cultural agree in their physics: like light
forced to a singular point, the normative female explodes in infinite directions, and like
the quantum particle, if you do mark its place, you can’t tell how fast it is going. The
Victorian woman, both as scopophilic object of the male gaze and as the psychological
subject of the female literary imagination, is ideologically marked as the Angel in the
House, but operates much more like Gilbert’s fairies:
Tripping hither, tripping thither,
Nobody knows why or whither;
We must dance and we must sing
Round about our fairy ring! (Iolanthe, Act I)
There is a curious dialectic of freedom and containment in these lyrics, a mercuriality
circumscribed by laws. The fairies dance hither and thither -- but in a circle, and because
they must. Fairy lights have the curious effect of enlarging the woman they adorn as they
simultaneously wrap her in an encircling web, just as Christmas lights magnify the
attractions of a suburban home while marking it off as separate and contained from its
neighbors. As the association of these fairy lights with Christmas suggests, the holiday

159
provides an axis wherein the contradictory forces of proliferation and containment
intersect.
There is in the above a threat, perhaps already realized, of a certain paranoid
associative mania at work: Christmas is woman is light is Scrooge is Gilbert is Sullivan
(and so on). If there is a common denominator that can bring these connections down to
earth, as it were, and avoid a sense of random coincidence rather than the more
theoretically pleasing image of quantum entanglement I am aiming for, it is that the
underlying aspect of all these varied phenomena is their quality as fiction. To understand
the concept of a specifically “Christmas” light (let alone accept the idea that light as such
is a medium with a message), and to equate such light with characters, men or women,
real or fictional, is to narrativize them, and, on a structural level, fictionalize them.
Perhaps the fundamental assumption of post-structuralism is its maddeningly attractive
and/or repulsive claim (depending on one’s taste) that truth, insofar as it is constructed on
a proliferating chain of signifiers, is itself fiction.
Nowhere is this more evident than in Lacan’s infamous claim that “There’s no
such thing as Woman” (Encore 72). Once this gnomic little bomb of a sentence has done
its work to provoke and assault, Lacan quickly makes clear that he is speaking of Woman
with a capital W: woman as a universal concept. Impossible, says Lacan, as the very
word wo-man suggests, “she is not-whole” (73):
A woman can but be excluded by the nature of things, which is the nature of
words […] if she is excluded by the nature of things, it is precisely in this respect:
being not-whole, she has a supplementary jouissance campared to what the phallic
function designates by way of jouissance.
You will notice that I said ‘supplementary.’ If I had said ‘complementary’
what a mess we’d be in! We would fall back into the whole. (73)1
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The nature of things, indistinguishable from the structure of words, relegates Woman to
an uncanny realm outside of the whole. But Lacan’s conception of the non-existence of
women is not simply that they are not allowed in the boy’s club of phallic jouissance. It
is precisely their outsider status, their supplementary rather than complementary
relationship to phallic normativity, their non-existence, that gives them power over the
phallus: “It’s not because she is not-wholly in the phallic function that she is not there at
all. She is not not at all there. She is there in full. But there is something more” (74).
While Lacan is reluctant to describe this not-not thereness, this “something more” as the
objet petit a, the otherness of woman, her non-phallic jouissance clearly exhibits the same
spectral traits as that mysterious remainder lionized by Lacanians like Žižek. Like a
ghost, she haunts. When he claims that women, however non-existent, “possess men”
(73), the ever polysemic Lacan is surely invoking the spectral sense of the verb “to
possess.”
Lacan’s enghosting of Woman is itself an example of fictionalizing her, an
acrobatically theoretical way of wrapping her in fairy lights and making her dance. And,
in a way, he makes of woman yet another form of McLuhanian “media”: an ex-tension of
man that disrupts the equilibrium of his environment. The question is whether it is
simply Lacan (or Gilbert and Sullivan, for that matter) that do the enghosting. In
examining literature by and about women in the nineteenth-century, the answer would
appear to be: no. I will argue in this chapter that between the universalizing
fictionalization of women through the structuration of language, and the more localized
fictionalization of them by individual artists and theorists, there is a distinctly Victorian
fictionalization, and spectralization, of women. This spectralization is created in part by
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the usual suspects: the male gaze can certainly be seen to do its scopophilic work in
constructing the fictional woman of the nineteenth-century. But as literary criticism has
increasingly come to realize, the real work of creating the spectral Victorian woman was
done largely by women themselves. Confronted by the claustrophobic dictates of
domestic ideology, female writers literally and figuratively wrote themselves as ghosts,
allowing themselves a mobility denied by the rigidness of the ideology they inhabited. If
marriage and domesticity pinned women down, the gothic fictionalization of women,
particularly in Christmas ghost stories, allowed them a form of flight. As Vanessa D.
Dickerson points out, “the supernaturalism of [the Victorian] period afforded women an
unprecedented opportunity to explore for themselves the nature of the culturally granted
spirituality that gave them a power or influence that was limited to the domestic sphere”
(9). If woman is a fiction, she is certainly a self-fashioned one. The current culture of
literary criticism has done quite a bit of admittedly deserved self-back-patting for
“discovering” neglected women writers of the nineteenth-century. But the readership of
many of these writers, and the fact that the sales of their books often far outstripped those
of many of their male peers, suggests they were not so neglected in their time. And the
proliferation of the writers and texts themselves, their very existence, are testament to
their power to create and transform culture. If I contest that the nineteenth century’s
greatest novelist and poet were women, and that the century’s greatest novel was written
by a woman, such a truth, if not universally acknowledged, is hardly a minority position.
And the interest of such a statement rests not in early twenty-first century critical (or
personal) taste, but in the actual fact that such objects of critical fetishism existed as such,
and in such profusion, in the nineteenth-century.
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What, then, does all this have to do with Christmas? Firstly, Woman and
Christmas are both, in their nineteenth-century literary permutations, constructed as
domestic fictions. That is, the proper domain of both Woman and Christmas is, in both
the most abstractly theoretical and diegetically specific senses, the home. Secondly,
Woman and Christmas, as fictions, pursue a similarly spectral trajectory: as parallactic
subjects, they become universalized exceptions, which, as we have seen, is one of the
defining characteristics of a ghost. As this chapter will show, the uncannily similar
ghostliness of Christmas and the Victorian woman is not a random coincidence. On a
practical level, the opportunities for publication afforded by the Christmas book market
directly expanded the sphere in which women could find literary work. On a more
spectral level, the subject matter expected by this market – namely, ghost stories – led to
a thematic entanglement between the seemingly unrelated issues of “The Woman
Question” and the phantasmic structure of Christmas itself. In a way, this chapter hopes
to show that Christmas, however obliquely, helped to shape the “fiction of woman” in the
nineteenth century. It is a fiction that, like Christmas, is one we still to a degree entertain.
And the extent to which we have rejected such fictions – to which we have refictionalized Woman for a volatile post-feminist age – only speaks to their power to haunt
us. Indeed, it is the volatility of the fiction of the domestic Victorian “Angel in the
House” -- an angel with the potential to both light up a house or burn it down – that the
fiction of Christmas so remarkably brings into focus.
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II

We have seen that “The Christmas Spirit,” in its literary application, was no mere figure
of speech to the Victorians. Dickens, in inventing that spirit, very literally reified
Christmas as a ghostly affair. In both Dickens and Tennyson, the Christmas spirit is not a
matter of whimsy: both poet and novelist provide ghostly policemen to insure that the
spirit is enforced. The curious injunction to enjoy which is central to the Victorian
conception of Christmas also suggests the deep ambiguity surrounding the holiday: in
allying Christmas with the mythical taboo of the dead father, we see that the domestic
bliss most commonly associated with the Victorian holiday should not be taken as read,
as unalloyed bliss would not require a demand for compliance. In other words, the
centrality – often, the equation – of Christmas with ghosts and haunting in Victorian
literature suggests a site of disturbance rather than peace, a singularity of pain as well as
pleasure. And Christmas is always a point, a singularity: it is both a real number that
marks an X between the dying year and the one about to be born, and, as a crossroads
between the two, a kind of algebraic variable – the imaginary x, the unknown,
transcendental signifier. In this sense, Xmas can be read as both the apex of a zenith –
the angel atop the Christmas tree, perhaps – and the vanishing point of a black hole.
Such a liminal realm is a natural place for ghosts, and their authority resides in their
ability to exist on either side of the singularity. In fact, their power arises in part because,
like the Lacanian Woman, they don’t, strictly speaking, exist at all.
The domain of ghostly activity, the liminal realm most commonly attributed to
contain their haunting, is also a place that can with some claim be said to possess a kind
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of non-existence: the haunted house. Of course, on a superficial level, the haunted house
-- as cultural trope and imaginary space -- can be called non-existent in that it is, pace
certain occultists and television ghost-hunters, a fiction. But in a broader sense, the
haunted house, as a construction of the Victorian imagination, can be read as a metaphor
for the house as such. And in Victorian literature, particularly where Christmas is
involved, the house, whether or not it is haunted in the traditional sense, is a site of flux,
potentiality, and uncertainty. The Victorian Home, so often read (not least by the
Victorians themselves) as the most sturdy and conservative edifice of Victorian belief,
the “place of Peace; the shelter, not only from all injury, but from all terror, doubt and
division,” the “shade as of the rock in a weary land, and light as of the Pharos in the
stormy sea” (158-9) as John Ruskin would have it, is, as it is reflected in Christmas
narratives, never quite so soundly constructed, and never so firmly attained. The
Victorian home is never the secure keep it desires to be; indeed, desire is often the quality
that makes the home, and domesticity, a spectral image rather than a concrete reality.
Coventry Patmore’s Angel in the House, the de facto mascot of stereotypical notions of
Victorian domesticity and femininity, devotes less than one hundred of its fourteen
hundred plus lines to domestic bliss – the rest is a surprisingly anxious account of a
courtship that is always haunted by a possible, though often doubtful, domestic future.
Revealingly, the narrator, like the heroes of the Savoy operas, must pick his angel from a
plurality of women.2 Near the end of the poem, when the hero has finally married his
beloved, he still asks:
Why, having won her, do I woo?
Because her spirit’s vestal grace
Provokes me always to pursue,
But, spirit-like, eludes embrace;
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…Because, though free of the outer court
I am, this Temple keeps its shrine
Sacred to Heaven; because, in short,
She’s not and never shall be mine. (Book II, 339-344, 351-4)
Possession, of the angel, and the house, is impossible for the male hero.3 He is, as Lacan
suggests, possessed by her. The restlessness of the speaker, so eager to connect his angel
to the house, to place her in it, comes instead to reveal the impossibility of his project.
Such libidinal investment in the house only highlights the uncanny nature of it, the
impossibility of home as such: the uncanny, after all, is both the Heimlich and
Unheimlich – the home that is simultaneously not home. If The Angel in the House is
indeed the quintessential expression of Victorian domesticity, if its home is truly the ideal
of the age, then one could well argue that the only properly Victorian house is a haunted
house.4
It is well-known that most of the successful practitioners of the Victorian ghost
story were women. Elizabeth Gaskell, Mary Braddon, Rhoda Broughton, Margaret
Oliphant, Ellen Wood – all of them were bestselling authors of popular, and often
subversive, domestic novels – and all are still to be found in nearly any anthology of
nineteenth-century ghost stories. The editors of The Oxford Book of Victorian Ghost
Stories claim: “the reasons why women took to the ghost story so successfully is one of
the great unasked critical questions” (xiv). I agree, though the answer is not difficult to
surmise: the women who haunted the Victorian home, particularly those that took up their
pens within them, were, if one accepts the Victorian house as essentially haunted,
inevitably ghosts.
This is not a new idea. Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s seminal feminist
examination of nineteenth century women writers, The Madwoman in the Attic,
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mythologizes the female writer, and her creations, in similar terms. The book is rife with
metaphors for the claustrophobic and agoraphobic psychic states these authors explore as
they navigate a world where textuality as such is by definition patriarchal, and many of
Gilbert and Gubar’s readings of the canonical texts of these authors are informed by
Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s litany of attributes for Aurora Leigh’s dead mother: “Ghost,
fiend, and angel, fairy, witch, and sprite” (18-9). For Gilbert and Gubar, the monstrous
female is a product of the constraints of domesticity: “In their attempts at the escape that
the female pen offers from the prison of the male text, women […] begin […] by
alternately defining themselves as angel-women or as monster-women” (44).
The attempt to pin Victorian femininity to an ideologically stable position creates,
via an anxiety generated by the inherent impossibility of such a move, ghostly repetition.
As Mary Poovey points out in Uneven Developments: The Ideological Work of Gender in
Mid-Victorian England, attempts to define the position of women inevitably resulted in
bringing contradictions in such definitions to light. Unmarried women, for example,
were dialectically constructed as a “social problem” in the 1851 Census because:
On the one hand, in designating an ‘entire house’ as the desire of ‘every
Englishman,’ the Census simultaneously represented the middle-class domestic
living arrangement as the norm and defined that norm as entailing both a
particular […] relation among the inmates of a house and a particular kind of
house […] On the other hand, however, in revealing that a proportion of women
to men within the marriageable age-group of fifteen to forty-nine years was 107
percent, the Census demonstrated that this ideal was not even available to every
woman. (14)
Such an idealized domestic construction of the female was, as a result, “both internally
contradictory and unevenly deployed […] open to a variety of readings that could be
mobilized in contradictory practices” (15). In other words, the very attempt to define the
domestic female led to multiple possible definitions of the role of women – not least of
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which arose in the fictions of female authors in the period, whose “ghosts, fiends, and
angels, fairies, witches, and sprites” haunt the landscape of Victorian literature. And isn’t
that disturbingly redundant 7% that exceeds the normative whole of 100% a
mathematical expression of a ghostly objet petit a: an uncanny revenant, or remainder?
It is perhaps inevitable that what Poovey calls the “ideological work” of gender
construction should so often be paired with the ideological work of Christmas. We have
seen how Christmas comes in the Victorian period to announce the re-territorializing
forces of capitalism, as well as totemizing the law of the father. In both cases, such
attempts at normalization produce unsettling and uncanny repetitions: proliferations and
variations of the immediate message which subvert and problematize the enjoyment that
Christmas comes to command. In the domestic fiction of the period, Christmas similarly
occupies a place that both reifies and subverts ideological normalization.
What, then, constitutes Victorian domestic fiction? A serviceable definition
would be any fiction of the period that addresses the ideological work of the “middleclass domestic living arrangement” and its legal guarantor, marriage. The fact that such a
definition could be said to include nearly the entirety of Victorian fictional production
should lead us to question less the fluidity of the genre than the insistence with which its
concerns are posed. For Nancy Armstrong, the rise of the novel “hinged upon a struggle
to say what made a woman desirable,” and that “the female was the figure, above all else,
on whom depended the outcome of the struggle among competing ideologies” (Desire
and Domestic Fiction 4-5). In this sense, female sexuality not only determines the scope
of domestic fiction, but the nineteenth-century novel as such. The question of marriage,
and its prolonged absence or ghostly presence within the domestic novel, is one that
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subsumes, and to a degree, generates, all others. Both within and without the narratives
of the domestic novel, the definition of the female, and the limits demanded of such
definitions, creates a dialectical movement which complicates and often contradicts the
initial definition.
This dialectical tension can be seen even in the most rigidly conservative of
domestic novels. Charlotte Yonge’s 1853 novel, The Heir of Redclyffe, one of the bestselling novels of the century, and a veritable text-book of domestic propriety, nonetheless
derives much of its narrative interest from uncertainty surrounding the female subject,
rather than its normative declarations regarding her constancy. The plot revolves around
the contest of wills between an orphan, Guy Morville, the titular heir of the gothic
Redclyffe estate, and his cousin Philip, who for numerous reasons (including a historic
feud between the two branches of the Morville family, and the nettling fact of Guy’s
more elevated social and financial status) develops a grudge against Guy. At the death of
his grandfather, Guy is taken in by the kindly Edmonstone family, who live in Hollywell,
a comfortable home that operates as a kind of anti-Redclyffe. It is a setting that supplies
much of the charm of the novel, as do Guy’s relations with the Edmonstone children,
including Amy, whom he eventually falls in love with and marries. The narrative is
mainly linear, moving steadily through the years, charting Guy’s growth from a slightly
Byronic and rebellious youth of seventeen, to an improbably wise and selfless young man
in his early twenties. The only point in which the novel diverges from this steady
forward movement in time is in its center, when the narrative reaches a dramatic turning
point. Philip’s rising jealousy and antagonism towards Guy reaches its apex with his
propagation of false rumors and a misunderstanding that presents Guy as a dissipated
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gambler. For a time, this shadow alienates Guy from the Hollywell household, and his
engagement with Amy Edmonstone is cast into doubt.
Guy retreats to Redclyffe, a house we, and the Edmonstone children, have heard
much about in the earlier chapters, in large part for its reputation for being haunted.5
Guy’s exile to his nominally haunted house occurs at Christmas, and the holiday provides
the narrative, and Guy, an extended opportunity to dwell on absence and loss. Guy
spends his holiday alone, and dreads Christmas Day “as recalling so many contrasts both
with those passed here and at Hollywell […] there was a dreariness about everything; he
was weary even while he undertook and planned energetically, each new project
reminding him that there was no Amy to plan with him” (256). In fact, Guy spends most
of his Christmas Eve vacillating between feeling worse over the absence of his dead
mother and the loss of his erstwhile-fiancé. At one point, “the depression of his spirits
inclined him to dwell at present more on the melancholy history of his parents than
anything else” (256), causing him to seek company with a woman who can tell him
stories about her. Once he does, the satisfaction of hearing stories about her turns into
yearning for Amy:
…though he could still love the fair, sweet vision summoned by [his mother’s]
name, he was less disposed to feel that it had been hard upon him that she died. It
was not Amy. In spite of his tender compassion and affection, he knew he had
not lost a Verena in her. None could occupy that place save Amy… (259)
For Guy, Christmas is an occasion for brooding over the absent feminine, and the shifting
movement of his thoughts between multiple women makes the particularity of any of
them nebulous. Amy “occupies a place” in Guy’s thoughts, but no longer in reality. She
is transformed from an object fixed in space into a vision – a specter – who mixes into a
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disturbingly amorphous feminine that transcends individuality: she joins Guy’s mother as
an emblem of lack and loss.
Guy’s Christmas Eve is reminiscent of the melancholic affairs in Dickens and
Tennyson, where empty ritual only serves to recall the absent one:
The late hours of Christmas Eve was the time when he had most to suffer. The
day had been gloomy and snowy, and he had spent it almost entirely in solitude,
with no companion or diversion to restore the tone of his mind […] He [Guy]
tried to read, but it would not do; and he was reduced to sitting looking at the fire
recalling this time last year, when he had been cutting holly, helping the sisters to
deck the house, and in the evening enjoying a merry Christmas party, full of
blitheness and glee, where there were, of course, special recollections of Amabel.
(260)
Here Christmas is again tied to mourning and absence, and the peculiar cruelty of the
injunction to enjoy is present in the memories of past, happier Christmases which only
serve to torment Guy. But there is an additional component to this miserable Christmas:
the feminine absence which makes domestic comfort impossible.
This absence is made even more palpable in Yonge’s handling of narrative at this
point in the text: after moving Guy’s story forward past Christmas, the narrative jerks
back to autumn in order to observe Christmas at Hollywell. In effect, Yonge repeats the
same Christmas within the text – an uncanny effect in a novel that otherwise proceeds
with linear regularity. Guy’s lonely Christmas becomes mirrored with Amy’s; after a
wearying Christmas party, we see Amy alone:
…she sat down in the dim light of the lamp, relieved by the stillness, only broken
by now and then a louder note to the music downstairs. It was very comfortable,
after all that buzz and talk, and the jokes that seemed so nonsensical and tiresome.
There were but two people who could manage to make a party entertaining, and
that was the reason it was so different last year. Then Amy wondered if she was
the only person who felt sick at heart and dreary; but she only wondered for a
moment – she murmured half aloud to herself, ‘I said I never would think of him
except at my prayers! Here I am doing it again, and on Christmas night! I won’t
hide my eyes and moan over my broken reed; for Christmas is come and the

171
circles of song are widening round! Glory; goodwill, peace on earth! How he
sung it last year, the last thing, when the people were gone, before we went up to
bed. But I am breaking my resolution again. I must do something.’
She took up a book of sacred poetry, and began to learn a piece which she
nearly already knew; but the light was bad, and it was dreamy work; and
probably she was half asleep, for her thoughts wandered off to Sintram and the
castle on the Mondenfelsen, which seemed to her so like the picture of the
Redclyffe crags, and the castle itself was connected in her imagination with the
deep, echoing porch, while Guy’s own voice seemed to be chanting – (281)
Like Guy, Amy struggles to enjoy Christmas in light of the torment of memories of past
happy Christmases. Both attempt to read, but fall into a reverie of the absent other. Both
are stirred by far-off music (a group of carolers eventually breaks Guy’s reverie at
Redclyffe). Both Amy and Guy call up spectral images of each other, and the doubling
of the scene, both in incident, and in the temporal shift of the narrative, create what Žižek
calls a “short-circuit,” and in film theory is called a “suture,” in which two opposing
scenes are matching by cross-cutting, which creates the illusion of “self-enclosure with
no need for an exterior, effacing the traces of its own production: traces of the production
process, its gaps, its mechanisms, are obliterated, so that the product can appear as a
naturalized, organic whole” (Fright of Real Tears 55).
In some instances of suture, the two crossing shots actually blend into one another
through a cross-fade rather than a cut, creating a ghostly hybrid image that Žižek calls
“interface.” Probably the most famous instance of this effect in cinema occurs in Jean
Vigo’s poetic 1931 film, L’Atalante. This simple story of a newly married couple who
embark on a life together aboard a river barge is complicated by a trivial fight that briefly
separates them. In a famous scene, the parted couple dream of each other, and their
individual fantasies and memories join into a single image on screen [Figure 8]. It is not
difficult to see in Yonge’s unusual narrative roundabout a prototype of this interface: Guy
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Figure 8: Stills from Jean Vigo’s L’Atalante (1931)
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and Amy recall each other in separate, indeed, opposing places that yet blend together in
similarity of incident and imaginative sympathy.6 The two scenes dialectically merge,
and in drawing two separate scenes to a point, paradoxically create a field in which
presence and absence combine. It is worth pointing out that this device was not the
invention of cinema, but a borrowing of the late nineteenth-century craze for spirit
photography, in which double-exposure produced a ghostly, seemingly unified image
[Figure 9].
What is interesting in comparing the novel’s method to the cinematic device of
cross-fading is that the linear determinations of language reveal that such co-ordination
produces repetition. Whereas the cinematic image can suture two images and create the
illusion of unity, the verbal constraints of prose require the scene to be replicated: in
order for Guy and Amy’s Christmas loneliness to be made one, it must occur twice.
What the ghostly complications of a cross-faded image suggest implicitly, the novel
makes explicit: in order to suture Guy and Amy’s Christmas, Christmas must be repeated.
In doing so, the singular point of one lonely Christmas Eve becomes a field of
multiplicity. In this most domestic of domestic novels, the implications of this uncanny
field of reversals (the novel must double back on itself to present two Christmases) and
repetitions, reverberate for the rest of the narrative: Guy and Amy’s separation will
ultimately lead to the separateness in unity of Philip and Laura Edmonstone’s love plot.
At the end of the novel, it is Philip who is the heir of Redclyffe, haunted by the narrative
of Guy and Amy. Philip and Laura’s union is described as a “harassed, anxious life, with
little repose or relief […] with little space for domestic pleasure and home comfort”
(526). The novel ends leaving the haunted house of Redclyffe with even more ghosts.7
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Figure 9: Photo by William Hope (1863-1933), paranormal investigator and spirit
photographer. “Man with the Spirit of his Deceased Second Wife.” National
Media Museum.
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These ghostly repetitions, as well as the mildly gothic romance and tale-of-twohouses plot of The Heir of Redclyffe lend the novel to comparisons with Emily Brontë’s
masterpiece Wuthering Heights, published just six years earlier. While the later novel’s
cozy Toryism (Guy, like many a Young Englander, suffers from an almost visceral
devotion to Charles I, a condition that had already been deftly satirized by Charles
Dickens in 1849’s David Copperfield, in the figure of the regicide-haunted Mr. Dick) is
worlds away from the savage class-consciousness embodied by Brontë’s Heathcliff (and
by extension, the entire world of Wuthering Heights), the oneiric tension produced by the
ghostly feminine in both novels create differences of degree rather than kind.8
Like any text that finds itself in the top tiers of the canonical pecking order of
Great Works, Wuthering Heights is famous for its seemingly endless interpretability.
This fecundity of the critical feast is the subject of J. Hillis Miller’s take on the novel in
his 1982 study, Fiction and Repetition. Miller accounts for this apparent interpretive
overload by drawing attention to what he sees as an unusual proliferation of signs in the
novel, or “materials inviting interpretation” that “present something evidently meaning
more than what is simply present” (43). These signs seduce the reader into the act of
interpretation in part because of their diegetic placement: “The reader is coaxed into
taking the position of an interpreting spectator by the presentation in the novel of so
many models of this activity” (43). Thus, the reader is led on by the outsider Lockwood
to find out more by his attempts to find out more by reading Catherine’s diary, which in
turn is an act of interpreting a Biblical passage, and so on. Each of these signs are further
complicated and divided by the numerous oppositions in the novel, which tantalizingly
offer a dialectic of sameness and difference: Catherine/Heathcliff, Wuthering
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Heights/Thrushcross Grange, etc. (60-1). Miller reads this proliferation of signs as
indicative of a heterogeneous text that is structured to produce an incoherent multiplicity
of interpretations. Miller’s clinical diagnosis becomes rhapsodic in his final paragraph:
If in Lockwood’s dream the air swarms with Catherines, so does this book swarm
with ghosts who walk the Yorkshire moors inside the covers of any copy of
Wuthering Heights, waiting to be brought back from the grave by anyone who
chances to open the book and read. The most powerful form of repetition in
fiction, it may be, is not the echoes of one part of the book by another, but the
way even the simplest, most representational words in a novel (‘1801 – I have just
returned…’) present themselves as already a murmuring repetition, something
which has been repeating itself incessantly there in the words on the page waiting
for me to bring it back to life as the meaning of the words forms itself in my
mind. Fiction is possible only because of an intrinsic capacity possessed by
ordinary words in grammatical order. (72)
I find this passage startling, and, in a sense, brave. Its Lacanian vision of a near infinite
regress of signification is not in itself surprising, but Miller’s willingness to single
Wuthering Heights out as a peculiar instance of such a process is. The last sentence, read
out of context, is, as I have suggested above, no more than a fundamental truism of poststructuralism. But in relation to Miller’s reaction to Brontë’s novel, it amounts to
something of an abdication of the critical enterprise as such: is the appeal of this novel
really just an accumulation of “words, words, words”? How do such prosaic and
innocent signifiers as “ordinary words” transform themselves into the “swarm of ghosts”
that glides straight out of the novel and into any reader’s brain? In effect, Miller invests
this novel with the abstract power of language itself, and in doing so suggests an almost
erotic image of reader and text, a cross-faded interface, perhaps, that mirrors the interface
that Catherine and Heathcliff repeatedly insist exists between them, despite the fact that
they are almost always separated.
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I think Miller’s image of a swarm of ghosts is evocative and appropriate in
describing both the impossibility of adequate interpretation, and the curious swooning
effect this novel generates among both general and critical readers. It also suggests the
strange way this novel seems representative of a genre it both transcends and to which it
often only obliquely references: the Christmas ghost story. Wuthering Heights certainly
represents the Christmas ghost story in its yearning for a univocity which both demands
and repels a similarly univocal reading, and I think it stems, at least in part, from the
volatility of the fictionalized Victorian woman discussed earlier. The key here is
volatility: if Wuthering Heights resembles more gentle fare like The Heir of Redclyffe in
its romantic and domestic entanglements, it distinguishes itself from such productions, as
indeed it distinguishes itself from almost the entirety of Victorian literature, in the
amount of potential violence it allows itself to actualize. As a novel of passion, and as
something of a Victorian freak, Wuthering Heights is often labeled a vestige of the
Romantic era. This is a mistake, I think. Such notions not only suggest a form of lazy
periodization, but act as a veiled insult to Brontë herself: the implication being that such a
sheltered regionalist so out of step with the social and cultural realities of her time should
not even be properly regarded as of her time (a variation of sorts on “the man from
Stratford,” how-could-a-glovemaker’s-son-possibly-have-written-Shakespeare
nonsense).9 Wuthering Heights’ unique position in Victorian literature should not let us
forget that it is, in fact, Victorian literature. In any event, the violence of Wuthering
Heights is of a greater degree than almost anything to be found in English Romanticism.
One would need to go back to Jacobean drama to find an English precedent of similarly
concentrated and consistent cruelty. I would argue that Wuthering Heights’ cruelty and
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violence stems in part from a particularly gendered performance. Wuthering Heights is
singular in its willingness to indulge in a kind of violence, both emotional and physical,
that marks it as a text exhibiting what Diane Long Hoeveler has usefully called
“hyperbolic femininity”: a kind of ratcheting up of the volume of the gothic register to a
point of parody, in order to compete with the “naturally” hystericized mode of female
writing presumed by a condescendingly patriarchal culture (Gothic Feminism 123-27).
I’d like to explore the hyperbolic femininity of Wuthering Heights by considering it
alongside what I can’t help but see as an unusually parallel text: Tobe Hooper’s 1974
film The Texas Chainsaw Massacre, another hyperbolic gothic text which is curiously,
and disturbingly, marked by extreme representations of femininity trapped within a
patriarchal culture. Together, these texts suggest that horror itself arises from the
uncertain place the feminine finds itself within a social field defined by phallic
jouissance.
Perhaps it is the obvious differences between Wuthering Heights and The Texas
Chainsaw Massacre that make their similarities so compelling.10 If the former text holds
a more elevated place in the critical literary consciousness than the notorious slasher film,
both texts mine their shared gothic roots in strikingly related ways. In fact, the parallels
between the two texts are legion. Both exhibit a pressure-cooked, hermetic regionalism
in which the vast open spaces of their respective environments (the rain-swept Yorkshire
moors and sun-baked mid-Texas plains) become increasingly and claustrophobically
circumscribed by the dueling haunted houses that define their regional borders. While
there is certainly room for the characters of both texts to roam, everyone seems
gravitationally drawn to either Wuthering Heights or Thrushcross Grange in the novel, or
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Sally and Franklin’s childhood home or Leatherface’s home/abbatoir in the film. Brontë
and Hooper both seem to enact a knowing parody of regional stereotypes: the outsiders in
both texts have no idea what they are in for at the outset. Lockwood’s pleased
assessment of remote Yorkshire as a “perfect misanthropists’ heaven!” (3) comes to be
both ironically apropos and something of an understatement, as the nature of his new
neighbor becomes increasingly apparent. Massacre’s group of young friends’ initial
encounters with the local grotesques conform to popular stereotypes of backwoods
hillbillies, but as more is revealed about these people (the hypnotic power of both texts
resides in how they slowly peel layers of local mystery away, while leaving so much of
the actual history ambiguous), it becomes apparent that Leatherface and his family fulfill
and transcend such stereotypes in unexpectedly terrifying ways. If one were to read these
perverse texts perversely, say, as black comedies rather than horror stories, the joke in
both cases would be one of domestic confinement, or, what goes wrong when families
become a little too close and connected.
What is most compelling about these two texts is their similar commitment to
assaulting the unsuspecting reader (in WH, the bland Lockwood, and in TCM, the equally
bland group of friends stand in for the similarly clueless reader) with a relentlessly
aggressive display of domestic violence. The horrific nature of the violence seems in
both cases to stem from an ambiguous disorientation of gender roles. More specifically,
this disorientation seems to reside in the fact that both the world of Wuthering Heights
and that of The Texas Chainsaw Massacre are scarred by the absence of the Lacanian
Woman. Certainly, women are at the center of both texts, and are the occasion for the
popular misreading of them. Catherine’s famous insistence that “I am Heathcliff” (64) is
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often read as grounds for the standard claim that Wuthering Heights is a – perhaps the –
romance novel.11 And the indelible scene in Massacre, in which the screaming Sally is
chased back and forth between the two houses by Leatherface and his equally bansheelike chainsaw for what seems an eternity, has become emblematic of the defining
principle of the slasher-film: young women in perpetual peril, chased by monsters beyond
the borders of the film itself and into countless sequels.12 But the standard gender-coding
involved in placing these texts in their respective genres – which popularly defines the
Heathcliff/Catherine romance as a story for sex-starved teenage girls, and the misogynist
splatter-fest as a grotesque liebestod for equally sex-starved teenage boys – only hints at
the sexuated, female lack these texts exhibit.
When Catherine proclaims her unity with Heathcliff, she is quick to point out that
her relationship is not a “pleasure, any more than I am always a pleasure to myself – but,
as my own being – so, don’t talk of our separation again – it is impracticable; and ---”
(64). Catherine’s stridency and confidence (“I am Heathcliff!”) soon dissolves into a
sputtering realization that there is a minimal difference between herself and Heathcliff, a
vague denial of that difference, and then, silence. The missing completion to Catherine’s
sentence is not a repudiation of her sense of unity with Heathcliff, but a sign of the
complexity of that unity. We are left to ask, as we presume, the tongue-tied Catherine is,
what the nature of their unity actually is.
One possibility has been famously proposed by Gilbert and Gubar in Madwoman
in the Attic. Catherine, and more surprisingly, Heathcliff, are both aspects of a single, and
singular expression of female monstrosity and rage:
From the first, Heathcliff has had undeniable monster potential, as many readers
have observed. Isabella’s questions to Nelly – ‘Is Mr. Heathcliff a man? If so, is
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he mad? And if not is he a devil?’ (chap. 13) – indicate among other things Emily
Brontë’s cool awareness of having created an anomalous being, a sort of ‘Ghoul’
or ‘Afreet,’ not (as her sister half hoped) ‘despite’ herself but for good reasons.
Uniting human and animal traits, the skills of culture with the energies of nature,
Heathcliff’s character tests the boundaries between human and animal, nature and
culture, and in doing so proposes a new definition of the demonic. What is more
important for our purposes here, however, is the fact that, despite his outward
masculinity, Heathcliff is somehow female in his monstrosity. […] on the level
where younger sons and bastards and devils unite with women in rebelling against
the tyranny of heaven, the level where orphans are female and heirs are male,
where flesh is female and spirit is male, earth female, sky male, monsters female,
angels male. (293-4)
On a mythic level, then, Heathcliff’s rebellious qualities, his outsider status, negate his
masculine qualities, and render him a semiotic female. Interestingly, the unity between
Catherine and Heathcliff renders the whole entirely female. Just as Lacan posits Woman
as outside the order of phallic signification, Gilbert and Gubar’s ingenious reading of
Heathcliff removes him from the symbolic order and places him firmly in the ‘nonexistent’ realm of monsters, ghouls and ghosts. And women.13
The idea of Woman as essentially monstrous receives perhaps its most compelling
theoretical expression in Julia Kristeva’s 1980 study, Powers of Horror: An Essay in
Abjection. In considering the function of disgust, and of the things that disgust us,
Kristeva contends that the abject is primally feminine.14 The abject is memorably evoked
by the author’s revulsion towards the “skin on the surface of milk – harmless, thin as a
sheet of cigarette paper, pitiful as a nail paring” (2): milk being, of course, an exclusively
female product. That which disgusts us also tends to make us afraid, and so, we cast
aside the abject object. On a broader level, this fear and loathing of the female
[…] turns out to be essentially a fear of her generative power. It is this power, a
dreaded one, that patrilineal filiation has the burden of subduing. It is thus not
surprising to see pollution rituals proliferating in societies where patrilineal power
is poorly secured, as if the latter sought, by means of purification, a support
against excessive matrilineality. (77)
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Among the “pollution rituals” psychically enacted to deal with the threat of the
monstrous female is to turn this feminized phobic object into a “hallucination of nothing:
a metaphor that is the anaphora of nothing” (42). In order to achieve this rhetorization of
nothingness, disgust must find its expression in desire:
On the trail of my fear I meet again with my desire, and I bind myself to it, thus
leaving stranded the concatenation of discourse with which I have built my
hallucination, my weakness and my strength, my investment and my ruin. (42)
That “concatenation of discourse,” that gothic ruin of language, is one way of describing
Wuthering Heights, or, indeed, any horror story. In casting aside that which horrifies us,
we narrativize it, fictionalize it, and in the process make of it an obscene object of desire.
Isn’t this what the horror genre (whether filmic or literary) is: the most reviled of genres,
yet the most visceral and compelling? The endless repetitions which characterize horror
fiction (and the proliferating repetitions of Wuthering Heights are perhaps the surest
indication that this text has a place in that genre), of which the Christmas ghost story is,
in some respects, an unusual yet typical example, speak to its endless capacity to enthrall
us – in part because, as a hallucination of nothing, it is never really there, but rather, like
anything that repeats, is always coming and going, leaving and coming back.
This is how Heathcliff can seem both hunky romantic anti-hero and a monster of
female rage. Similarly, it explains how Leatherface (the Heathcliff of The Texas
Chainsaw Massacre, if you will) is both a hulking terrorizer of women, and, in his wig
and housedress, the lady of the house. Heathcliff and Leatherface, who are always
coming and going, are hallucinations of nothing: objects of dread that in their very
representation are also obscene objects of desire. As figures of horror, they are de facto
women.
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Perhaps this accounts for the fact that the most horrific and violent scenes in both
Wuthering Heights and The Texas Chainsaw Massacre are domestic scenes. There is a
parallel sense of disquiet when Lockwood first encounters the not-quite-right domestic
arrangements at Wuthering Heights (chapters I and II), and when each of the unlucky
teenagers finds their way into Leatherface’s house. The climactic scene of Massacre, a
grotesque parody of the family dinner, achieves much of its Grand Guignol effect
through a hallucinogenic distortion of gender roles. Specifically, the lack of female
representation at the table paradoxically signifies an overabundance of it. In much of this
scene, the camera places the viewer in Sally’s (who has been tied to a chair and forced to
partake in the family meal) point of view. The cannibal family is composed exclusively
of males, but none of them are fit representatives of a phallic symbolic order. The
patriarch “Grandpa” is a desiccated, vampiric creature (in an earlier appearance – a nod
to the mummified mother in Hitchcock’s Psycho – he appears to be simply a corpse) who
barely has the strength to sit upright in his chair. The “father” – ostensibly the only
member of the family capable of rational thought or coherent speech – is a mess of tics
and equivocations, constantly berated by his troglodytic “son” for being “only a cook.”
And Leatherface, dressed in a wig and apron, dutifully sets the table while nervously
emitting high pitched noises in a crude attempt to approximate a stereotypical housewife.
Sally, the only female present, supplies the properly horrific female gaze of this scene of
male degeneration. She is a Lacanian supplement, rather than complement to the scene –
she sits at the table, but is certainly not part of it – but her outsider status is precisely the
means by which the spectator is able to see the family as a whole. It is Sally’s fish-eye
lens POV, preceded by a reverse zoom that begins inside Sally’s eye, which allows us to
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see the family in all its horror. This spectacle of female lack is possible only through the
disorienting presence of the female gaze: everything we see is the product of an ironically
totalizing female vision, and it is only horrific because it has been feminized, since
presumably there is no horror in the domestic ritual of the cannibal family for the
cannibal family themselves. For Sally, and by extension, the viewer, the only escape
from this family feast is to jump screaming out the window.
There is, I think, a curious symmetry between this scene and the Christmas dinner
scene in Chapter VII of Wuthering Heights. Witnessed and reported by Nelly Dean, the
long-serving retainer of the Earnshaw family, the scene serves to show both the apparent
success of domesticating Catherine during her stay at Thrushcross Grange, and the
futility of attempting the same with Heathcliff. At the opening of the chapter, Catherine
has been five weeks at Thrushcross Grange, “her manners much improved” and looking
very much the lady (41). The taming of Catherine provokes her into cruelly
differentiating herself from Heathcliff when she sees him, as she remarks, “how very
black and cross you look! and how – how funny and grim!” (42). Later, Nelly visits
Heathcliff, who has been locked in the attic (like a similar garret inmate from the Brontë
canon…), and finds he wishes to clean-up like Catherine, and vowing “to be good” (44).
Nelly attempts to integrate Heathcliff into the family Christmas meal, but to disastrous
result. After enduring an offhand rebuke from his step-brother Hindley, and a careless
insult from Edgar Linton, Heathcliff explodes:
[…] Heathcliff’s violent nature was not prepared to endure the appearance of
impertinence from one whom he seemed to hate, even then, as a rival. He seized
a tureen of hot apple-sauce, the first thing that came under his gripe, and dashed it
full against the speaker’s face and neck – who instantly commenced a lament that
brought Isabella and Catherine hurrying to the place.
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Mr. Earnshaw snatched up the culprit directly and conveyed him to his
chamber, where, doubtless, he administered a rough remedy to cool the fit of
passion, for he reappeared red and breathless. I got the dish-cloth, and, rather
spitefully, scrubbed Edgar’s nose and mouth, affirming it served him right for
meddling. His sister began weeping to go home, and Cathy stood by,
confounded, blushing for all. (46)
There is, as in the dinner scene of Massacre, a grotesque parody of domestic ritual here.
Staging the scene at Christmas hightens the violence of Heathcliff’s graphic outburst, and
makes slightly surreal the violent aftershocks described in the next paragraph. Everyone
involved becomes as unhinged as Heathcliff: Hindley “snatches” Heathcliff up in order to
beat him (described by Nelly Dean with a dry euphemism – a Victorian specialty – that
adds to the black comedy of the scene); Nelly roughly and vindictively attends to the
stricken Edgar, while his sister raises the volume of the scene even more by crying.
Catherine plays the straight man here, looking on in embarrassment. In tone, Christmas
at Wuthering Heights becomes nearly as cacophonous and gruesome an experience as
dining with Texas cannibals.
More interestingly, the scene shares a similarly uncanny sense of female
authorship. Just as the horror of the dinner scene in Massacre is produced by the female
gaze of Sally (in the sense of its transmission to the spectator, not, lest I be
misunderstood, by her agency within the narrative), the horror here is produced by the
presence of Nelly Dean, who provides Lockwood, and us, with access to it. As a servant,
Nelly Dean is outside the narrative, but as an outsider, she is able to comprehend it, and
see it as a whole. Indeed, Nelly’s role as absent author can be seen clearly earlier in this
chapter when she tries to lift Heathcliff’s spirits:
‘And now that we’ve done washing, and combing, and sulking – tell me whether
you don’t think yourself rather handsome? I’ll tell you, I do. You’re fit to be a
prince in disguise. Who knows but your father was Emperor of China, and your
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mother an Indian queen, each of them able to buy up, with one week’s income,
Wuthering Heights and Thrushcross Grange together? And you were kidnapped
by wicked sailors, and brought to England. Were I in your place, I would frame
high notions of my birth; and the thoughts of what I was should give me courage
and dignity to support the oppressions of a little farmer!’ (45)
Not only does Nelly encourage Heathcliff to exploit his otherness by fictionalizing it to
his advantage, she does it herself in imagining him the rightful heir of both India and
China. More, Nelly is, in a way, writing Wuthering Heights herself here, not simply as
narrator, but in predicting the trajectory of the plot: Heathcliff will not only overcome the
oppressions of the little farmer Hindley, but will become the emperor of Wuthering
Heights and Thrushcross Grange.
Nelly’s advice to Heathcliff to, in effect, hyperbolize himself (or herself, if we
read him, as Nelly does, as an imaginative construct – and, as a creation of both Emily
Brontë, and in this scene, of Nelly Dean herself, he is the construction of female
imagination), can be read as an analogue for Gilbert and Gubar’s reading of Wuthering
Heights as a hyperbolized extension of Emily Brontë herself: as an explosive, and often
outrageous “Bible of Hell,” as Gilbert and Gubar put it, a satanically Miltonic text written
by and for the rebellious other. To feminize Heathcliff in this manner – and to demonize,
in a sense, the feminine cultural imaginary – is to abstract the text in a manner that can be
critically uncomfortable: as J. Hillis Miller points out, there are an uncanny myriad of
“incoherent” readings of this text. But as Miller also points out, such critical variance is
also a mark of this text’s peculiar greatness. Central to Wuthering Heights’ greatness and
polysemic fascination is its willingness to indulge in and release the violence that
threatens on every page. It is a violence that seems strangely and particularly feminine, a
femininity that, as Kristeva and others have argued, lies at the heart of horror itself. The
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hyperbolic violence of Wuthering Heights, threatens a parody of the gothic that was often
realized in other gothic productions of the period, particularly the Christmas ghost story.
The Christmas ghost story was the most explosive market for female writing of
the Victorian age. The catalyst for this market, as in most things Christmas in this period,
was Charles Dickens, and his periodical Household Words, which popularized both the
annual Christmas number and the genre that characterized it: the frame-tale series of
ghost stories.15 Numerous periodicals followed suit with their own Christmas numbers,
providing work for most of the popular women writers of the period. That work was
ideological as well as economic. The explosion of cozy and creepy ghost stories by
women expanded not only the writer’s purses, but the cultural narrative of domesticity as
such. A particularly striking example of the concurrent narrativization of the Victorian
woman with that of the Christmas ghost story can be found in the anonymously penned
Ghost’s Wives: a String of Strange Stories Told Round a Christmas Fire, by Six Young
Widows, and a Spinster Lady of a Certain Age.16
The phenomenon of the Christmas annual was, by 1867, the year Ghost’s Wives
was published, a familiar one, and could be said to be entering a decadent period, judging
by the winking, self-deprecating tone taken in the text. The near-parodic violence of
Wuthering Heights gives way here to straight comedic parody. The setting of the framestory is the wild and windy island of Pengullock, a hyper-gothic environment, where on
[…] Christmas Eve especially […] misty shapes whirled and circled around the
island to the wailing music of the stormy wind and the fierce chorus of the
breaking waves. It was another world, that little island, a supernatural world,
where beings neither men nor spirits laughed, danced, sorrowed, and mourned in
the ocean spray and night mist. (6)
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Figure 10: American and English Gothics. Masculine excess in The Texas Chainsaw
Massacre (1974); Surplus females tell A String of Strange Stories Round a Christmas
Fire (1867).
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The only living beings on this de-natured and de-gendered island are the women
ensconced in haunted Raby House, who are spending a “dismal Christmas Eve” silently
watching the clock on the mantel (7). Immediately, Ghost’s Wives makes clear that the
milieu of gothic horror is made possible by an overabundance of feminine energy: this
explicitly male-less environment is the very condition of the ghostly. The titular
“Spinster Lady of a Certain Age,” who, we are told, is “of a severe and depressing
character […] great on the proprieties […] eloquent on women’s rights” (7) threatens to
enliven the evening by reading a poem by a Doctor of Divinity, when she is interrupted
by one of the widows, demanded a more entertaining pastime. When one of the widows
suggests telling ghost stories, the others demur, arguing that “‘no one ever does that,
except in Christmas Annuals’” (7). This sly meta-commentary on the gothic stereotype
these women find themselves in not only exposes the “invented tradition” of telling ghost
stories (no one does it – except in, and as, fiction), but goes on to suggest the nature of
such fictions: “‘But people always are snowed-up in Christmas books. They are snowedup in country inns, or mail-coaches, or express trains; and then, instead of losing their
tempers, as Englishmen would do under such circumstances, they tell long stories’” (7).
Christmas books (or ghost stories: given the list of clichéd ghost story settings the
narrator provides, they are seen here as one and the same thing) are read here as
essentially claustrophobic, and the telling of them, a therapeutic means of averting pentup rage. Tellingly, it is Englishmen who lose their temper; the snowed-up inmates of the
country-inns, mail-coaches and express-trains are implicitly gendered female here, and so
the telling of ghost stories is rendered the equivalent of a feminine way of losing one’s
temper.
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This conception of the ghost story as a site of repressed female violence is
effectively narrativized in one of the tales of the collection, cryptically titled “A Tale
Without End or Beginning.” The narrator again opens her story with a parodic
description of a haunted house: “Rumbold Abbey is one of those tumble-down
dilapidated, dismal old houses which ought to be pulled down by Act of Parliament, or
else left in charge of a deaf old woman to show inquisitive strangers and prying tourists
round at sixpence a head” (90). This clichéd (and rather violently engendered) haunted
house is owned by a similarly clichéd antiquary who would be at home in Irving’s
Bracebridge Hall, and whose sole purpose in the narrative is to give a ball attended by the
heroine Laura Furniss, who in her turn, later learns that the area has been plagued by a
rash of robberies. After the ball, in the middle of the night, Laura thinks she hears
robbers outside her window, but as “her chamber was at the end of a long corridor, all of
the doors opening out of which led only into uninhabited rooms” (91) – the type of room
a visitor inevitably finds oneself in in these stories – she makes to arm and defend herself:
She retreated into her room, locked the door, and piled against it such heavy
furniture as she could lift, and then, preparing for the worst, looked round for
some weapon with which to defend herself, in the event of the burglars forcing an
entrance.
Opening an old cabinet, she found, to her surprise, a pistol-case, which
held not only the firearms, but also powder and bullet. They were old-fashioned
pistols, with flint locks – everything was old-fashioned at Rumbold Abbey – but
they would serve to defend herself with, she thought, so she carefully and
resolutely loaded them, looked to the priming, and then, making a rest of the back
of a high carved chair, she waited, pointing the pistol at the door, ready to fire the
instant any attempt was made to effect an entrance. (91)
Out of her own imagination, and the supplies at hand, Laura carefully constructs her
nightmare. The “old-fashioned” gothic prop of the flint-locked pistols helps to generate
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suspense, but Laura’s awareness that she is now starring in her own gothic story make the
tension unbearable:
By this time she was in so excited a state she hardly knew what she was doing or
where she was. All the most terrible of the stories she had heard filled her mind,
and the fate of one poor girl in particular produced so great an effect upon her that
it was only by a great mental struggle she maintained her position of defence. (91)
The story does not elaborate on the particular “poor girl” or her fate, but then, it does not
need to. Like Catherine Morland in Northanger Abbey, it is clearly the generic effect of
horror as such – the cliché of the gothic -- that makes Laura create her own horror. When
Laura discharges the pistols, she hears an “unearthly scream” and finds a trail of blood
outside the door (91). But as it turns out, she has only shot another cliché: “She had
roused the whole house, she had made a hole through one of Sir Edward’s doors, and she
had killed Lady Saxon’s favourite black cat! Yes, that was all. Poor puss was her
victim” (92).17
The gothic comedy of this tale paints but a thin veneer over the female violence at
its heart. Though the striking image of the phallic female brandishing loaded pistols
[reinforced by an equally striking illustration in the text; see Figure 11] is defused by the
fact that the phallic woman only succeeds in killing a cat, the graphic detail with which
that murder is described tempers the joke with a grisly actuality. The self-reflexivity of
this meta-gothic tale also makes the reader question the manner in which the narrative
pulls its punches. If this narrative is an investigation, albeit a minor one, of the gothic,
then the murder of an animal traditionally coded as female, by a female, suggests the
same kind of internalized, yet externalized violence that suffuses the world of the sadomasochistic Catherine and Heathcliff in Wuthering Heights. In a mytho-cultural sense,
“A Tale Without Beginning or End,” is aptly named: for all its winking parody, the story
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Figure 11: “Beseiged” in “A Tale Without End or Beginning” (1867).
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shares the same concerns with claustrophobic domestic horror, and its ever-present threat
to conflagrate outside the home, that marks the female gothic – a genre that, despite its
relatively recent “invention,” stems from a fear and horror that seems to precede narrative
or genre as such. Perhaps the most striking thing about the female gothic in the middle
years of the nineteenth-century is that its fears and terrors were so commonly read as the
essential components of the emerging genre of the Christmas story.

III

The use of Christmas as a site of uncanny domestic separation and union is equally
dramatic in masculine, scopophilic fantasies of Victorian domesticity, particularly in that
most lugubriously woman haunted of Victorian novelists, Thomas Hardy. Perhaps the
most calamitous Christmas in English fiction occurs in idyllic Weatherby, one of Thomas
Hardy’s real/fictional hamlets dotting his mythic, though geographically precise realm of
Wessex/Dorset. The Christmas in question makes up the climax of Hardy’s Far From
the Madding Crowd, a novel which charts the shifting amorous and domestic
arrangements of Bathsheba Everdene and her three suitors. Bathsheba is not the first of
Hardy’s femmes fatale, but the climax of her drama is most emblematic of Hardy’s
representation of the essentially gothic fascination of the female, and the uncanny
frequency of her Yuletide apotheoses. After rejecting marriage proposals from the solid
farmer Gabriel Oak and the sexually repressed William Boldwood, Bathsheba stakes her
independence and farm on the Freudian swordplay and rakish wit of the impetuous
dragoon Francis Troy. Predictably, the marriage is not a happy one, and Sergeant Troy
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takes the opportunity to capitalize on the death of his jilted fiancé Fanny to abandon
Bathsheba. Through an improbable chain of events typical in Hardy’s work, Troy’s
absence is mistaken as his likely death, and the increasingly desperate Farmer Boldwood
re-emerges as a suitor, hoping to extract a promise of marriage at a Christmas party at his
farm designed for that purpose.
When Boldwood presses Bathsheba for a promise, she blithely suggests
Christmas as the date to give him her answer, but the arbitrary date quickly acquires
gravity, and becomes a site of dread: as “the weeks intervening between the night of this
conversation and Christmas day began perceptibly to diminish, her anxiety and perplexity
increased” (406). Bathsheba’s reticence is understandable. Not only does she have good
reason to fear that, as she confides to Gabriel Oak: “if I don’t give my word, he’ll go out
of his mind” (406), but – particularly as bigamy is never far from a Hardy plot – she does
not feel certain that her husband is indeed dead.
It is in this mood that Hardy constructs his climactic Christmas chapters. The
first, “Converging Courses,” sets up the fateful evening in a manner that recalls some of
his later poetry. The title echoes his famous lines on the sinking of the Titanic, “The
Convergence of the Twain,” as does the division of the chapter into scenes marked by
Roman numerals. This portentous device of loudly dividing the action of the plot into
disparate scenes also has the curiously cinematic effect of joining them, and creates
considerable suspense. Structurally, these divisions create the very drama Hardy
describes in the poem, preparing “a sinister mate/ For her – so gaily great --/A Shape of
Ice, far and dissociate” (VII, 19-21): In the seven sections of the chapter, Hardy offers
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close-ups of his four circling protagonists, each separately preparing for Boldwood’s
Christmas party.
In the second chapter, “Concurritur – Horae Momento,” Hardy weds his disparate
elements into a nexus of time and space, as his quotation from Horace suggests: “Battle is
joined: in the space of an hour” (Satires, I.I). At the party, Bathsheba is further pressured
by Boldwood to marry him, as farmers’ gossip outside and villagers dance in the
decorative hall. Boldwood finally extracts his promise, and Sergeant Troy arrives at the
party in disguise to re-claim his wife. Hardy extracts as much irony out of this festive
scene as he can, as Boldwood cheerfully invites his unrecognized rival into his home,
charging him to “drain a Christmas beaker with us, stranger!” (431). The scene of Troy’s
recognition is worth quoting at length, as it illustrates Hardy’s deft handling of a moment
of tension, in which swift movement and paralyzed stasis are paradoxically joined:
She had sunk down on the lowest stair; and there she sat, her mouth blue and dry,
and her dark eyes fixed vacantly upon him, as she wondered whether it were not
all a terrible illusion.
Then Troy spoke. “Bathsheba, I come here for you!”
She made no reply.
“Come home with me: come!”
Troy went across to her.
“Come, madam, do you hear what I say?” he said, peremptorily.
A strange voice came from the fireplace – a voice sounding far off and
confined, as if from a dungeon. Hardly a soul in the assembly recognized the thin
tones to be those of Boldwood. Sudden despair had transformed him.
“Bathsheba, go with your husband!”
Nevertheless, she did not move. The truth was that Bathsheba was beyond
the pale of activity – and yet not in a swoon. She was in a state of mental gutta
serena; her mind was for the minute totally deprived of light at the same time that
no obscuration was apparent from without. (433)
This ghostly scene, one of Hardy’s many representations of the return from the (apparent)
dead, is filled with the spectral motion of stasis: Bathsheba “sinks” and “sits,” Boldwood
is “confined,” yet “transformed,” and Troy, in his melodramatic moment of return, is
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both alive and dead. The reader is in perhaps the most curiously parallactic condition of
all: we are stuck in a kind of hermeneutic stasis – are we to read Troy’s plea as an urgent,
earnest appeal to domestic resolution, or as yet another example of the grotesque capering
he has been recently indulging as a travelling actor? The dramatic uncertainty of Troy’s
motives makes his appearance a ghostly variation on the demon lover trope so prevalent
in gothic fiction.
Such dramatic confusion is perhaps one of the mitigating factors of Boldwood’s
next move: shooting Troy point-blank with a gun hanging above the hearth. After being
prevented from shooting himself afterwards, Boldwood is resigned to hang, but he is as
surprised as we are to find that his sentence is reduced due to a generally agreed upon
“condition of mental disease” (442).
Boldwood’s disastrous Christmas party is the ghostly singularity to which all of
the novel’s sexual energy gravitates, and Christmas operates as the ironic parody of
domestic finality, where Troy’s ambiguous holiday plea for Bathsheba to “come home” is
transformed into sudden catastrophe. Hardy’s use of Christmas as the occasion of
domestic apocalypse takes on even more metaphoric weight when these chapters are read
beside “Convergence of the Twain,” in which the conjunction of iceberg and unsinkable
ship takes on unmistakable matrimonial overtones:
Alien they seemed to be:
No mortal eye could see
The intimate welding of their later history,
X
Or sign that they were bent
By paths coincident
On being anon twin halves of one august event,
XI
Till the Spinner of Years
Said “Now!” And each one hears,
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And consummation comes, and jars two hemispheres.
The pun of “welding” has a double operation: the substitution of an “l” for a “d”
disfigures the alternative word “wedding”; and the consummation of that
welding/wedding is, of course, a description of the apparently clumsy crash between a
phallic iceberg and a feminized “gilded,” “cleaving” ship. Read this way, the tragic
poem becomes domestic farce. Similarly, if inversely, Christmas, erstwhile site of
“Boldwood’s merrymaking” (435), returns as tragedy: transforming the domestic
intrigues of Weatherby -- seemingly trending towards the “august event” of marriage -into an occasion for murder.
Hardy’s use of Christmas in Far From the Madding Crowd might seem merely a
darkly ironic joke, were it not for the fact that he puts it to similar use in his first
published novel, the studiously sensational Desperate Remedies. Read alongside each
other, the Christmases of the former novel and the latter read less like singular events,
and more like a cycle of repetition – a tradition, perhaps. The first sentence of Desperate
Remedies seems to imply this:
In the long and intricately inwrought chain of circumstance which renders worthy
of record some experiences of Cytheria Graye, Edward Springrove, and others,
the first event directly influencing the issue was a Christmas visit. (7)
This direct, if not exactly poetic opening gives the reader fair notice of what is in store: a
“chain of circumstances” masquerading as narrative, desperately searching for an
ordering meaning, in other words, a ramshackle plot seeking a semblance of sense. The
novel is a frankly ridiculous tale of thwarted love, illegitimate children, bigamy, murder,
mistaken identity, and a touch of lesbianism. Hardy seems aware of this from the outset,
and even before the first sentence, we are given hints that this work is not a model of
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Aristotelian unites: a somewhat gratuitous epigram from Sir Walter Scott defending the
“artificiality” of romance, and a list of chapters that are titled after the amount of time
that transpires within them (“The Events of Thirty Years,” “The Events of Eighteen
Hours,” etc.). On one level, this strategically deflects criticism of the melodrama about to
unfold, but it also highlights the artificial structuration of spatio-temporal existence as
such: The seemingly arbitrary ordering of events into temporal units is not, after all,
confined to melodrama, but to any rational ordering of experience. Hardy’s chapter
headings neutralize the feverish overplotting of the novel, and suggest the chaos and
arbitrariness of reality. The first sentence, then, encapsulates the novel as a whole: a
stream of seemingly circumstantial events given meaning and order by the structuring
power of a temporal event – which, more than once in Desperate Remedies, is Christmas.
The importance of the first Christmas, to which the first sentence alludes, is only
hinted at in the pages that immediately follow. It is revealed to be the point of meeting
between Ambrose Graye and another Cytherea, to whom Graye proposes marriage. He is
swiftly and regretfully rejected for mysterious reasons (Cytherea is pregnant). Graye
eventually married another woman, but, as is standard with Hardy, cannot forget the other
woman, and (rather tactlessly) names his daughter by the second woman after his
intended first.
Later in the narrative, Cytherea Graye becomes a fixture in the household of
Cytherea the elder, and is eventually maneuvered into marrying the elder Cytherea’s
illegitimate son Aeneas, who, though himself married, is in love (or at least lust) with
Cytherea the younger, and sees his chance once his first wife (apparently) dies in a fire.
Aeneas’s difficulties, however, are nothing to Cytherea’s (the younger, if you are keeping

199
up). She does not love Aeneas, and would marry Edward Springrove if he were not
betrothed to his cousin (whom he does not love). The intrigues of Aeneas and Cytherea
the elder to secure Cytherea the younger prefigure the desperate remedies of Boldwood in
Far From the Madding Crowd. Like Bathsheba, Cytherea reluctantly picks Christmas as
the date to declare herself. Trapped in gothic surroundings, Cytherea, however, finds a
way to make Christmas less of a fixed point than Aeneas would like:
The church was nearly dark now, and melancholy in the extreme. She stood
beside him while he locked the door, then took the arm he gave her, and wended
her way out of the churchyard with him. Then they walked to the House together,
but the great matter having been set at rest, she persisted in talking only on
indifferent subjects.
‘Christmas-day, then,’ he said, as they were parting at the end of the
shrubbery.
‘I meant Old Christmas-day,’ she said, evasively.
‘H’m, people do not usually attach that meaning to the words?’ (223)
Cytherea has located a technicality: January 6th, the Feast of the Epiphany, was
sometimes called “Old Christmas Day,” and therefore, she has given herself almost a
fortnight’s reprieve. But as Aeneas notes, she is also overturning the idea of Christmas as
a fixed point, and epistemologically and linguistically undermining the meaning of
Christmas itself. Already trapped in an oppressive domestic environment that threatens
to be legally and sexually mandated by Christmas, Cytherea subverts the idea of
Christmas as event, and highlights its variability, its function as a process.
This variability of Christmas comes to operate as a kind of literary variant of
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in the narrative, after Aeneas and Cytherea II’s
Christmas wedding. Cytherea’s brother Owen and her hapless suitor Edward Springrove,
who have found out that Aeneas’s first wife is still alive, give chase to the couple after
the wedding, hoping to find them before the marriage is consummated. Hardy creates
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suspense here in a manner similar to his minute breakdown of time in the Christmas
chapters of Far From the Madding Crowd, chronicling the chase with chapter breaks
that mark intervals of the clock: “Half past two to five o’clock” reads one (241). Owen
and Springrove’s attempts to track down Aeneas and Cytherea are convoluted and
difficult to keep up with: the reader is as flummoxed as the characters, who repeatedly
express their confusion in locating the couple and piecing together the plot in cosmic
terms. Owen laments: “‘How unutterably mean must my intelligence have appeared to
the eye of a foreseeing God,’ he frequently said in after time. ‘Columbus on the eve of his
discovery of a world was not so contemptibly unaware’” (234). His exasperation is, of
course, the result of his inability to pin-point with certainty when or whether his sister has
consummated her possibly bigamous marriage: the “event about to transpire [which] was
as portentous to the woman […] as any, short of death itself, could possibly be” (243).
Ultimately, Cytherea’s strategic mis-reading of Christmas creates this matrix of
uncertainty, locating sexual and domestic panic within cosmic questions of our ability to
fix the domestic subject within a secure time and place. This flux is inherently spectral,
and gives substance to what might otherwise be read as gratuitously “gothic” moves by
Hardy within the text: the improbable doublings of Cythereas, and, of course the
appearance of the actual ghost of Cytherea the elder to Cytherea the younger at the end of
the novel, “wan and distinct” (374). Her appearance, as with so many ghosts, coincides
with the exact moment of her death, which, in a novel obsessed with attempts to fix
objects and subjects in time and space, is dutifully reported as occurring at “ten minutes
past four” in the last sentence of the chapter. This approach to the feminine domestic
subject is, of course, the product of a gothic sensibility that can be traced back from the
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sensation novels Desperate Remedies is so clearly influenced by to the gothic novels of
Ann Radcliffe and Mary Shelley. But it also illustrates, and inaugurates, the protean
adaptability of the Hardy heroine, and an emblematic representation of the female in
Victorian literature: Obscure Object of Desire, impossible to pin down, paradoxically
domestic and undomesticatable.
Hardy’s remaining career as a novelist would be spent developing this protean
female, a project that would lead critics from his day to our own to mark him as
alternately a misogynist and a feminist, but no work encapsulates the meaning of this
figure more starkly than his last novel, The Well Beloved.18 Perhaps Hardy’s strangest
fiction, the novel charts the erotic and artistic career of Jocelyn Pierston, who alternately
loves three generations of women on Portland Island. In his shifting erotic attachments to
a woman, her daughter, and her grand-daughter (all named Avice Caro), Pierston (whose
name is Pearston in the earlier version of the novel) attests to an idealistic fidelity:
To his Well-Beloved he had always been faithful, but she had many
embodiments. Each individuality known as Lucy, Jane, Flora, Evangeline, or
what-not, had been merely a transient condition of her. He did not recognize this
as an excuse or defense, but as a fact simply. Essentially she was perhaps of no
tangible substance; a spirit, a dream, a frenzy, a conception, an aroma, an
epitomized sex, a light of the eye, a parting of the lips. God only knew what she
really was; Pierston did not. She was indescribable. (184)
The dialectic between Pierston’s fixed image and the corporeal transience of his objects
of desire produces a ghost-woman who alternately materializes and dematerializes under
the male gaze. Hardy’s chapter headings in the 1897 version illustrate this spectral flux:
“The Old Phantom becomes Distinct,” “She Becomes an Inaccessible Ghost,” “She
Threatens to resume Corporeal Substance,” “The Past Shines in the Present,”
“Juxtapositions,” and so on. The text, like Pierston, abstracts a phantom feminine from
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the particular, and re-particularizes it, making the abstract idea a quasi-material ghost.
This process, explicitly described in The Well-Beloved, marks the male-female relations
of all of Hardy’s novels (and many of his poems, particularly the poems of 1913 that
follow the death of his first wife, in which she appears in many of them as a ghost),
characterizes Bathsheba and Cytheria as well. That the crisis point of these characters’
materializations and dematerializations occurs on Christmas – itself a point of flux in
Cytheria’s distinction between Christmas and “Old” Christmas – not only continues in
another form the emerging tradition of Christmas as site of haunting, but illustrates the
dialectical nature of Christmas, and therefore, its own intrinsic ghostliness.
While Hardy’s novels are not generally considered to fall under the genre of
domestic fiction, the recurring tropes he obsessively returns to do tend to define
characteristics of the genre: 1) the conception of women as a frustratingly mercurial mix
of ideological fixity and corporeal mobility, 2) domesticity and marriage as the sphere in
which that mix can be pinned, or “tamed”, and 3) Christmas as a metaphorical device to
fix not only the amorphous sphere of domesticity itself, but the protean female who
makes that sphere so prone to flux. Indeed, though Thomas Hardy is often regarded as a
singular case in the development in English fiction, both in his depiction of women, and
in his status as a “regionalist,” his admittedly more overtly sexualized treatment of
domesticity, and its troubled relationship to Christmas can be seen more generally in
fiction of the period.
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IV

For all the raw power of Emily Brontë and Thomas Hardy’s domestic horror
shows, it is Emily’s sister, Charlotte, who seems to me, finally, the most haunting poet –
indeed, visionary –of the Victorian woman and her domestic milieu. No one seems more
preternaturally aware of the sense of lack that surrounds the idea of woman as such, and
no one invests more meaning into the empty but pregnant spaces of female confinement
than her. From her early juvenilia, in which she routinely sequestered the Byronic demigods of her brother Branwell’s creations into country homes that also served as
convenient prisons for the female characters Branwell neglected to write about, to the
iconic images and representations of Jane Eyre that have become a mythos of sorts for
feminist criticism, Charlotte Brontë’s fiction abounds with female characters enveloped
in a domestic space which both circumscribes them, and lends them an uncanny power.
Perhaps nowhere is this more compellingly the case than in her masterpiece, Villette, a
novel that could fairly be called the first modernist ghost story.
Villette is famous for its “unreliable” narrator Lucy Snowe, who consistently
withholds information from the reader throughout the narrative. She is a narrator who
fetishizes every corner of every room she enters, investing so much dead space with so
much presence in an attempt to leave her own character a blank, that she makes of her
novel a veritable haunted house in itself. Brontë seems to anticipate Samuel Beckett in
giving us a narrator with an almost autistic obsession with describing the world of things:
every room Lucy enters is meticulously described; every object she sees is mercilessly
analyzed. As in Beckett, the net effect of such description is to hollow out the characters
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that fill such clinically realized space, not least Lucy Snowe herself. We are never
entirely certain who the characters Lucy interacts with really are (particularly as they
often turn out to be someone else). And despite, or perhaps because of, the detail with
which Lucy describes her surroundings, we are never really sure why she inhabits them.
She is always curiously absent from her own narrative, shifting through various roles that
seem to come to her as if by accident. From goddaughter to caretaker to traveler to
English teacher (with stints as an actress and art critic), Lucy inhabits a diversity of roles
that lurch the plot forward in unexpected directions, all the while calling into question the
roles Lucy never does quite fully adopt: daughter, lover, wife. Lucy’s reticent yet prolix
style of narration is a kind of mirror of the life she leads, one that is claustrophobically
constrained by a variety of domestic walls, but which, because of that variety, constantly
expands in scope and range.
Christmas more than once marks the border of this expansion. Early in the novel,
Lucy relates the tragic story of the spinster she is caring for, Miss Marchmont. As Miss
Marchmont describes it:
‘…one happy Christmas Eve I dressed and decorated myself, expecting my lover,
very soon to be my husband, would come that night to visit me. I sat down to
wait. Once more I see the moment – I see the snow-twilight stealing through the
window over which the curtain was not dropped, for I designed to watch him ride
up the white walk […]’
(40)
Already, Christmas is a site of portent and flux, as Miss Marchmont slips back and forth
between the past and present tense; yet one of precision, as she marks the scene – like
Hardy – with an exactitude that tells the tale of a moment. As it turns out, Miss
Marchmont’s wait is in vain, as her lover returns mortally injured, and
‘When the dawn of Christmas morning broke, my Frank was with God.’
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‘And that,’ she went on, ‘happened thirty years ago. I have suffered since.
I doubt if I have made the best use of all my calamities. Soft amiable natures they
would have refined to saintliness; of strong, evil spirits they would have made
demons; as for me, I have only been a woe-struck and selfish woman.’ (41)
Miss Marchmont herself dies the day after telling her story, freeing Lucy to pursue her
own career in suffering. The spinster’s story acts as a kind of Campbellian call to the
heroic quest. The story serves as a prophecy of sorts: it not only inscribes Lucy within
the tale in its descriptive details (“the snow-twilight”), the tale itself is an uncanny
doubling of the waiting and suffering Lucy will undergo at the end of her own narrative.
As such, it also serves as a warning of the ways such suffering can result in multiple,
possible outcomes: it can make a woman a saint or a demon. As Nina Auerbach notes,
spinsters are uniquely qualified to issue such prophecies in Victorian fiction: “in the
fervent vision of some less orthodox writers, she becomes a figure we do not expect: an
authentic female hero, with angelic and demonic capacities shaping the proud uniqueness
of her life” (Woman and the Demon 111). In Miss Marchmont’s tale, Christmas,
combining the expectant joy of domesticity and the cruel reversal of those expectations,
is the focal point that unleashes those capacities. Christmas is the point that sets Miss
Marchmont off on her career of solitude and suffering, and in its repetition in her
retelling, it plays a similar role in Lucy’s development. Indeed, as we shall see, Lucy’s
suffering will make her into something more than a spinster.
Christmas, like the rest of the outside world that Lucy translates for us in her
evolving consciousness, is a reflection of the inner world that ultimately dominates our
entrance into her narrative. As Gilbert and Gubar note:
What makes the narrative seem authentically ‘preternatural’ or uncanny is
Brontë’s representation of the psychic life of Lucy Snowe through a series of
independent characters as well as her use of contiguous events to dramatize and
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mythologize her imagery by demonstrating its psychosexual meaning.
(Madwoman in the Attic 408).
Miss Marchmont’s relationship to Lucy, and more importantly, the strange weight that is
placed on this minor character’s story, carries an oblique significance for our reading of
Lucy, and Lucy’s writing of herself. In this sense, Christmas plays a role similar to the
painting of Cleopatra that Lucy encounters mid-way through the novel. “That wealth of
muscle, that affluence of flesh […] this huge, dark-complexioned gipsy-queen” (200),
which so captivates and repulses Lucy, has had a similar effect on critics. Indeed, the
aggressive attention to which this image is given in the text makes it impossible to ignore,
and, in a way, draws attention to its very gratuitousness. Almost uncomfortably a
“symbol,” the Cleopatra demands reading; its physicality, and Lucy’s visceral reaction to
it, transform it into a kind of image of the Lacanian Real: its crude, almost willful
meaninglessness practically guarantees a hermeneutic response. On a smaller scale, this
is the effect of all of the things Lucy sees, from the equally gratuitous McGuffin of the
spectral nun, to the obsessive detail Lucy gives the reader of her various surroundings.
None of these images and items contributes much weight to the “plot” as such, but they
gather a considerable power of accrual: their contiguity comes to define the shifting
horizons of Lucy’s interior world. As such, we read Lucy by reading her negation of the
fleshy giantess that revolts her.
In fact, most of Lucy’s reaction to the world that surrounds her is one of negation
and barely contained revulsion. Even the warm Villette refuge of La Terrasse, where the
Bretton family strangely reappear – literally, re-materialize, as their surroundings emerge
out of Lucy’s returning consciousness after collapsing outside the Catholic church – is
subject to quiet criticism. Lucy coldly anatomizes the Brettons’ Christmas celebrations
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as “a mask of Old Christmas they now affected” (279). Lucy’s description, and reading,
of this Christmas, can be traced to the Christmas she experiences in Miss Marchmont’s
retelling, in which the patina of holiday joy, where “women and girls sit warm at snug
fire-sides,” masks an internal suffering, where women’s
hearts and imaginations are doomed to divorce from the comfort surrounding their
persons, forced out by night to wander through dark ways, to dare stress of
weather, to contend with the snow-blast, to wait at lonely gates and stiles in
wildest storms, watching and listening to see and hear the father, the son, the
husband coming home. (279)
Here, as so often in the text, it is difficult to tell precisely where Lucy’s description of her
external surroundings ends and that of her interior psyche begins. In describing Twelfth
Night at La Terrace, Lucy virtually repeats Miss Marchmont’s tale, this time inscribing
herself into her snow-blasted description, in which Christmas “dooms” hearts and
imaginations, alienating them from their persons – yet in the process, freeing them to
“wander,” “dare,” and “contend.”
Lucy’s interiorization of her external surroundings is ultimately an act of
Hegelian sublation: her voice effectively negates her negations and transforms the surface
world of things into a dialectical world of spirit. This is nowhere more apparent than in
the novel’s remarkable ending, in which Lucy famously declines to definitively inform
her readers of the fate of her beloved M. Paul. Is he lost at sea? Will they live “happily
ever after?” In fashioning her own retelling of Miss Marchmont’s Christmas tragedy,
Lucy refuses to say. Instead, either with bitter irony or coy satisfaction, or both, Lucy
offers only spectral possibility:
Trouble no quiet, kind heart; leave sunny imaginations hope. Let it be theirs to
conceive the delight of joy born again fresh out of great terror, the rapture of
rescue from peril, the wondrous reprieve from dread, the fruition of return. (496)
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There is a quiet, mysterious triumphalism in the dialectical movement of this valediction.
The return of M. Paul, which will finally pin Lucy to the elusive role of “wife” she has
avoided throughout her narrative, is neither negated nor affirmed. What is negated,
however, is the role of M. Paul in determining Lucy’s fate. In this final rejection of
description, of the world of things, characters and environments that have previously
defined Lucy for her readers, we see her, finally, as the real ghost of the text. As Diane
Hoeveler puts it in her exploration of the gothic side of female literary self-fashioning,
Gothic Feminism:
She is, quite simply, all mind. She embodies Charlotte Brontë’s ‘supreme
psychological achievement’ because Lucy is finally pure psychic energy set free
from the trammels of that most gothic of nightmares, the female body. (241)
Lucy’s emergence as “pure spirit” allows her to suspend the ending of her own story in a
plane of uncertainty – as she spectralizes herself, she spectralizes her world. Her home at
the end of the novel, Numero 7, Faubourg Clotilde, is truly “uncanny”: Heimlich and
unheimlich both, a place concrete in its minute physical description, and yet, finally,
completely indeterminate. It is yet another “tiny, but […] very pretty” (485) space in
which Lucy will dwell. But it is also a site of uncertainty and possibility: in disappearing
from her narrative suspended between wife and spinster, she becomes both present and
absent from her text, a specter haunting her own home, expanding its confining walls in
our imagination into infinite possibility.
Dickens called Mrs. Gaskell his “dear Scheherezade” (Uglow 258), presumably
referring to her storytelling skills, and her reliability in pumping out ghost stories for the
Christmas market, rather than his Household Words role as her King Shahryar. Charlotte
Brontë too, when considering the seemingly never-ending development of her juvenilia
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(of which she herself played a role as Chief Genii), has claims to kinship with the infinite
storyteller. Just as Scheherezade’s stories drift into infinity (there is no true “final” story
in most sources of the 1001 Nights), so does Brontë leave off her death-deferring taletelling with stories in the air: Villette ends in possibility and ambiguity, leaving the entire
enterprise of storytelling, Scheherezade-like, in a state of suspense. More importantly,
Brontë’s work (and sadly, life) illustrates, as Scheherezade does, the result of
confinement and repression, whether patriarchal, or more generally ideological:
proliferation and paradoxical expansion. As readers of Scheherezade come to know (or
readers of de Sade, for that matter): that which is repressed, repeats. Lucy Snowe’s
narrative expands each time it is circumscribed: events accumulate, until representation
itself disappears into pure possibility. Jocelyn Pierston’s Well-Beloved proliferates into
multiple individual human subjects each time it appears it is about to be pinned down.
The texts I have considered in this chapter all exhibit traits Nina Auerbach
anatomizes in her panoramic study of representations of Victorian womanhood, Woman
and the Demon, which seeks a dialectical solution to the tired clichés of the Angel in the
House, the Fallen Woman, and, implicitly, the Madwoman in the Attic. What Auerbach
sees in the various representations of the Victorian woman is not so much the rigid
ideological domesticity that -- via the standard model of Walter Houghton’s The
Victorian Frame of Mind -- stems from the waning belief in religion and a concurrent rise
in a desperate secularism, but rather a new and flourishing belief. The rise, in other
words, of a modern myth:
The impulse to erect neurasthenic prisoners of the home into goddesses of the
hearth was not a special plot against women, but part of a larger, complex and
transfigured perception of Victorian dailiness […] a belief in the transcendent,
transfigured life of characters of fiction. As an essentially metaphysical creature,
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one whose very presence brings eternity into time, woman enlarged by myth has
more in common with fictional creations than she does with living men; her
fictionality is one source of the energy that aggrandizes her. (15)
As I have argued here, the fictionalization of women – whether through their electrical
transformation into fairies, the cross-faded daydreams of separated lovers, or the
obsessive sexual idealization of scopophilic men – is a phenomenon that can not but
explode the boundaries of ideology, even as it nominally proclaims that ideology. This
fictionalizing of women results in the spectralization of women. Just as the reification, or
deification, of the dead father creates, in its repetition of the repressed, a ghostly return,
the mythification of domesticity creates in its seeming repression of women, a
complementary ghost. As we have seen, Christmas is often the site in which this
spectralization occurs: the X which makes of woman the variable x which determines,
problematizes, expands, and reterritorializes ideological discourse.
If Christmas plays a distinct, if often oblique, role in spectralizing men and
women – forging the subject into a cultural ghost, as it were – its role in spiritualizing and
spectralizing the third element of the Oedipal triad: children, is much more immediate
and pronounced. In Chapter Four, we will examine how Christmas does this, in the
process interrogating what Hegel calls in The Philosophy of Right “the immediate
substantiality of spirit” (359): the family.
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1

Lacan, of course, is not saying Woman, but la femme. His point, however, is hardly lost
in the translation into English.
2
It is perhaps worth noting that the narrator’s first encounter with the three sisters from
whom he will pick his wife revolves around his witnessing them burning a dead
Christmas tree.
3
This was, of course, also the case for John Ruskin, who, despite his rhetorical advocacy
of Queen’s Gardens, was more than willing to relinquish his legal possession of them.
4
And indeed, it is difficult for the cultural imaginary to picture a haunted house whose
architecture and design are not Victorian.
5
Philip describes Redclyffe as “more like a scene in a romance than anything real – the
fine old sandstone house crumbling away in the exposed parts; the arched gateway
covered with ivy; the great quadrangle where the sun never shone, and full of echoes; the
large hall and black wainscoted rooms, which the candles never would light up. It is a fit
place to be haunted” (9).
6
This process, of course, is, in Lacanian terms, merely another example of the movement
of the symbolic order. As Žižek points out in Fright of Real Tears:
This shift from standard suture to the interace effect can be perfectly rendered in
Lacanian terms: suture follows the logic of signifying representation (the second
shot represents the absent subject - $ - for the first shot), while the interface effect
occurs when this signifying representation fails. At this point, when the gap can
no longer be filled by an additional signifier, it is filled by a spectral object, in a
shot which, in the guise of the spectral screen, includes it’s own counter-shot. In
other words, when, in the exchange of shots and counter-shots, a shot occurs to
which there is no counter-shot, the only way to fill this gap is by producing a shot
which contains its own counter-shot […] it is only the objet petit a which can be
directly included in the picture. Consequently, when a shot includes its own
counter-shot, the two shots are no longer related as the two signifiers of a
signifying dyad; the first shot now stands for the signifying chain as such, while
the spectral counter-shot stures it, providing the fantasmic supplement that fills its
hole. (54)
7
The ending of The Heir of Redclyffe was the most unpopular thing about it. In an
insightful essay examining the novel’s parable-like structure, Susan E. Colón notes that:
“Aside from overall enjoyment of the novel and its characters, the affective reaction to
The Heir of Redclyffe that has been most consistently expressed is a strong dislike of the
novel’s ending, in which Yonge prolongs the tale well beyond the death of the hero (Guy)
to narrate the repentance of the anti-hero (Philip)” (32). Colón suggests this may be the
case because of the “reversal of the reversal” of the Biblical parable of the Pharisee the
novel adopts. The argument is compelling, though I would add that some of the
discomfort of readers arises from the fact that these reversals and repetitions are marks of
the ghost story as much as the parable.
8
Admittedly, “class un-consciousness” may be a more appropriate term for the
ideological subtext of this most nominally apolitical of novels. In spite of Wuthering
Heights’ psychological hermeticism – though perhaps because of it – the novel has
received a surprising share of compelling Marxist readings. One of the most intriguing,
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and certainly one of the most entertaining, is Terry Eagleton’s riff on Heathcliff’s
possible Irishness that opens his 1995 study, Heathcliff and the Great Hunger.
9
This is to assume that there is a difference large enough between the Romantic and the
Victorian “ages”-- or, more pointedly, that such a difference exists as such -- that could
allow such on offense to be credible. The question, I admit, is an open one.
10
The plot of The Texas Chainsaw Massacre, such as it is, involves the arrival of a group
of young friends at the abandoned home of two of the friends’ (Sally and Frank, who are
sister and brother) grandparents in the Texas countryside during a mysterious rash of
grave-robbings. One by one, each of the friends wander onto the property, and into the
house, of a family of apparently inbred former slaughterhouse workers who now have
taken to torturing and murdering unwary strangers for various cannibalistic purposes. All
of the murders are performed by a masked, hulking character (unnamed in the film, but
known as Leatherface), who appears to fill the role of “housewife” in the all-male
cannibal family. After dispatching the wheelchair-bound Frank with titular chainsaw,
Leatherface spends a deal of time chasing Sally between the two houses, until she is
finally captured and tortured at the cannibal family’s dinner table. Sally ultimately
escapes the house, and the film ends with the fate of the family, and Sally’s mental state,
in doubt.
11
Wuthering Heights is indeed the template for the much-maligned genre of the
“romance novel” or bodice-ripper, though its formal artistry and thematic complexity
make their kinship seem slightly absurd. Similarly, Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings, while
launching a thousand sword and sorcery doorstops, has a sui generis peculiarity of
invention and commitment to its world-building which is sorely missing in all but a few
of its underachieving brood. In both cases, it is tempting to blame the cultural afterlife of
the texts, rather than the texts themselves, for their myriad illegitimate children.
12
On my first viewing of The Texas Chainsaw Massacre – a viewing I put off for many
years due to my fears (quickly realized) of its unpleasantness – this scene hypnotized me.
It’s absurd, almost abstract violence, like a Tom and Jerry cartoon drawn by de Sade,
alerted me to a fundamental quality of violence as such: it is, in a way, unreadable.
Watching the scene, I literally asked aloud: “what IS this?” and laughed uncomfortably (a
reaction I often have in my readings of Wuthering Heights to its escalating non-stop
violence). I think the genius of this film is that it treats violence in perhaps the only way
it should be treated – as a horror in itself, rather than as something narratively coded to
justify or repudiate (which, as an inversion of justification, comes to the same thing) a
particular ideology. For example, the violence of a movie like Stephen Spielberg’s
Schindler’s List or Saving Private Ryan is made respectable enough to garner its director
a number of Oscars, and create a sense of almost moral obligation in its audience to
endure it, by being attached to seemingly inarguable ideological imperatives: ie, the
holocaust was wrong, or war is hell. Such truisms, reinforced by the punitive assault of
the violence illustrating them, tend to obscure more questionable aspects that are adjunct
to them. The denouement of Schindler’s List, for example, is a squirm-inducing scene of
a group of Jews exonerating a “good” German for his complicity in the Nazi war machine
(while they are still in his concentration camp, no less!). On paper, this seems a seriously
questionable moral to anchor a movie that, through its thorough commitment to portray
the violence of the holocaust, purports to be the Hollywood text on the holocaust as such.
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If we read this as the definitive “story” of the holocaust, which the film’s violence invites
us to do, then the nominal subject of Oscar Schindler would seem to be an inappropriate
vehicle for such a story, at best. Yet the violence of the film also demands that we accept
the spurious moral situation that the violence has itself created.
This is not to suggest that The Texas Chainsaw Massacre is free of ideology, but
rather that its willingness to, for lack of a better term, wallow in its violence, rather than
tame it to a specific ideological context, allows its violence to be read more freely (even
at the risk of making the text itself read as an immoral celebration of violence), and
perhaps more honestly (in this sense, The Texas Chainsaw Massacre could be read as a
more “moral” film than Schindler’s List). Consider as well the critical reception of
Jonathan Demme’s 1991 film, The Silence of the Lambs, which was the Best Picture
winner at the Oscars the following year. In comparison to Massacre, Silence of the Lambs
is far more graphic in its depiction of violence, and just as relentless in depicting the
torture of women. Certain ideological markers – a more or less explicit feminist subtext;
a higher-class monster (the Bach-loving foodie Hannibal Lecter is a much more
appealing cannibal than the redneck Leatherface) and victim (Jodie Foster’s Clarice
Starling is an ambitious, educated woman trying to prove herself in a “man’s” profession,
while Sally’s interior life is largely a blank, readable only in the embarrassingly
bumpkin-like behavior of her brother Franklin) – force us to read Silence of the Lambs as
a “quality” text: its violence becomes neutered by its own bourgeois pretensions. In this
light, I think the strangely abstract indulgence in violence as such in Wuthering Heights
in part accounts for J. Hillis Miller’s somewhat overawed appraisal of that novel’s
unusual sense of polysemy.
13
Gilbert and Gubar are conscious of the critical leap they are making here, and I think it
accounts for their brief flirtation with the intentional fallacy in their description of
Brontë’s construction of character: “her cool awareness” in developing the character of
Heathcliff, which slyly subverts her sister’s characterization of her as a wild child, is as
much a fiction of Gilber and Gubar’s as Charlotte’s is. In a way, Gilbert and Gubar’s
reading of the world of Wuthering Heights as a stage for female monstrosity is largely
contingent on their appropriation of Emily as almost a character in her own novel: just as
Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley is built upon a fictionalization and masculinization of her
sister, Gilbert and Gubars’ feminized Heathcliff is largely dependent upon the myth of an
arguably masculinized Emily. In order for Wuthering Heights to be read as a particularly
feminized world of claustrophobia and rage, the role of the author must also conform to
the model, and so the author must be characterized as complicit with the critic, and, as
such, fictionalized. In a way, this can be read as another example of the non-existence of
women: in order to make sense of the real Emily Brontë, she must be imagined, and
therefore made un-real.
14
An equally thought provoking consideration of the un-considerable is William Ian
Miller’s wide ranging The Anatomy of Disgust (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1997), which
seems in part an attempt to broaden the discussion of the abject beyond its traditionally
psychoanalytic arena.
15
Tara Moore provides an interesting history of the Christmas ghost story in her 2009
study Victorian Christmas in Print. In discussing the frame-tale device commonly used
by the Christmas annuals, Moore notes that “a frame with a holiday setting leads into the
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often Christmas-free embedded narrative” (86). One of the more interesting aspects of
the Victorian Christmas ghost story was the fact that so many of them do not even
mention Christmas. As Moore points out, “it is rather the genre of the ghost story that
makes [such texts] occasional reading” (83). As many contemporary observers pointed
out, ghosts as such became signifiers of Christmas.
16
The question of whether a woman or a man wrote this text is, perhaps, of some
importance, though the ambiguity of authorship only enhances the ambiguity of
femininity as such as it is presented within the text, in my admittedly convenient
estimation.
17
The cat’s role as witch’s familiar is well known in western culture. The relationship
between cats, women and the supernatural is even more prevalent in Japan, where the
bakeneko, the “monster cat,” is a fixture of the Japanese ghost story and horror cinema.
Shindo Kaneto’s atmospheric and furiously oedipal 1967 film, Kuroneko is an intriguing
example of this genre.
18
The Well-Beloved’s status as Hardy’s final novel is contingent on reading it as a
separate text from the novel it is a revision of, The Pursuit of the Well-Beloved, which
appeared in serial form in 1892, between the publication of Tess of the Durbervilles and
Jude the Obscure, more commonly regarded as Hardy’s fictional swan-song. Much of
the critical discussion of the two guises of The Well-Beloved revolve around the repetitive
process of revision, and its relation to the repetition compulsion of the hero of the novel.
See especially, J. Hillis Miller, Fiction and Repetition, pp 147-75.
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Chapter Four:
A Ghost Is Being Beaten
And soon as the time wears round,
The good old carle we see,
Coming a-near; -- for a creditor
Less punctual is than he!
He comes with a cordial voice
That does one good to hear;
He shakes one heartily by the hand,
As he hath done many a year.
And after the little children
He asks in a cheerful tone,
Jake, Kate, and little Annie,-He remembers them everyone!
-Mary Howitt, “Old Christmas”
Every child must be made aware
Every child must be made to care
-Bing Crosby and David Bowie, “Peace on Earth/Little Drummer Boy”

I
The official website for the Coca-Cola Company features a page dedicated to “Coke
Lore,” much of which is given over to relating the role of Coca-Cola in promulgating the
current standard model of Santa Claus. The image of Santa as “jolly, with a red suit and
white beard,” a description that, taken metaphorically, could just as easily describe the
Coca-Cola logo itself, is credited with being introduced in a 1931 magazine
advertisement. “Because magazines were so widely viewed, and because this image of
Santa appeared for more than three decades,” the website claims, “the image of Santa
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most people have today is largely based on our advertising.” Tom Standage, in his lively
History of the World in Six Glasses, contests this claim, citing a 1927 New York Times
article that gives a detailed description of a “standardized Santa Claus” (246) with red
hood and white beard. Much of this description can be credited in turn to the work of the
nineteenth-century American cartoonist Thomas Nast, whose famous black and white
illustration of Santa in the January 1, 1881 edition of Harper’s Weekly gives no evidence
of red clothing, but does provide the requisite white whiskers, as well as cementing the
iconography of Santa as (not-so) morbidly obese [Figure 12]. Nast’s cartoon can in turn
be traced to influences like Clement Moore’s “A Visit from St. Nicholas” (1823), which
introduced to the lore both reindeer and St. Nick’s preferred method of delivering toys
through burglary. Moore most likely had Washington Irving’s pipe-smoking patron saint
of Old New Amsterdam from Knickerbocker’s History of New York (1809) in mind while
writing the poem. Prior to Irving, Santa Claus becomes a case for the cultural
anthropologist, and he is seen with varying degrees of similitude in the actual St.
Nicholas (a fourth-century Anatolian bishop), Father Christmas (a figure traceable to
fifteenth-century English Christmas carols), and Martin Luther’s Protestant-friendly
alternative to St. Nicholas, Christkindlein, or Kris Kringle.1
Clearly, attempts to pin down an ur-Santa would require a cultural calculus
outside the scope of this work, but even a superficial listing of iterations like the one
above demonstrates the parallactic quality of Santa: the perpetually re-inventing tradition.
He seems a figure ever in motion as we watch him transform down the decades and into
the centuries, the only constant image being the one that rests, invisibly, outside the
iconography: a picture of our need to constantly reinvent a figure that in his very nature is
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Figure 12: Thomas Nast’s Santa Claus (1881).
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static, unchangeable. Let us for a moment consider the current iteration: the American
Santa Claus. He is, as already mentioned, an elderly, overweight, red-suited Coca-Cola
enthusiast. He seems to exist on a fairly exact spatio-temporal plane: he lives at the
North Pole, but enters the home of any domicile with a child on Christmas Eve. These
co-ordinates would seem to make him easy to find – indeed, any adult with children need
nominally only stay alert during the early hours of December 25th to find him in her own
home – but even a cursory reflection of these coordinates renders them extremely
problematic. It is, in fact, impossible for Santa to deliver toys (or coal) to every childrearing home on Christmas Eve: if we made a rough estimate that Santa would have to
visit, say, 500 million homes in the course of the evening, even at the rate of one visit per
second, Santa could only enter 1,036,800 of them (and this only if we grant him a twelve
hour window in each of 24 different time zones).2 In the face of such facts, only two
alternatives are possible: Santa Claus is: 1) a god-like figure who exists outside of time,
and as such, is able to observe and judge the moral quality of every child on the planet
while simultaneously producing and distributing commodities to those children based on
his analysis outside the material restraints of the physical universe, or 2) he does not
exist. While reason would suggest the latter option as most likely, American – indeed,
global – culture has opted for the former. A vast majority of these people would argue,
of course, that they do not “believe” in Santa Claus, but again, a cursory reflection of
certain facts suggests they do. The Coca-Cola Company, which, in a feat to rival the
magic of Santa Claus, is able to produce and distribute 1.7 billion servings of its product
on a daily basis, became the target of controversy in 2011 when it released its holidaythemed cans. Traditionally red, and often emblazoned with Santa’s image, the 2011 cans
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were white, causing confusion among consumers, and in some cases, outrage: a
December 1 article in the Wall Street Journal suggested that the change in design
“bordered on sacrilege.” Coca-Cola’s embarrassment over this incident must surely be
tempered with a certain amount of pride: the chaos generated in part by not having Santa
Claus on their cans suggests some truth to their claim that Santa is indeed another product
of the Coca-Cola Company. The ubiquity of Santa’s image on Coke cans is only a small
part of his pervasiveness in late-capitalist culture, however. Hundreds, if not thousands,
of people every year enter the market as avatars of Santa himself, installed within and
without commercial space as bell-ringers and short-term babysitters. The cultural interest
of this admittedly limited market can be seen in a number of famous, even classic, texts:
the perennial Miracle on 34th Street recursively asks if one of these ersatz Santas might
not indeed be the Santa. The fantasy of the film’s premise is balanced by the seriousness
with which that fantasy is accorded: the legal and cultural importance derived from the
question within the plot as to whether or not this department store Santa is in fact Santa
becomes, thematically, an injunction to believe. “Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Claus” is,
presumably, a statement to be taken literally. In the film, as in real life, the ubiquity and
multiplicity of Santa Clauses – the commercial reproducibility of them, whether as Coke
cans or simply human beings – which would nominally seem to discredit his existence
(how could there be a real Santa in a sea of so many imposters?), serve instead to
reinforce belief. We can say we don’t believe in Santa, but why then do we still write his
name on the tags of our Christmas presents? Why do we so readily lie to our children
that he does exist if we don’t believe it ourselves? Why do we allow him to occupy so
much of our cultural space? Seen from the standpoint of a hypothetical Martian
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observer,3 it would seem incredible that a culture so devoted to the idea of this jolly, toyobsessed deity could deny its own investment in him.
The question, then, is not whether or not we believe in Santa Claus – his value as
a currency of cultural exchange, however fantasmic, proves that on a practical level at
least, we clearly do – but rather how and why we make that belief operative. Part of the
how has already been answered: Santa Claus -- ceaseless producer, distributer and
advertiser of commodities -- is literally the ghost in the machine of American capitalism.
While his image has changed through the years, the idea of Santa Claus remains
consistent: even if we allow that the Coca-Cola Company effectively invented him in
1931, he has always already been there. Reliably transcendent and eternal, he is the calm
eye at the center of the capitalist hurricane: paternally panoptic and domestically
ensconced at his North Pole address, he provides a ghostly focus to the endlessly shifting
and multiplying process of consumer activity. Like Krishna to Arjuna, Santa puts a
friendly face on a cosmic force, naturalizing the de-territorializing and re-territorializing
maelstrom of capitalism in a manner that allows us to see a process that is fundamentally
changing as something that has always been there. In short, he traditionalizes capitalism.
More interesting perhaps, is the question of why Santa enacts this remarkable
procedure. The immediate answer would appear to be: for the children, of course. But
the overwhelming energy invested by adults in promulgating the fantasy of Santa Claus
makes this answer problematic. Setting aside the commercial element, the local
dissemination of the Santa myth among individual families suggests something more is
going on here than the simple desire to enchant one’s children. While it is nominally the
child that believes in Santa, it is the parents’ job to instill this belief, and to conduct the
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child’s credibility, even after the child reaches the point of disbelief. Again, Miracle on
34th Street serves as a narrativization of this practice: even, perhaps especially, after a
child professes incredulity toward the concept of Santa, it becomes incumbent upon
unbelieving adults to keep belief alive. I found myself in precisely this situation during
the last holiday season. I entered into a conversation at a Christmas party with my
friend’s nine year old son, who rather proudly exclaimed that he no longer believed in
Santa Claus. The child wore a cryptic smile while offering this information, which gave
me little clue as to how to proceed with the discussion. Should I simply tender a polite
congratulation for his deductive prowess? Such a move would certainly serve as a
helpfully conspiratorial recognition of a laudable, if bittersweet step into the world of
adulthood (particularly as his three year old sister -- a far more orthodox, even
evangelical, believer -- was in the room, though out of earshot). However, what if the
child’s statement was more a question than declaration? What if he were simply
attempting to get confirmation for an idea he only half-suspected, half-dreaded were true?
Either out of cowardice or some ill-defined compulsion, I opted to play devil’s advocate.
With a cryptic smile of my own, I playfully advocated Santa’s existence. When the child
proposed that Santa didn’t exist in part because he hadn’t come to his house this year, and
he received no presents with his name on the label, I countered that his house had no
chimney. When he retorted that Santa has no need of chimneys (with what level of irony
I will never know), I lamely suggested that Santa surely had some valid reason for
avoiding his house. Mercifully, the child’s attention quickly wandered elsewhere, or I
would surely have lost the argument. But what surprised me was that I made the
argument at all. I have no particular fondness for Santa Claus, and see no valid reason
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why children should either. In fact, I suspect that a great deal of children do not like
Santa Claus. A photograph of my mother in childhood, seated on an unusually fakelooking department store Santa, screaming in terror with tears streaming down her face,
was a perennial source of holiday humor during my childhood [Figure 13]. What was so
funny about this obviously traumatic moment? I suspect it was less the oddity of a child
afraid of Santa, than it was a recognition of a more general phenomenon. Who has not
encountered the child who expresses only fear and loathing when presented with Santa’s
lap? The queasy horror of the department store Santa is something of a fixture in holiday
films (Bob Clark’s 1983 film A Christmas Story being the most memorable example), but
I suspect the abjection children experience when confronted with this figure has as much
to do with the terrible power of the ‘real’ Santa Claus as it does with whatever
objectionable qualities any ersatz Santa possesses.
When presented baldly, Santa’s qualities appear less like those of a jolly old man,
and more those of a troublesome ghost. He breaks into people’s houses. He is seemingly
omnipresent, and apparently omniscient. He “knows when you’ve been sleeping, he
knows when you’re awake.” Indeed, he “knows if you’ve been bad or good, so be good
for goodness’ sake.” The chirpiness of the tune aside, such lyrical advice makes the
proposition that “Santa Claus is Coming to Town” more a threat than a promise. Santa’s
role as Father Christmas makes his close ties to the holiday an often anxious proposition
for children. A number of Christmas stories, notably the Rankin Bass productions Rudolf
the Red-Nosed Reindeer (1964) and The Year Without a Santa Claus (1974), and the
1966 film The Christmas That Almost Wasn’t, play with the idea that when Santa
becomes incapacitated by illness or mishap, Christmas itself will be cancelled. The
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Figure 13: The author’s mother endures a visit with St. Nicholas.
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happiness of children, on a global scale, rests in the precarious health of a dangerously
overinvested icon. In this context, Santa’s power becomes as much a liability as a
blessing.
If there is something inherently terrifying about Santa Claus, it is not so much that
he is an adult with supernatural powers, but that he is essentially a child with what a child
might read as the powers of an adult. Like adults, Santa has the power of ethical
judgment over children: commodities are granted or withheld on a calculus of moral
behavior. Like adults, Santa has no legally mandated bedtime: he gets to work/play into
the wee hours of Christmas morning. But what makes Santa uncanny, and possibly
disturbing, is that Santa, finally, is not an adult: like a child, he has a fantasmic,
personalized relationship with the animal world. Like a child, he is obsessed with toys.
And perhaps most childlike of all, he lives in a neatly Manichean world where good and
evil are plainly signified by toys and coal.
Perhaps, then, the current iteration of Santa Claus is less a reification of American
capitalism, and more fundamentally a reification of the unstable boundary between the
adult and the child. Santa -- the child-adult/adult-child -- performs, as it were, the
difference between the two. Such a performance, by such a fantastic actor, seems
increasingly necessary the more one considers the difficulty in theorizing the difference
between adults and children as such. I imagine that many “adults,” myself among them,
have occasionally considered the fact that, on a purely temporal level, the only thing
separating their adulthood from their childhood is a more or less lengthy procession of
days and nights divided and demarked purely by the phenomenon of sleep. Without this
unconscious punctuation of consciousness itself, one is presented with the striking notion
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of an uninterrupted consciousness extending from infancy to death: a kind of endless day.
In such a configuration, the ideas of “child” and “adult” seem suddenly artificial, like
mile markers on a highway: they act as a structural fiction of progress, masking the
perhaps greater structural fiction of a uniform existence. From this perspective, sleep
itself seems a kind of anti-suture: while the blank space between frames of a motion
picture create an illusion of animation, sleep provides us with an illusion of difference
and event, allowing us to develop more complex, cultural milestones – like birthdays or
Christmas – that sustain an otherwise volatile and unpredictable subjectivity. If sleep, by
definition a lacuna in consciousness, a kind of phenomenological cessation of being as
such, can be read as the thing that makes the idea of “a day” possible, it does so as a
fundamental lack. It is, as we experience it, something that is not there, that does not,
from the perspective of consciousness, exist. In this sense, it is apropos that Santa can
only enter our homes when we are asleep: since he doesn’t really exist, he can only make
himself present when, in a manner of speaking, we don’t either.
The question then arises: if one might just as easily abandon the distinction
between adult and child as a structural fiction, if, as so much recent scholarship suggests,
the idea of the child is indeed an “invention” of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries,
why make the distinction at all? More pertinently, what do we make of the rigid
distinctions between childhood and adulthood that Christmas asks of us through agents
like Santa Claus, a figure who simultaneously clouds those very distinctions? In other
words, what makes Christmas such a site of contention between adults and children? A
less abstract way of framing this question might be to ask how Christmas came to be so
child-centric. For instance: the practice of gift-giving, a tradition that dates back to
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before the celebration of Christmas itself in the Roman Saturnalia, has only recently
become the cultural imperative to give to our children as many presents as economically
feasible on December twenty-fifth. That imperative, underwritten by a narrative barrage
in the form of Christmas carols, television specials and feature films, finds its apotheosis
in the figure of Santa Claus. As I noted above, there is a complex calculus to finding the
origin, or rather origins, of this strange, ancient, yet child-like demi-god. As much as
Ebenezer Scrooge, it is Santa Claus – post-modern colonizer of Coca-Cola cans – who
provides the face of our late-capitalist, Americanized Christmas. But, as I will show in
the pages that follow, Santa, like Scrooge, finds, to a compelling degree, at least part of
his mythic origin in the haunted houses and miasmic streets of nineteenth-century
London. If Santa Claus, and our post-modern Christmas, ever had a childhood, it is to be
found in the haunted, and haunting, ghost children of Victorian literature.

II

In December 2009, the satiric “newspaper” The Onion released its “Top 10 Stories of the
Last 4.5 Billion Years.” At number eight was the story, “Industrial Revolution Provides
Millions Of Out-Of-Work Children With Jobs.” The story dryly encapsulates, with
impeccable journalese, what might be called the crime of the century:
According to records, the introduction of machine-based manufacturing provided
a desperately needed solution to England's toddler-unemployment epidemic. Outof-work children, many of whom had struggled since birth to earn any kind of
wage at all, were now afforded the chance to work seven days a week, up to 19
hours a day, in such competitive industries as iron-smelting and steel-tempering.
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For those who prefer their comedy black, this story nicely digests the horror of reams of
Parliamentary Blue Books and the careers of Charles Dickens and Karl Marx, a literature
that has supplied us with perhaps the most iconic meme of Victorian capitalism: the
exploited child laborer. If Oliver Twist and Bleak House’s tragically exhausted streetsweep Jo seem to us today mythic, perhaps stereotypical, examples of the Victorian
proclivity to both fetishize and torture its children, they were no less so for their original
audience. It is commonly understood that literature decrying the exploitation of child
labor, from Dickens to Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s 1842 poem “Cry of the Children,”
played a significant role in the stream of Parliamentary activity regulating child labor
throughout the nineteenth century. The literature, agitation, and laws that speak to this
issue suggest that Victorian society was broadly and consistently engaged in wrestling
with the systematic economic destruction of its children even as it was occurring. Even
so, it was not until 1881 that the Education Act of 1871, mandating that all children up to
the age of ten attend school, was instituted nationwide, nearly eighty years after the first
regulatory acts were passed.4
Perhaps the reason such a struggle with such an obvious moral imperative for
resolution took so long to accomplish lies in a broader cultural context in which the social
role of children was ambiguously formulated. Industrialism and capitalism as such were
rarely the focused targets of Victorian rage at the treatment of its children. When one
considers that the typical literary vehicle for considerations of child exploitation and
abuse were fantasy narratives, this fact becomes hardly surprising. The young chimney
sweep hero of Charles Kingsley’s The Water Babies (1863) dies early in the narrative
into a world of fantastic trials of a Darwinian rather than Marxist nature; Alice’s
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traumatic trips to Wonderland and Looking-Glass World provide hints of a political and
economic “reality,” but they are subsumed by the overriding logic of nonsense; and the
child victims of Dickens, while clearly products of social injustice, are ultimately either
rescued or subsumed by the fairy-tale dictates of their narratives: Tiny Tim and Oliver
Twist “do NOT die” because of ghostly or angelic intervention, while Little Nell does die
in part because of a malignant dwarf, and Jo dies unheeded by a London wrapped up in a
far more delicious case of family mystery and spontaneous combustion.
It is, in short, the Oedipal fairy-tale that determines the Victorian narrative of
child abuse, and while this frame can illustrate the fabric of social relationships, it can
just as easily serve to obfuscate them. Even social institutions removed from the
fantasmic air of literature can be seen to be invested in this narrative. One of the primary
campaigns of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children in the 1890’s
was against the practice of taking out life insurance policies on children, a phenomenon
that, as early as 1843, was seen, by Thomas Carlyle in Past and Present, as a stain on the
national character, an example of the problematic “condition of England.” As Monica
Flegel points out, Carlyle’s reading of a notorious case of child murder in which a
Stockport mother and father poisoned their children to collect on their insurance suggests
“a kind of cannibalism, in which the child who cries for food is murdered so that others
might be fed,” as well as “a gruesome form of commerce: a child is converted into funds
that then become food; once that child is ‘eaten,’ the rest soon follow” (217). While this
kind of imagery is taken up in the NSPCC’s literature forty years later, it differs from
Carlyle in that it attempts to remove the onus of guilt of child murder from society to bad
parenting. As Flegel argues, “the NSPCC, in an effort to maintain the Society’s classless

229
stance, sought to reframe the debate surrounding child-life insurance by conflating stories
of poverty and starvation with horrific narratives of parental savagery” (218).
If the NSPCC’s tactic of negotiating thorny class issues in combating child
murder by effectively avoiding them makes political sense -- appealing to a bourgeois
plurality invested in a narrative of domestic universality requires an Oedipal, rather than a
social villain -- it was not unique in doing so. Carlyle himself, in Past and Present,
quickly moves from a generalized, essayistic condemnation of the condition of England
to a narrative of medieval St. Edmundsbury. In exploring social and economic problems
by narrativizing a localized hegemonic culture safely rooted in the past, Carlyle, like the
NSPCC, moves from a social imaginary to a cultural one, where the family romance
trumps political economy, and where the psychological explains the social. This is what
makes Dickens’ Christmas Carol – itself deeply indebted to Carlyle’s Past and Present –
operative as both social critique and fantasy: the reduction, or elevation, if you prefer, of
issues of economic injustice to a psychological study of Ebenezer Scrooge. The issue of
child neglect, child abuse, and child death is never far from A Christmas Carol’s
narrative, whether it focuses on the precarious fate of Tiny Tim, The Ghost of Christmas
Present’s twisted children, or Scrooge’s own lonely, neglected childhood [Figure 14].
But it is always filtered through Scrooge’s ghost-haunted consciousness, and distilled into
Scrooge’s transformation at the end of his narrative into both father figure to Tiny Tim
and a self-professed “school-boy” (118) and “baby” (119). At the beginning of A
Christmas Carol, Scrooge is a disturbing version of Carlyle’s Midas, and as such,
dangerously readable by the charity workers who invoke his aid. When confronted with
such pleas, Scrooge is deft at countering them. He demonstrates a coldly efficient
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Figure 14: John Leech Illustration from first edition of A Christmas Carol (1843).
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knowledge of the law in asking if the prisons and workhouses are in operation (44). But
this is before we get to know Scrooge and his story. Scrooge’s social position is
effectively erased by his ghostly narrative, and he emerges at its end a cultural myth: like
Santa Claus, he is an adult child/child adult, a second father to Tiny Tim, but also his
peer. Both Tiny Tim and Scrooge, threatened throughout the Carol with a seemingly
inevitable death, emerge at the end newborn, and culturally, immortal and perennial.
In ceasing to be an intersubjective social agent, one alive to the iniquities and
injustices of his time (however coldly and ironically he engages and debates them),
Scrooge becomes instead what Salvoj Žižek calls an interpassive subject, one who no
longer is embedded in a social framework dictated by questions of knowledge (“Are there
no prisons?”) but one who has found the answer of belief, provided by the big Other (“I
will live in the Past, the Present, and the Future! The Spirits of all Three shall strive
within me.”). The big Other here is Christmas itself, personified by its trinity of ghosts,
transcendental signifiers that guarantee Scrooge’s belief is not misplaced. In fact,
Scrooge need not believe at all: the spirits that “strive within” (118) him will do it for
him. As Žižek points out, this is how belief operates:
In an uncanny way, belief always seems to function in the guise of such a ‘belief
at a distance:’ in order for the belief to function, there has to be some ultimate
guarantor of it, yet this guarantor is always deferred, displaced, never present in
persona. (“The Interpassive Subject” p 5)
Scrooge can believe in Christmas because Christmas itself, through the agency of its
spirits, is already clearly operative.
What is interesting here is how Scrooge’s Christmas apotheosis keeps the
Lacanian chain of signification going: once Scrooge becomes a stand-in for Christmas
itself, so invested in the idea that its spirits literally strive within him, don’t we, Scrooge’s
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readers, then become interpassive subjects ourselves? Doesn’t Scrooge, like Santa Claus,
now believe for us? We too can now believe in Christmas, because Scrooge has done the
heavy lifting: his narrative allows us to believe through him.
In fact, it is probably necessary for Scrooge to provide this function. As I
explored in Chapter 1, the narrative of A Christmas Carol not only stresses the injunction
to enjoy Christmas, it stresses the necessity of death: in order for Scrooge to understand
the importance of Christmas, he must know that he will die; he must, in fact, see his own
grave. The narrative power of A Christmas Carol stems from the fact that its dual
imperatives, Christmas and death, are intertwined. We know that Scrooge and Tiny Tim
must die, but we know just as surely that Christmas cannot let that happen: Scrooge will
be reborn, and Tiny Tim will NOT die. Only the fantasy of Christmas can portray this
paradox: only the spirits of Christmas can allow Scrooge to witness his, and Tiny Tim’s
death while simultaneously avoiding them. Reading A Christmas Carol, we know that
Scrooge and Tiny Tim are doomed, just as surely as we are. But thanks to Scrooge’s
ghostly encounter, we can believe they, and we, aren’t.
How do we let others believe for us? Žižek provides some illuminating examples
in his essay “The Interpassive Subject”: the canned laughter of a television sitcom allows
us to enjoy a comedy that might not be all that funny (p 7); a VCR can record, and
effectively, “watch” all the movies a film buff doesn’t have time to watch himself (p 12).
Similarly, children can be read A Christmas Carol or become invested in the figure of
Santa Claus so that we might believe in Christmas too. Conversely, it could be argued
that children can be made to believe in Christmas so that we don’t have to. As Žižek
suggests, this practice is more widespread than we might think:
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There are some beliefs, the most fundamental ones, which are from the very
outset ‘decentered,’ beliefs of the Other; the phenomenon of the ‘subject supposed
to believe,’ is thus universal and structurally necessary. From the very outset, the
speaking subject displaces his belief onto the big Other qua the order of pure
semblance, so that the subject never "really believed in it"; from the very
beginning, the subject refers to some decentered other to whom he imputes this
belief. All concrete versions of this ‘subject supposed to believe’ (from small
children for whose sake parents pretend to believe in Santa Claus, to the ‘ordinary
working people’ for whose sake Communist intellectuals pretend to believe in
Socialism) are stand-ins for the big Other. So, what one should answer to the
conservative platitude according to which every honest man has a profound need
to believe in something, is that every honest man has a profound need to find
another subject who would believe in his place… (p 2)
There is much in the Victorian relationship to its children to suggest a desire, a need, to
invest in a belief in childhood to oppose, and in a way, redeem the unbelievable realities
attendant upon such a childhood. In 1875, the infant mortality rate in England was 158 in
every 1,000. The mean lifetime in England in 1851 was forty years.5 Setting aside the
exploitation of child labor and the culture’s self-constructed image of “cannibalizing” its
own children, it is not hard to imagine a widespread difficulty in believing that Tiny Tim
did NOT die. Nor is it hard to understand how a culture conscious of the systematic
abuse of its own children might prefer to invest in a libidinal belief in the transcendence
of its children while haunted by knowledge of the inefficacy of curtailing the practical
destruction of those children. In one sense, A Christmas Carol is about the appalling
children hiding under the cloak of The Ghost of Christmas Present, decrying the social
sins of Ignorance and Want (101). In another sense, Dickens’ fantasy is a means by
which we can erase those children, and put in their place the delightful, transcendent
children that Scrooge and Tiny Tim become: children we can believe in, or who can at
least believe for us.
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In one respect, A Christmas Carol is only the most famous example of a
particularly English form of Kindertotenlied, the ghost-child story. Whether we read A
Christmas Carol as a social protest or a kind of gospel, it is the inaugural canto in a genre
which conflates the guilt, anxiety, and dread of the dead child, and its revenant, with the
pleasure and comfort of Christmas. It is a genre marked by its determination to shake our
incredulity in ghosts and other horrors by believing in them for us.

III

One of the first and most effective ghost-child stories is Elizabeth Gaskell’s contribution
to the 1852 Household Words Christmas number, “The Old Nurse’s Story.” It is one of
the most famous and widely anthologized of Victorian ghost stories. Its wide appeal
stems in part from the artfulness with which it balances the horrific and the sentimental,
in its ambiguous presentation of the Victorian child as both tragic victim and terrifying
nemesis.
The story takes place at the strange and creepy Furnivall Manor, where Hester,
the titular nurse, and her five year old charge Rosamond come to stay with their elderly
relation Grace Furnivall, after the death of the girl’s parents. As winter draws near,
Rosamond becomes drawn to the ghost of a child her age, and the nurse hears strange
music from an organ in the east wing of the house. Fear builds in the house when the
ghost-child lures Rosamond out into the freezing snow, and, after rescuing her, the nurse
takes steps to protect the girl from the ghost’s plaintive cries at the window. It eventually
emerges that the ghost is the illegitimate daughter of the sister of Grace Furnivall, cast

235
out into the cold to freeze to death by the late cruel lord. At the end of the tale, Grace
Furnivall falls dead after seeing the ghostly reenactment of her sister and niece’s
banishment, which she was, in part, responsible for.
Gaskell’s story may at first seem something of a departure from the work that
made her name, the celebrated “condition of England” novel of 1848, Mary Barton.
While an argument could be made that Gaskell’s depiction of the Manchester workingpoor in that novel is often more horrific than anything in “The Old Nurse’s Story,” its
explicit engagement with the burning social issues of working class poverty, labor
relations, and Chartism makes it seem worlds away from the ultimately cozy domestic
fantasy of “The Old Nurse’s Story,” which, after all, first appeared in a periodical titled A
Round of Stories by the Christmas Fire. But the great novel of social protest and the
great Christmas ghost story both owe their genesis, to a greater or lesser degree, to the
tragedy of child mortality. In her Preface to Mary Barton, Gaskell comments: “Three
years ago I became anxious (from circumstances that need not be more fully alluded to)
to employ myself in writing a work of fiction” (5). The circumstance that Gaskell alludes
to is the death of her ten month old son William in 1845, of scarlet fever. If Gaskell is
reticent here to fully explain the personal influences that led to Mary Barton, she
elsewhere allegedly invoked the same issue in more broadly social terms:
Elizabeth allegedly told Travers Madge of the moment which inspired Mary
Barton. One day, visiting a poor family, she was trying, like Susanna Winkworth,
to argue against their suspicions of the rich, ‘when the head of the family took
hold of her arm, and grasping it tightly said, with tears in his eyes, “Aye, ma’am,
but have ye ever seen a child clemmed to death?”’ This is the question which
John Barton, the weaver-hero of her novel, hurls at the rich: have they ever seen
their children starve? (Uglow 192-3)
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“The Old Nurse’s Story” more or less answers this question in the affirmative, as it
unveils the tragic story of Furnivall Manor. As in the above anecdote, “The Old Nurse’s
Tale” addresses the class-inflected aspects of the issue of child death obliquely, couching
its questions of how “the rich” deal with the tragedy of child mortality in the narrative
voice of the working class, and as an appeal to the imagination: the class consciousness
which Gaskell attempts to address in the anecdote is effectively stopped by the pathos
and horror of the poor man’s question: “have ye ever seen a child clemmed to death?”
Similarly, the class distinctions between Hester and her charge – a poor relation of Lord
Furnivall – and the seemingly settled aristocratic residents of Furnivall Manor is
subsumed within the more sensational goings-on of a ghostly pipe-organ and a
dangerously seductive ghost child.
Or is it? If Mary Barton can be seen as a social rendering of personal tragedy –
the working-through of the personal grief of the death of a child via a consideration of
child-death on a mass scale in which the rich are taken to account for the death rates of
the poor, “The Old Nurse’s Tale” can be read as its inverse: a rendering of the social as
the psychological. In other words, instead of seeing “The Old Nurse’s Tale” as a retreat
from social criticism into fantasy, we can read this story, like Dickens’ Christmas Carol,
as a kind of transcendence of social criticism via fantasy: here, the child “clemmed to
death” impossibly speaks for itself, and in doing so, works its vengeance on the
aristocrats of Furnivall Manor in a way that would be impossible in a realist text like
Mary Barton. If John Barton can only make an impotent plea for revolution, the childghost can actually enact it, if only on a domestic, and fantastic, level. In doing so,
however, the child-ghost of “The Old Nurse’s Tale” does something the beleaguered
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Chartist of Mary Barton cannot: it can bring the social and political implications of its
own neglect and murder to the cozy hearth of the Christmas fire. Indeed, as the first
sentence of the story makes clear, this is a tale of child abuse told directly to children
(11).
As in A Christmas Carol, it is the interpassive subject that draws us into this
arrangement. The nameless nurse, like Scrooge, and countless narrators of other
Victorian ghost stories, is the subject who believes in ghosts for us. Gaskell is perhaps
more artful in beginning her tale than the legion of Victorian ghost stories that begin with
a promise to the reader of the credibility of the tale about to be told. Gaskell’s narrator
need not, as, say, Charlotte Riddell’s narrators so often do, attest to her trustworthiness in
relating the supernatural incidents of her story, nor does she appeal to the credulity of the
reader. Her authority and reliability is suggested at the outset by clues to her
longstanding domestic service and care for children:
You know, my dears, that your mother was an orphan, and an only child; and I
daresay you have heard that your grandfather was a clergyman up in
Westmoreland, where I come from. I was just a girl in the village school, when,
one day, your grandmother came in to ask the mistress if there was any scholar
there who would do for a nurse-maid; and mighty proud I was, I can tell ye, when
the mistress called me up, and spoke to my being a good girl at my needle, and a
steady honest girl, and one whose parents were very respectable, thought they
might be poor. (11)
The nurse’s diction accentuates the pride she has in her working class background, while
her remembrances conveniently supply a three generation resume of service to this
family. Her authority is most deftly articulated by the fact that she is addressing the next
generation of this family here, rather than the reader herself. Compare Gaskell’s opening
with that of Riddell’s “The Open Door,” which winkingly plays with the convention –
which Riddell was instrumental in codifying – of the narrator’s appeal to credibility:
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Some people do not believe in ghosts. For that matter, some people do not
believe in anything. There are persons who even affect incredulity concerning
that open door at Ladlow Hall. They say it did not stand wide open – that they
could have shut it; that the whole affair was a delusion; that they are sure it must
have been a conspiracy; that they are doubtful whether there is a such a place as
Ladlow on the face of the earth; that the first time they are in Meadowshire they
will look it up.
That is the manner in which this story, hitherto unpublished, has been
greeted by my acquaintances. How it will be received by strangers is quite
another matter. I am going to tell what happened to me exactly as it happened,
and readers can credit or scoff at the tale as it pleases them. (39)
The defiant posture of Riddell’s narrator slyly acknowledges the burden of the narrator of
the ghost story to make his story as believable as possible.6 His offhand dismissal of the
need for reader corroboration of his narrative also serves as a passive-aggressive
condemnation of any unbelieving readers: the litany of excuses by those who disbelieve
his story tends to highlight a foolish, if not desperate need to rationalize among his
detractors, and his insinuation that people that don’t believe in ghosts probably “do not
believe in anything” suggests belief in ghosts is as important as belief as such. Riddell’s
narrator makes plain the position of the interpassive subject: you can believe in his story
or not – it’s enough that the narrator himself believes. Gaskell’s nurse, on the other hand,
works a much more subtle operation on her readers: since she’s not even addressing a
readership, but rather a group of children, she draws in reader complicity not only with
her bona fides as a “steady honest girl,” but by the fact that as a “subject supposed to
believe,” her position is enhanced even more by her interaction with a group of subjects
supposed to believe: children. In beginning her tale with a conspiratorial “You know, my
dears” Gaskell nicely places her readership in the position of the nurse’s children. The
nurse makes no statement as to the authenticity of her tale, or her own credibility as
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witness, because she doesn’t have to: her first words interpellate us within her narrative
as credible children.
It is as such that we enter the nurse’s, and Rosamond’s, diegetic space. And as
such, it is easy for the reader to miss the class divisions that mark Rosamond’s progress
to Furnivall Manor. Rosamond’s mother was, as the nurse relates, “a real lady born” (11)
who married a “curate, son to a shopkeeper,” “a right-down hard worker” (11-12). The
nurse, in addressing her young audience, does not dwell on the class problematic of this
match, but its disastrous results are quickly hinted at:
When your mother, little Miss Rosamond, was about four or five years old, both
her parents died in a fortnight – one after the other. Ah! That was a sad time. My
pretty young mistress and me was looking for another baby, when my master
came home from one of his long rides, wet and tired, and took the fever he died
of; and then she never held up her head again, but just lived to see her dead baby,
and have it laid on her breast, before she sighed away her life. (12)
The fairy-tale structure of this edited-for-children narrative suggests much that is not
said: is it the curate’s status as a “right-down hard worker” that precipitates his illness
and death? What are the conditions of Rosamond’s home that allow the curate’s fever to
kill his wife and newborn child? Economic hardship – a condition Gaskell explores in
excruciating detail in Mary Barton is here only hinted at. For the sake of the children in
the audience, explication and analysis do not go much further than “Ah! That was a sad
time.”
The nurse offers further hints of the economic and social backdrop of this tale,
and their relative importance to it, when she describes the ride to Furnivall Manor:
And now it was long past noon on a September day, and we stopped to change
horses for the last time at a little smoky town, all full of colliers and miners. Miss
Rosamond had fallen asleep, but Mr. Henry told me to waken her, that she might
see the park and the Manor house as we drove up. (13)
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Once again, the nurse’s child-like diction reduces an environment that, in another
context, would require two novels, Mary Barton and North and South, to adequately
observe, to “a little smoky town, all full of colliers and miners.” But the nurse needs no
further description, as the heroine of her story is fast asleep. Her conscious attention to
this quaint industrial smogscape is not required: she need only wake to see the impressive
grounds of the Manor. And we, the ingeniously infantilized readers of Gaskell’s story,
need not pay any attention either (though I suspect Gaskell’s attention to detail is as
strategic here as her old nurse’s). There is a striking double articulation in Gaskell’s
handling of this “throwaway” background. Though Rosamond, her children the nurse is
addressing, and the stand-in reader need none of this information, it nevertheless colors
our sense of the Manor and its twisted family history. It also lends greater authority to
the nurse, who, awake to a social and economic history her readers are implicitly
welcomed to sleep through, knows more than we do, and as the only adult in the room, so
to speak, she is someone we can believe in. As David Ellison observes in his essay,
“Glazed Expression: Mary Gaskell, Ghosts and Glass,” Gaskell’s art often describes
…a visual system that routinely fails to see the poor. In Mary Barton, this is
identified as a central threat to political stability. But Gaskell complicates this
problem, drawing connecting lines between the imperfectly glimpsed, if not
spectral bodies of the poor, the emaciations of famine and the concurrent removal
of labor-traces from the spectacular display of commodities set behind glass.
(485)
These connecting lines can be seen in this story as well, in the offhand references to the
unseen poor and the spectacular, and spectral, Furnivall Manor. If Hester encodes these
connections in a language fit for children, she nevertheless is the one that is able to
encode them. Perhaps more interesting, though, is the manner of unseeing the
unconscious Rosamond enacts in the tale.
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Hester, as narrator, plays the traditional role of interpassive mediary in her story’s
call to believe, but that role is also occupied by Rosamond. It is Rosamond who makes
first contact with Furnivall Manor’s ghosts, and it is her ambiguous relationship with the
ghost-child that forms the dramatic and thematic core of the story. The interaction
between Rosamond and the ghost-child create an atmosphere of moral ambiguity: the
mystery of the ghost initially calls into question not only the motives of the ghost itself,
but those of Rosamond. When Rosamond is brought back from the snowy Fells, her
veracity is questioned when she claims she was called out by the ghost. When Hester
investigates the child’s story, and finds only one pair of footprints in the snow, she
suspects the child is lying, calling her a “naughty little girl” and admonishing her for
“telling stories” (22). Rosamond’s excuse is equally morally inflected: she insists that
she “could not choose but go” because the ghost-child was “so pretty and so sweet” (22).
But Miss Furnivall’s servant Mrs. Stark, aware of the ghost, quickly insists that the ghost
is an “evil child,” a “wicked, naughty child” that will “lure [Rosamond] to her death”
(23). Both the mystery and frissons here center on the moral qualities of both the girl and
the ghost-child. Is the ghost good or evil? Is Rosamond simply “telling stories”? The
latter question is not a minor one, considering the weight the Victorian ghost story places
on veracity: Hester’s moral and narrative authority is of course predicated on the truth of
her own story.
Interestingly, the resolution of this moral quandary is delayed by the fact that
Rosamond is once again asleep. Her account of her ghostly rendezvous is compromised
by the fact that the ghost-mother, upon seeing her, “hushed her weeping, and smiled very
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proud and grand, and took me on her knee, and began to lull me to sleep” (23).
Information is delayed further when Rosamond returns to the Manor:
At last Dorothy knocked at the door with Miss Rosamond’s breakfast; and she
told me the old ladies were down in the eating parlor, and that they wanted to
speak to me. They had both been into the night-nursery the evening before, but it
was after Miss Rosamond was asleep; so they had only looked at her – not asked
me any questions. (23)
Rosamond’s ghostly interaction, then, is figured in large part on her being unconscious.
Her unconsciousness, in turn, puts her own veracity in question, and by extension, the
moral atmosphere of the whole of Furnivall Manor – by now clearly recognizable as a
haunted house with unspeakable secrets.
Is it too much to suggest here that Gaskell, arguably the most impassioned social
realist and literary advocate of the working class, is drawing a parallel between a political
and psychological unconscious in this tale? As a child, Rosamond is by necessity
unconscious of the socio-economic environment which she inhabits. But her
unconsciousness also brings to the fore the reality of the Furnivall ghosts: her very status
as a child makes her the victim/confidant of the ghost-child, which in turn allows, in the
climax of the story, the tale of injustice and tragedy of the ghost-child to emerge in full to
the adults of the house. The climactic procession of the Oedipal triad of ghosts -- Miss
Furnivall’s father, sister, and niece – is immediately preceded by yet another description
of Rosamond sleeping (29), who awakes with an uncontrollable urge to join them: “Just
at that moment my darling wakened with a sudden start: ‘My little girl is crying, oh how
she is crying!’ and she tried to get up and go to her” (30). Rosamond’s struggle to join
the ghosts is intercut, as it were, with the phantasmagoric repetition of the expulsion of
Lord Furnivall’s daughter and grand-child:
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All at once, the east door gave way with a thundering crash, as if torn open in a
violent passion, and there came into that broad and mysterious light, the figure of
a tall old man, with grey hair and gleaming eyes. He drove before him, with
many a relentless gesture of abhorrence, a stern and beautiful woman, with a little
child clinging to her dress […] They passed along towards the great hall-door,
where the winds howled and ravened for their prey; but before they reached that,
the lady turned; and I could see that she defied the old man with a fierce and
proud defiance; but then she quailed – and then she threw up her arms wildly and
piteously to save her child – her little child – from a blow from his uplifted crutch.
(30-1)
This scene, and the family plot of fallen women and illegitimacy that informs it, has been
read as an echo or recapitulation of Gaskell’s novel Ruth, written the same year and
dealing with similar subject matter.7 However, in the scene’s abstract, primal violence, I
think one could just as easily read this as a child-eye view of injustice as such, an echo of
the fundamental pain that served as the genesis of Mary Barton: the death of a child.
Readers of Ruth will recognize that the topic of the fallen woman in that novel is itself a
springboard for wide-ranging social interrogation, and Ruth’s journey a kind of pilgrim’s
progress through the myriad inequities of the English class system. Here too, though in a
much more compact, fantastic form, Gaskell offers a local incident to stand in as a
ghostly indictment of social injustice. More importantly, it is the subjectivity
constructing the incident that provides the indictment, both as a projection of the ghostchild’s history of abuse, and Rosamond’s affective investment as spectator of that
projection – she literally wants to jump into the picture to quell its horror. In this primal
fantasy, in which, to paraphrase Freud, a ghost is being beaten, that which was unseen is
now seen, to the edification of adults as well as children. The potency of injustice on full
display here is perhaps what led Dickens to plead with Gaskell to make this spectacle
visible only to Rosamond.8 It is ultimately a more disturbing image of child abuse than
the visions discretely afforded to Scrooge, in that the psychological horror has finally
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become social: if Scrooge’s private epiphanies lead to his reformation, the public
unveiling of Miss Furnivall’s past causes her to drop dead. “The Old Nurse’s Tale” ends
not with a conventionally cozy epilogue from the narrator, but with the anguished cries of
Miss Furnivall. If most Victorian ghost stories end with a reassuring affirmation of
exorcism, Gaskell’s ends on a note of uncertainty. Hester, who opens her tale with a
carefully modulated exposition crafted for the pleasure of children, lets the horror of her
ghosts supply the ending. Her story is in part a tale of abuse that, willfully or not, goes
unseen. Fittingly, it ends not with telling, but with an almost cinematic burst of seeing.
“The Old Nurse’s Tale” is a seminal example of the increasing power of ghosts,
particularly child-ghosts, in Victorian fiction. As Jennifer Bann observes in her essay
“Ghostly Hands and Ghostly Agency: The Changing Figure of the Nineteenth-Century
Specter,” “In the supernatural fiction of the later nineteenth century, death began to bring
freedom: shackles, silence, and regret were cast aside, and ghosts became active figures
empowered rather than constrained by their deaths” (664). As she memorably puts it,
“the powerless hand-wringing of Marley’s ghost” gives way to “the controlling, guiding
or demonstrative hands of later ghosts” (664). While this formulation is somewhat
reductive – the three other ghosts of Dickens’ Carol suffer no such constraints – it
adequately describes the trajectory of the child-ghost over the Victorian period. The
child-ghost of “The Old Nurse’s Tale, like the silent, moping child-ghost of Charlotte
Riddell’s “Walnut-Tree House,” act largely as mute signifiers, trapped within their
respective environments. Increasingly, these ghosts will expand their territory, as well as
their ability to move, and transform, those they haunt. This increase in the power of the
child-ghost can be largely attributed to a shift in their affective, and moral, agency. If
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earlier child ghosts, like Dickens’, were objects of horror and disgust, or, like Gaskell’s,
ambiguous in motive and deadly in their power to shock, later ghosts increase the scope
of their power to haunt largely by becoming pathetic, even friendly, rather than
malevolent, spirits.
The child-ghost of Margaret Oliphant’s 1885 story, “The Open Door” (a popular
title and trope of the Victorian ghost story), provides a liminal example of this shift. The
ghost here is the child of a housekeeper who died in a ruined building which once was
servants’ quarters. In repeating his cry “Oh, mother let me in!” night after night, he
draws the attention of the wealthy new tenants of Brentwood House: Mortimer, a colonial
bureaucrat (whose pride in his new estate is testified by nearly three pages of selfsatisfied description at the opening of the story), his wife, and their “fragile” son Roland.
Oliphant’s story is more direct in its treatment of class issues than “The Old Nurse’s
Tale.” As Melissa Edmundson notes, the ruined doorway the ghost haunts “immediately
brings to mind a symbolic ‘doorway’ between two social classes,” that also “comments
on the transitory, uncertain lives of the servants, whose fortunes must rise and fall with
the status of the house they work for” (59-60). Oliphant’s “poor ghost,” haunting the
bureaucrat’s property like a tape loop, forces a class confrontation reminiscent of
Dickens’ Carol: Mortimer, prone to extended visits to London to dine and drink with
friends at his club (155-6), learns in confronting the child-ghost to be a more attentive
father and husband.
As in “The Old Nurse’s Story,” it is a child who initially makes the most visceral
contact with the ghost-child, a contact which threatens the safety of the living child.
Roland, who has heard the ghost’s cry, develops, like Rosamond in “The Old Nurse’s
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Story,” a dangerously sympathetic obsession with the ghost. Fearing his son will die,
Mortimer, along with a skeptical doctor and a clergyman, attempts to lay the ghost in an
effort to save his son. Roland’s illness is the occasion for redemption and understanding,
between both the living family and the child-ghost and his mother. If the ghost is initially
a figure of fear and dread, his true nature is divined by Roland: his injunction to his father
to “go and help it” challenges, and allows, his father to conform to his son’s expectation
that “Father will know” (172). It also allows us to read the ghost more sympathetically
than the ambiguously threatening child-ghost in Gaskell’s story, in part because
something can be done to free the ghost from its repetitive behavior.
What distinguishes Oliphant’s story from so many of its peers is its relatively
overt religious sensibility. In laying the ghost, a minister earthily gives the ghost spiritual
advice to “‘Go home, ye wandering spirit! […] Do ye think the Lord will close the door,
ye faint-hearted creature? No!’”, as well as imploring the Lord to “‘take him into Thy
everlasting habitations’” (198). In doing so, the minister not only exorcises the ghost, he
effectively gives the ghost an agency quite different from that of Gaskell’s: the ghost is
not trapped in a repetitive loop after all, but is free to go to Heaven, where it belongs.
In creating a ghost pathetic rather than frightening, one redeemable rather than
repeating, Oliphant’s ghost-child blurs the line between ghost and angel, and opens up
the figurative space in which the ghost-child can operate. If Gaskell and Riddell’s childghosts are housebound slaves of repetition, Oliphant’s bursts through its open door -Mortimer feels a physical jolt from the ghost’s escape: “I sprang forward to catch
something in my arms that flung itself wildly within the door” (198). The laying of the
ghost increases, rather than decreases its potency: Roland becomes “strong and well”
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(202) after the ghost departs, attaining a well-being he never possessed prior to his
connection with the ghost. Mortimer becomes more attentive and thoughtful, and,
perhaps most importantly, goes from being an unbeliever in ghosts to a reliable evangelist
for them, boasting at the end of the tale at how he can make the skeptic town doctor
doubt his own disbelief in ghosts: “I must add that when the doctor defies me, I can
always bring back gravity to his countenance, and a pause in his railing, when I remind
him of the juniper-bush [a piece of evidence suggesting the ghost was real]” (203).
Oliphant’s combination of religious sensibility and class comment raise the stakes of
belief in this story. The ghost, in moving from an earthbound revenant to an explicitly
theological spirit, entwines the belief in ghosts with belief in God, and provides a
convenient religious justification for perpetuating the class system. Mortimer becomes a
reliable advocate for this ghost – a fitting subject supposed to believe – by transcending
the class differences between his family and the ghost’s. The social and religious
transcendence Mortimer brings about through his engagement with the ghost-child also
serves to negate the troubling specter of class conflict: at story’s end, Mortimer has
successfully evicted not only a ghost, but a threatening and irritating revenant of the
suffering working class. Believing in ghosts – and their rightful place with God, rather
than on Mortimer’s property – allows one not only to get rid of ghosts, but to believe in
the class system as well.
The ghost of “The Open Door” is a transitional one. While it retains, to a lesser
degree, some of the malignant ambiguity of the ghosts of “The Old Nurse’s Story” – the
negative influence of the ghost on Roland’s mental and physical health; the gothic
trappings of the ghost’s milieu – it also, through the mediation of those trying to lay it,

248
arguably generates more sympathy than Gaskell’s ghosts. Its more pronounced role as a
vehicle for the interpassive subject makes it ultimately a beneficial ghost. However
repetitively and passively the ghost initially behaves, through the action of the subjects
that try to exorcize it by believing in it, it acquires a second-hand power to change the
lives of the living for the better. The ghost charts a trajectory over the course of the story,
from being a figure of fear, to a figure of faith.
This transition finds its completion in “The Ghost-Child,” a 1906 story by
Bernard Capes. This well-crafted, if slightly bathetic, fairy-tale develops the figure of the
ghost in surprising, transformative ways. The most fascinating novelty of the tale is that
the ghost is seemingly generated by belief itself (or at least a kind of wish-fulfillment)
rather than being a revenant of the dead.
It opens with the obligatory invocation to belief, conveyed with an inimitable fin
de siècle purple prose that conflates the psychological and the moral, promising to be as
forthcoming as possible in presenting the truth. As the narrator avows: “…to withhold
from evidence, in these days of what one may call a zetetic psychology, anything which
may appear elucidatory, however must be pronounced, I think, a sin against the Holy
Ghost” (442). Interestingly, much of the elucidatory evidence the narrator presents,
including the ghost-child itself, are not witnessed by the narrator, but related to him
second-hand. The narrator’s remove from the action of the tale nicely mirrors the
circumstances of the arrival of the ghosts of the story. If he takes the story on faith, it can
be said that the ghost-child itself is a product of faith.
The story is simple: Tryphena, a girl who lives by the sea in the “east of England”
(442), is engaged to the restless Jason, who, in a fit of pride, breaks the engagement and
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goes to sea. He swiftly repents his hastiness, and promises to return to the faithful
Tryphena, but dies at sea en route home. Jason’s ghost appears to Tryphena in a dream,
and “all night he lay there, blest and forgiven, till in the morning he melted away with a
sigh” (446). Nine months later, at Christmas, a child, “naked, and his pink, wet body
glazed with ice” (447), arrives at her door. He looks remarkably like Jason, and when
Tryphena asks him his name, she finds that Jason is the child’s name as well. She asks
the child:
‘And who am I? […] If you are Jason, you must know what to call me.’
‘I know,’ he said; ‘but I mustn’t, unless you ask me.’
‘I won’t,’ she answered, with a burst of weeping. ‘It is Christmas Day,
dearest, when a miracle of a little child was wrought. I will ask you nothing but
to stay and bless our desolate home.’ (447)
The ghost stays, until Tryphena finally feels compelled to ask the ghost-child who he is.
In a nicely rendered intersection of reader conjecture and narrative revelation, the ghostchild tells her “I was to call you ‘mother’!” (448), before he disappears into the gathering
snow. In a brief epilogue, the narrator informs us that “Tryphena made this confession,
on a Christmas Eve night, to one who was a believer in dreams. The next morning she
was seen to cross the causeway, and thereafter was never seen again” (448).
In this story, the ghost has almost completely shed its more disagreeable traits.
The ghost-child here is neither threatening, nor particularly ambiguous: it offers
straightforward answers to questions, even those it can’t answer. The ghost is received
instead as an unequivocal miracle and blessing, bearing comparisons to Christ Himself.
It is rather the outside world that becomes malevolent, or at least depressingly indifferent.
When the ghost-child reveals his nature, he dissolves into a bleak environment:
Even as he spoke, his pretty features wavered and vanished. The snow broke into
him, or he became part with it. Where he had been, a gleam of iridescent dust
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seemed to show one moment before it sank and was extinguished in the falling
cloud. Then there was only the snow, heaping an eternal chaos with nothingness.
(448)
This is a much gentler ghost than Gaskell’s and Oliphant’s, who engage the material
world with aggressively repetitive behavior that create physical, as well as mental, effects
on the people they haunt. The narrator describes his story as a “butterfly to be broken on
a wheel” and a “delicacy” (442) that presents a danger of insensitivity even in its telling.
The ghost-child’s fragility becomes a mark of his peculiar power: he is a miracle and
blessing ever threatening to merge into a chaotic nothingness. There is a sense that this
ghost, the impossible child of a dream encounter with a dead man, is more real than the
world he is born into. The oneiric, fairy-tale trappings of the story (the narrator compares
Tryphena variously to a mermaid and an elf), in which dreams and ghosts are the
vitalizing agents of procreation, make the ghost paradoxically more solid, in spite of his
evanescence, than his surroundings.
Biographical material on Bernard Capes is scarce, but he was apparently a lapsed
Catholic, which may account for the ease with which he mixes religious symbol
(Tryphena shares her name with a Christian women in the The New Testament Book of
Romans; the ghost-child is a stand in both for the baby Jesus and the Holy Ghost) and
pagan myth and fantasy (Jason is clearly modeled on the Greek Argonaut and deserting
husband).9 This self-conscious mixture of referents heightens the un-reality of his fairytale world, making its ghost-child a ground for meaning and faith to a narrator who is a
“believer in dreams.” In this world, the ghost-child becomes an acceptable stand in for
the Son of God, appearing on Christmas to incarnate his parents’ ghostly dream. If
Gaskell and Oliphant suggest that ghosts can lead us to a higher social truth, Capes’
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ghost-child becomes that Truth itself: he is precisely something to believe in, in that he
was never anything else. He is also the ultimate reification of the dead child: this ghostchild circumvents death by having never been alive. Gaskell and Oliphant’s ghosts
suggest ideals that have been misplaced in their implicit ideological critique: both
literally and figuratively stand at a doorway between class divisions. Capes’ ghost-child
makes no ideological critique, perhaps because it was never part of the material world in
which such critiques make sense in the first place. He is rather a transcendent, implicitly
religious figure, supplying the impossible third piece of a failed Oedipal triad.
Viewed this way, Capes’ ghost-child, is, for all its fragility, the most powerful of
Victorian ghost-children: sidestepping its own tragic failure to be born, it ceases to be
even a reflection or revenant of child abuse. Instead, it is a purely benevolent force, and
an avatar of benevolence itself in a world of “eternal chaos” and “nothingness.” This
child, who never had to be a child at all, is a child to believe in. It is, after all, its only
function. It arrives neither to frighten nor edify, but to comfort and bear witness to its
own impossible being. This perfectly hypothetical child can be seen as the ultimate
alternative to the millions of real children that society, and culture, could not protect in
the nineteenth-century. More real than real, the ghost-child possesses a power that mere
mortal children, in their faceless numbers, do not. We can view Capes’ ghost-child as the
distilled essence of the century’s other ghost-children: Oliphant and Gaskell’s ghosts can
create social awareness and change through an agency never possessed by their
victimized living selves; and Tiny Tim, another child who never was, and can never die,
lives in a way that millions of real children like him never could. The power, then, of
ghost-children, and what makes then such an appealing alternative to real children, is

252
precisely the fact that they do not exist. Whatever terrors they evoke are nothing
compared to the horrors of the plight of the real children that inspired them. Such terror,
in fact, is what constitutes the pleasure they give. To idealize children in this manner,
particularly as a means to assuage the fact of their systemic abuse, is, paradoxically, to
invest them with an uncanny agency and power. But the investiture of such power, such
agency, in children – the subjects supposed to believe – is not, as we shall see, without its
problems.

IV

Henry James’ 1898 “Christmas-tide toy,”10 The Turn of the Screw, is famously either the
crown-jewel of Victorian ghost-stories, or a harrowing account of delusion and childabuse. Or both. The story opens on Christmas Eve, with a round of ghost stories,
“gruesome, as on Christmas Eve in an old house a strange tale should be” (1). James
immediately sets his tale within a discussion of the genre of ghost stories centering on
children: the group around the fire keep upping the ante on horrifying stories of ghosts
possessing children. Through a convoluted chain of narrators, we finally hear the story of
a governess and her (possibly) haunted charges, Miles and Flora, in her own words. The
governess increasingly becomes convinced that the two children under her care have
become corrupted by the ghostly influence of two dead former servants, Quint and Miss
Jessel. The nature of their evil, and by association, the children’s, is never made explicit,
though the suspense of the tale is made palpable by the governess’s rising sense of alarm.
Flora is eventually removed from the house, and Miles, in the final scene, dies in the
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governess’s arms, of unknown causes. The minutely detailed frame of the tale serves as a
more sophisticated form of the “call to believe” typical of the Victorian ghost tale. The
governess’s bona fides are given in the lead up to her narrative, lending her ambiguously
suggestive story a sense of veracity. The frame and the governess’s narrative work in
tandem to set up a condition which has dominated critical discussion of The Turn of the
Screw for decades: the “reliability” of the governess, and whether the ghosts she sees are
“real.”
Indeed, the critical debate surrounding The Turn of the Screw and its ghosts has
become as famous as the novella itself. Since 1934, when Edmund Wilson first
published “The Ambiguity of Henry James,” in which he popularized the notion that the
child-possessing ghosts Quint and Miss Jessel might be products of the governess’s
perverse imagination, critics have gone back and forth as to the existence of The Turn of
the Screw’s ghosts. Shoshana Felman’s tour de force 1977 reading, “Turning the Screw
of Interpretation,” brilliantly reframes the question of whether or not the governess is
mad by positing that the story’s structure forces us into a dialectical position in which our
suspicion of the governess puts us as readers in her exact place. Felman suggests the
narrative enacts a Lacanian web of signification in which we become trapped:
The reader of The Turn of the Screw can choose either to believe the governess,
and thus to behave like Mrs. Grose, or not to believe the governess, and thus to
behave precisely like the governess. Since it is the governess who, within the
text, plays the role of the suspicious reader, occupies the place of the interpreter,
to suspect that place and that position is, thereby, to take it. To demystify the
governess is only possible on one condition: the condition of repeating the
governess’s very gesture. The text thus constitutes a reading of its two possible
readings, both of which, in the course of that reading, it deconstructs. James’s
trap is then the simplest and most sophisticated in the world: the trap is but a text,
that is, an invitation to the reader, a simple invitation to undertake its reading. But
in the case of The Turn of the Screw, the invitation to undertake a reading of the
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text is perforce an invitation to repeat the text, to enter into its labyrinth of
mirrors, from which it is henceforth impossible to escape. (215)
Felman’s reading is compelling insofar as it delineates the mechanism of James’s
Christmas toy, but it leaves unanswered the question of why we would engage the trap in
the first place. If the question of whether or not the ghosts are real, whether or not the
governess is mad, and whether or not the children are innocents or damned, must remain
unresolved in this textual labyrinth of mirrors, the question of why the questions are
asked in the first place remains open. What, in other words, occasions the textual
labyrinth of mirrors? What makes The Turn of the Screw an unresolvable text, an
exercise in repetition?
I think the answer can be found in part in the masterpiece James published one
year before The Turn of the Screw, a novel I can’t help but read as its companion piece,
What Maisie Knew. Here, child abuse is seen from the child’s perspective, and the
sinister, corrupting ghosts are replaced by the child’s parents, seen more or less fleetingly
and incompletely, depending on Maisie’s age and ability to comprehend her world at
various points in the novel. Here too, though in a manner obverse to Turn of the Screw,
the central question is the epistemological sophistication of children. By the novel’s end,
after Maisie has been abandoned by each of her monstrous, divorced parents, and has, in
her turn, abandoned her equally irresponsible step-parents, Maisie is able to sigh, “Oh, I
know” in recognition of her situation. Her governess, Mrs. Wix, supplies the final
observance of the novel, and, I think, the psychological engine behind both novels: “She
still had room for wonder at what Maisie knew” (266). What, precisely, Maisie knows is
never divulged – the wonder, for Mrs. Wix and for the reader, whose interest is largely
sustained by guessing Maisie’s level of comprehension of the incidents that occur around
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her, is that she knows. Mrs. Wix’s wonder is something of a piece with the governess in
The Turn of the Screw: while we may speculate as to the reality of the ghosts, the
governess has no question as to their reality -- her issue is with what the children know
regarding them. The very fact that the children know something is a cause of horror to
the governess:
I got hold of Mrs Grose as soon […] as I could; and I can give no
intelligible account of how I fought out the interval. Yet I still hear myself cry as
I fairly threw myself into her arms: ‘They know – it’s too monstrous: they know,
they know!’
‘And what on earth--?’ I felt her incredulity as she held me.
‘Why all that we know – and heaven knows what more besides!’ (29)
Whatever horrors the governess imagines Flora and Miles have learned from Quint and
Miss Jessel, it is clear that the fact that the children know “what we know” – what adults
know – is the root cause of the horror. This is the same horror that lurks behind What
Maisie Knew: that the child Maisie may be fully aware of the perversity of the adult
world around her, an awareness Maisie’s step-father Sir Claude hopes to circumvent,
when, in the final scene, he asks (to whom, it is not clear): “Will you be so good as to
allow these horrors to terminate?” (265).
What James presents as a horror in both novels is the spectacle of the child as the
“subject supposed to know,” the horror arising from the fact that children are,
presumably, precisely the subjects supposed not to know: that is, the innocence of Miles
and Flora, and of Maisie, is contingent upon them not knowing the corrupting knowledge
of their elders. This, I think, accounts for the labyrinthine sense of Turn of the Screw: if
the children do know what they are presumed to know, they will presumably withhold
that knowledge from those that suppose they have it. If they don’t know what they are
presumed to know, those that presume they possess the knowledge can never know that
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they do not know it. The paradox here being that knowledge as such, invested
everywhere, is actually present nowhere.
James here seems to be presenting the dark side of the same libidinal economy –
played for pathos in Maisie, and for horror in Turn of the Screw – that is operative in the
ghost-child stories we have previously encountered. In both novels, children are
spectralized into interpassive subjects: the governess’s ghostly fears are projected onto
Miles and Flora, and the degree of their corruption is read by the governess as the degree
to which they do not share her fear; the innocent Maisie is the subjectivized object of all
of the adult corruption that pervades her novel. Like the ghost-children of Gaskell,
Oliphant and Capes, James children become the ghostly representation of adult lack, both
moral and epistemological.
What does Maisie know? Put more bluntly, what do children know? Nothing, but
what we tell them. The horror of Henry James, and, I suspect, a large part of the horror –
and the pleasure -- of Christmas, lies in the fantasy we make of our children, our
enghosting of them, making of them both the stock holders of our sleepy Christmas
dreams, and of our social nightmares. James’s children are unknown quantities –
fantasies – and as such, their presumed innocence becomes paradoxically demonic.
These children invested with meaning, meaning that arises from the very fact that they
are not known, that they are, in effect, not really there, becomes an occasion of horror
because they are believed in, rather than experienced: that is, they become occasions for
belief in lieu of knowledge.
Claude Lévi-Strauss, in his 1952 essay “Father Christmas Executed,” argues that
the gap between belief and knowledge becomes an occasion for cultural exchange
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between adults and children. Children, the “uninitiated” (45), become the focus of
religious ritual and spiritual belief because of their otherness, which, as Lévi-Strauss
argues, makes them appropriate substitutes for the dead, who are not only the ultimate
other, but who dwell purely within the spiritual. In exploring the question of why we
invent figures like Santa Claus to placate our children, Lévi-Strauss argues that it is not
simply to make sure they behave, but because they effectively are Santa, in that they
most resemble his otherworldly qualities. He makes a striking comparison between the
figure of Father Christmas and the katchina of the Hopi:
If children are kept in the dark about the human nature of the people incarnating
the katchina, is this simply to get them to fear, respect, and behave well? Of
course, but that is only a secondary effect of the ritual. There is another
explanation which the myth of origin clarifies perfectly. The myth explains that
the katchina are souls of the first native children who were dramatically drowned
in a river at the time of the ancestral migrations. So the katchina are
simultaneously proof of death and evidence of life after death. Moreover, when
the Indians’ ancestors finally settled in their village, the myth relates how the
katchina used to come every year to visit them, and, when they left, took away the
children. The Indians, desperate at losing their offspring, made a deal with the
katchina that they would stay in the other world in exchange for promising to
honour them every year with masked dances. If the children are excluded from
the secret of the katchina it is not primarily to intimidate them. I would say just
the opposite: it’s because they are the katchina. They are kept out of the mystery
because they represent the reality with which they mystery constitutes a kind of
compromise. Their place is elsewhere – not with the masks and the living, but
with the gods and the dead – with the gods who are the dead. And the dead are
the children. (45)
The children, kept in the dark and ignorant of the mechanism of the rituals concerning
them, are nevertheless in the privileged position of being the locus of belief, which, for
the katchina as much as for the governess in The Turn of the Screw, supersedes
knowledge itself. Or rather, belief becomes knowledge, in the sense that what we believe
children know existentially, spiritually, is greater than whatever knowledge we actually
possess.
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There is, in Lévi-Strauss’s relation of the Hopi myth, a poignant corollary with
the myth of the Victorian child. Aren’t the Christmas ghost stories of ghost-children an
analogue of the katchina ghost dance? Both arise from an unthinkable tragedy of child
death. The katchina are spirits of children drowned during a time of social upheaval. So
too are the ghost-children of Victorian Christmas narrative. One can see in the exchange
the Hopi make with their dead the unconscious bargain the Victorians made with theirs:
as if in apology for the millions of children worked or starved to death under social
conditions too difficult to change in time, the adults would allow the dead children of
England to rise again as ghosts to entertain, edify, and comfort, the living on Christmas
Eve.11
In this way, substitution and simulacra become the most cherished reality. It is
the ghosts of the spirit world, the revenants that, strictly speaking, do not exist, that allow
us to invest in our children a belief that makes of adults the ultimate beneficiary. As
Lévi-Strauss remarks:
We should reflect on the tender care we take of Father Christmas, the precautions
and sacrifices we make to keep his prestige intact for children. Is it not that, deep
within us, there is a small desire to believe in boundless generosity, kindness
without ulterior motives, a brief interlude during which all fear, envy, and
bitterness are suspended? No doubt we cannot fully share the illusion, but sharing
with others at least gives us a chance to warm our hearts by the flame that burns
in young souls. The belief that we help to perpetuate in our children that their toys
come from ‘out there’ gives us an alibi for our own secret desire to offer them to
those ‘out there’ under the pretext of giving them to the children. In this way,
Christmas presents remain a true sacrifice to the sweetness of life, which consists
of not dying. (50)
As a child, our family had a ceramic statue of Santa Claus kneeling before the baby Jesus.
I remember being somewhat put off by it (I like to think I had a precocious distaste for
kitsch, but I’m sure I flatter myself): Santa, his hat removed out of respect, looked so
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vulnerable and awkward with his bald head and serious expression. His bulk, distorted in
his crouching position, made him look uncomfortable, and me as well [Figure 15]. With
the strange literalism of a child, I felt a disturbingly uncanny sense of anachronism in the
tableau: wasn’t Jesus supposed to come before Santa Claus? If Jesus was the cause of
Christmas, shouldn’t Santa not even have been born at the time of Christ? But here he
was, already old, kneeling incongruously to a child. I realized, of course, that the child
was God, and that Santa could very well have been in business doing something else
before meeting Christ, and that the message of the sculpture was the one every typically
greedy and thoughtless child like myself always hated to hear: that Jesus was the “reason
for the season.” But I still didn’t like it, particularly as I began to see it in my relative’s
homes as well: it had seemingly become a minor cause célèbre that Christmas (a quick
Google search revealed to me that this statue is even today more popular than I had
thought). To me, though, it just didn’t seem right – it was too high-concept, too serious.
The reason, I think, is because the statue wasn’t for me, it was for the adults. Perhaps
they found something refreshing in this mimetic representation of Santa, this Santasupposed-to-believe, placidly removed from all the annoying cartoons and childrens’
songs. Here at last, they had found an icon of Santa worthy of adults. Perhaps, as the
inventors and disseminators of Santa, they had finally found the statue they deserved.
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Figure 15: The Santa Supposed to Believe.
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1

I am indebted to Russell W. Belk’s excellent article, “Materialism and the Making of
the Modern American Christmas” (Unwrapping Christmas. Ed. Daniel Miller. Oxford:
Oxford UP 1993) for its insightful and concise genealogy of Santa Claus.
2
It was a rough calculation along these lines that led me to discard my belief in Santa
Claus during the Christmas season of 1980. The fact that we lived in a chimney-less
home certainly contributed to my apostasy.
3
A standpoint that is literally and uproariously realized in one of the best, and worst,
holiday offerings ever filmed, the 1964 turkey, Santa Claus Conquers the Martians.
4
Dates of legislation provided by www.victorianweb.com
5
Figures taken from: http://www.victorianweb.org/genre/childlit/banerjee1.html
6
Sandy, the upwardly mobile narrator of “The Open Door,” rises from put-upon clerk to
gentleman farmer through a lucrative stint ghost-hunting in a Lord’s estate, so he, at any
rate, has reason enough to believe in ghosts.
7
See Jenny Uglow, Elizabeth Gaskell.
8
Laura Kranzler, ed. Elizabeth Gaskell, Gothic Tales, p. 344
9
http://www.enotes.com/topic/Bernard_Capes
10
“Preface to the New York Edition,” Norton, p. 124.
11
An intriguingly blunt intersection between Santa Claus, belief, and death can be found
in the insufferable 1979 novelty song by Elmo and Patsy, “Grandma Got Run Over By a
Reindeer.” In the song, Santa’s existence is verified by the fact that he has killed the
narrator’s grandmother in a hit and run accident. The point of the song is not the tragedy
of death, but the occasion for belief. As the refrain continually stresses, “You may say
there’s no such thing as Santa, but as for me and Grandpa, we believe.”
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Postscript:
Ghosts of Christmas Yet To Come

Sobs they sighdid at Fillagain’s chrissormiss wake, all the hoolivans of the nation,
prostrated in their consternation and their duodisimally profusive plethora of ululation
[…] Agog and magog and the round of them agrog.
--James Joyce, Finnegans Wake

I began this study with a consideration of a sub-literary Christmas story that takes the end
of the world as an occasion for holiday reflection, so it may be fitting to end with another.
Like Marie Corelli’s “Devil’s Motor,” Adam Roberts’ 2009 opus, I Am Scrooge: a
Zombie Story for Christmas is a pastiche of the Victorian cultural imaginary as careening,
self-devouring nightmare. Its groan-inducing, pun-filled prose suggests it is a self-aware
attempt to cash in on two numbingly recursive sub-genres: the perennial stream of
Christmas Carol adaptations/parodies, and the recent vogue for re-written nineteenthcentury classics like Pride and Prejudice and Zombies, Jane Slayre, and Android
Karenina, in which monsters are intercut with the canonical corsets and manners of our
Victorian literary heritage. One might suppose that the titles of these books alone could
suffice as the joke behind the mash-up of nineteenth-century Masterpiece Theater and
Post-modern monster movies, but amazingly, books like Sense and Sensibility and Sea
Monsters have actually been written. More, if sales are any indicator, they have been
read. Presumably, there is a need for this strange collision between Victorian taste and
Post-modern tastelessness beyond the desire for cheeky literary non sequitur.
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If nothing else, I Am Scrooge addresses this need directly, and admirably attempts
to justify its existence beyond simply replacing Bob Cratchit and Tiny Tim with
cannibalistic, undead revenants (though, as one would expect, it does that as well). The
book begins with an awareness of its parent-text’s dialectical engagement with death’s
inevitability and contingency: “Marley was dead, to begin with. Dead for about three
minutes, that is: then he got up again” (3). From here, Roberts gleefully replaces
Dickens’ shackled, disembodied Jacob Marley with a rampaging, soul-less flesh-eater
less concerned with Scrooge’s moral regeneration than with feasting upon his brains.
Interestingly, the Christmas ghosts who come to visit Scrooge inform him that zombieMarley, and the hordes of ghouls multiplying on the streets of London, can eat not only
flesh, but spirit as well. As The Ghost of Christmas Present explains:
Understand this about Zombies. They feed upon mind. They devour mentition
itself. If they come upon you then they will break open your skull and slurp up
your brains. With me, should they chance upon me, and because I am wholly
ideational, they would devour me entire. And very unpleasant it would be. (37)
As the story progresses, it becomes clear that the zombies’ hunger for mentition extends
beyond individual souls to cultural ideations, to the zeitgeist itself: the growing horde of
undead anarchically, and anachronistically, come to devour Jack the Ripper, a feisty
Queen Victoria, H.G. Wells, and Charles Dickens himself. As Scrooge moves through
time with the Christmas ghosts to witness the exponential growth of the zombie plague,
he learns that the outbreak is a man-made catastrophe set in motion to wipe out the
Victorian world as such: in devouring everything, body and soul, the zombies “will
devour the past, consume it whole,” so that “Mankind will never have existed here”
(129). In a way, Roberts casts his Christmas zombies as a scourge against his source
material: their ultimate goal is to kill Scrooge, who, conveniently immune to the zombie

264
virus, is the only thing standing in the way of erasing Christmas, Victorian England, and
humanity itself. Revealingly, Scrooge must kill Tiny Tim, who in a surprising turn, is
revealed to be the zombie-mastermind, in order to save Christmas.
I Am Scrooge is intriguingly ambivalent toward the Christmas Carol that spawned
it. One can see a kind of comic-book re-enactment of Harold Bloom’s Anxiety of
Influence at work here. As an undead revenant of A Christmas Carol itself, I Am Scrooge
invests an extraordinary agency in its parent-text: Scrooge himself is the key not only to
the survival of the human race, but to its very being: the zombies threaten not only to end
the world, but to erase its previous existence. Scrooge’s position as the foil to this plan
places his Victorian milieu as Ground Zero in the battle to decide if Christmas and
humanity ever were. At the same time, the world of A Christmas Carol is the world that
spawns the zombie threat in the first place: Tiny Tim, the boy who DID NOT die, must
die, violently, to make things right. Scrooge and Tiny Tim, the un-killable icons of A
Christmas Carol, become the existential poles of I Am Scrooge: one must survive to save
humanity, and another must be destroyed to achieve the same. I Am Scrooge, then,
presents the cultural artifact of A Christmas Carol as both essential to the survival of
Christmas, and as a pernicious influence that, in spawning a zombie pandemic, must be
defeated, or, at least, mutilated.
I Am Scrooge, punningly titled after Richard Matheson’s seminal 1954
vampire/zombie novel I Am Legend, reveals itself to be a kind of zombie while offering a
provisional definition of zombies as such. If a zombie differs from a ghost in its
relentless materiality, if, in fact, a zombie can be defined as a kind of anti-ghost which
must feed on spirit itself, couldn’t we read I Am Scrooge as the textual corpse of A
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Christmas Carol, recognizing the parent-text only as a grisly source of food, a spirit to be
incorporated, and extinguished, to keep its own mindless materiality in motion? I don’t
ask this question to slight I Am Scrooge, but rather to point out its potentially
revolutionary power: of the thousands of incarnations of A Christmas Carol, this is the
only one to my mind that actually threatens, and obliquely questions, its source material.
At least in part, it suggests that A Christmas Carol may no longer be a friendly ghost that
haunts our culture, but a breeding ground for soul-less zombies that stalk it.
The question then becomes: if there is a substantial distinction to be made
between ghosts and zombies, are zombies an evolutionary step forward in the cultural
appreciation and appropriation of A Christmas Carol’s afterlife? Are Christmas ghosts
giving way to Christmas zombies? In other words, is our perennial Victorian Christmas
becoming something different, something we could conceivably call a Post-modern
Christmas?
As this study has hopefully shown, such questions, I think, are not as trivial as
they might appear. In October 2011, Slavoj Žižek gave a speech at Liberty Plaza in New
York City to a crowd of Occupy Wall Street protesters. In it, he made this observation:
“It is easy to imagine the end of the world […] But you cannot imagine the end of
capitalism.” “Capitalism” here is to be read as the current dispensation of the Symbolic
Order as such, rather than the more localized “invisible hand” caressing the liberal
economic order, as those that do not find “capitalism” a dirty word might call it. Either
formulation, of course, is a structural fantasy used to interrogate or defend the social,
cultural, and economic system we find ourselves in at the dawn of the third millennium,
and it is a system that was codified, socially, culturally, and economically, by the
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Victorians. Without engaging in a critique of capitalism as such, this study has assumed
that the cultural codification of Christmas in the Victorian Age went hand in hand with
codifying capitalism, and as such, one could just as easily call the Victorian Christmas
explored in these pages the Capitalist Christmas, or at least the most magical and
persistent of the cultural expressions of the capitalist age. In this light, Žižek’s challenge
to imagine the end of our own cultural and social moment can also be seen as a challenge
for us to see if we can imagine the end of our Victorian Christmas, an ancient tradition
that dates back to at least 1843. His challenge also asks the fundamental question: why
do we prefer to imagine our own destruction than that of our cultural institutions? Why,
as in I Am Scrooge, are we made to take delight in the cannibalistic overthrow of
humanity, but feel dread and suspense at the threatened end of Christmas? Put another
way, why do our cultural institutions so often ask us to take pleasure in imagining our
own destruction: intimately and cozily, as in the Victorian Christmas ghost story, and
apocalyptically, as in I Am Scrooge and “The Devil’s Motor”?
Is it that we simply cannot imagine the end of Christmas? We certainly do not
like to see it changed. As we have seen, the very formulation of the Victorian Christmas
is in part predicated on the notion, or belief, that it has always already been there. And
the engine driving so many Christmas narratives is the threat that Christmas will be
ruined, cancelled, or extinguished, either by Christmas-haters like Scrooge, The Grinch,
or secular liberals who want to replace “Merry Christmas” with “Happy Holidays.” We
could say that it is easy to imagine a threat to Christmas, but it is impossible to imagine
that threat realized. Doesn’t the so-called “War on Christmas,” as reliable a narrative
among the talking heads of cable news come Christmas-time as Rudolf and A Charlie
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Brown Christmas, simply multiply Christmas narratives by reporting on each local
Nativity scene under threat from civic atheists, and broadcasting them to television
screens nation-wide? As long as we can imagine an insidious intent lurking behind the
phrase “Happy Holidays,” the mantra of “Merry Christmas,” even if used only in spite,
need never fear extinction.
In a way, Christmas – and capitalism – inoculate themselves from danger by
posing the threat of their extinction as the surest safeguard against it. As we have seen,
such an inoculation is effective because we have invested enough of ourselves into
Christmas to make the threat against it frightening. Christmas, as we all know, is a time
for family, that structural unit that offers the primal object in which the subject can invest
itself. No more so than when the family is most phantasmic, that is, when it signifies
lack. As we have seen, the dead, absent father is the father that matters most. Women
take on their fullest reality when abstracted into mothers, wives, and ghosts. And
children, invested with the power of belief, become immortal ghosts. Christmas,
incorporating these Oedipal ghosts into its narrative, becomes the site where culture
invests itself: where its ghosts go, as it were. If we can imagine our own deaths before
we can imagine the death of Christmas, it is because Christmas has told us that Christmas
is where we go when we die: our Christmas ghosts are ourselves, and our best part.
Here then, is what perhaps accounts for the fear the Christmas Ghosts have of
zombies in I Am Scrooge: they threaten to devour the ghost entire. If the zombies’ flesheating is an occasion for gruesome comedy, their threat to “pure ideation” is not. While
zombies are akin to ghosts in that they are undead, they are also their negative image: if
the ghost is a spirit free of the body, the zombie is a body bereft of spirit. The ghost
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safeguards our fantasies, and makes them immortal; the zombie, red in tooth and claw,
dismembers our fantasies, limb from limb. Marina Warner, in her evocative,
encyclopedic 2006 study of our varied cultural iterations of the spiritual,
Phantasmagoria, offers a compelling reading of the zombie:
Slave culture formed the concept, out of Africa and the Caribbean, to describe the
way in which slavery stripped someone of personhood. The invention has since
grown to describe individuals in a world of wealth and power that, to say the
least, offers each of us a very different horizon of possibilities, yet for all its
insistence on choice and access and enablement strategies and empowerment,
manages to communicate to many of its members a feeling of numbing and
volitionless vacancy. Zombies embody the principal ghostly condition of our
time, the successor of waxworks, shades, ghosts, apparitions, and the host of
paranormal spirits that have figured the dead in public since the eighteenthcentury. (357)
Zombies, then, are the ghosts of late capitalism, perhaps nowhere more potently
visualized than in the hordes of undead that haunt the Pittsburgh shopping mall in George
Romero’s Dawn of the Dead (1978), material manifestations of our sense of agency lost
to a “world of wealth and possibilities” that increasingly seems to cater to an ever
removed elite. If the ghosts of the nineteenth-century preserved the hopes and fears of a
culture at the mercy of industrial capitalism in the form of pleasurable Christmas frissons,
the zombies of the twenty-first century threaten to literally devour those hopes and fears
by their sheer numbers: unlike the eccentric ghost that haunts its house like a fixture or
mascot, the zombie induces its shudders by replicating into countless hordes. The
Victorian ghost is pure personality; the zombie is pure meat, recognizable precisely
because it has no personality. As Chris Harmon suggests in his 2009 book, Zombie
Capitalism, capitalism itself has, especially since the financial implosion of 2008, lost its
personality:
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[Capitalism has] turned into a machine that dominates the humans that undertake
[labor], hurling the world in a direction that few people in their right mind would
want. Faced with the financial crisis that began in 20007, some economic
commentators did begin to talk of ‘zombie banks’ – financial institutions that
were in the ‘undead state’ and incapable of fulfilling any positive function, but
representing a threat to everything else. What they do not recognize is that 21st
century capitalism as a whole is a zombie system, seemingly dead when it comes
to achieving human goals and responding to human feelings, but capable of
sudden spurts of activity that cause chaos all around. (11-12)
This hauntological metaphor of the economic as gothic is, I’m sure, not limited to
Marxists. One might characterize the Occupy Wall Street’s figuration of the one percent
versus the ninety-nine percent in spectral terms: the one percent being, of course, the
house-proud ghost; and the faceless ninety-nine percent – represented by masses of
unwashed, tent-dwelling protesters – the shiftless, volitionless zombies.
It is in this sense that I Am Scrooge represents something of a break with the
tradition of Christmas Carol adaptations. Here, finally, the ghosts that make our place in
the capitalist world endurable are, for all their seeming immortality – for seeming, as
Scrooge does in A Christmas Carol, to have circumvented death itself – vulnerable. If
they do not finally imagine the end of Christmas, they do suggest a possibly different
Christmas. I do not suggest here a Manichean reading of ghosts = conservative
capitalism = bad vs. zombies = Marxist proletariat = good. It should be clear that the
very idea of zombies – an idea, after all, of a being completely bereft of ideas – is
inherently troubling. If the future of Christmas and its ghosts is that of the pathetic,
cannibalistic zombie, then – rather like Marxists who proclaim communism or barbarism
– we have not imagined much of a future at all. But the fact that our ghosts can evolve,
even into such horrific configurations, suggests a post-capitalist future, and a post-
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capitalist culture, may be possible to imagine, even if we must wait until the future to be
able to imagine it.

I have found in researching this project that it is something of a tradition for
scholars investigating Christmas to offer a mea culpa for even presuming to interrogate
the holiday at all, the presumption being that it is something of a desecration to question
how Christmas operates. Having felt that strangely magnetic sense of taboo myself, I
will follow tradition here and state that I have no animus against Christmas, nor do I,
contrary to what the above might suggest, harbor any desire to change Christmas or see it
disappear. As one might suppose, I am actually inordinately fond of the holiday – a
quality that has made my consistent company with it over the past three years not only
bearable, but a pleasure. What to my mind needs changing is not so much Christmas
itself, but the very zombie-like way in which we tend to experience it, or rather, not
experience it. As perhaps the most aggressively present form of localized cultural
expression in the history of civilization, Christmas has, as I have argued in the
Introduction, a way of making itself not only omnipresent, but seemingly inevitable.
Such a sense of inevitability tends to hide its most striking characteristic: its protean
expansiveness, its ability to cross cultural boundaries, and to, like capitalism itself,
continuously re-territorialize cultural terrain. Christmas is, in short, a global phenomenon
that not only affords us an opportunity to explore who we are as an unprecedentedly
global culture, but to make contact with that apparently dead culture that helped create us,
and continues to haunt us, the Victorians. It is a mistake to write Christmas off as a
vulgar expression of capitalist marketing, just as it is a mistake to view it as an ahistorical
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expression of divine goodwill. If these narratives inhabit the Christmas we all think we
know all too well, they are only a part of a broader and more important narrative: that of
a culture trying to come to terms with one of the greatest social, cultural, and intellectual
upheavals in history. As industrial capitalism transformed the physical world in ways we
are still trying to comprehend, it also produced transformations in our mental landscape
we have also yet to come to terms with. Nietzsche, Marx, Darwin, and Freud –
Victorians all, in their various ways – still define the academic and popular discourse of
our time; our attempts to surpass them or replace them only speak to the way they still
inhabit and define the way we read our world. The Victorian Christmas, I have argued, is
the fantastic narrative we have made for ourselves to deal with the even more fantastic
Victorian narratives of capitalism, evolution, and the unconscious. The nineteenthcentury, and its specters of Marx, Darwin, et al, foreclosed certain long-held religious and
cultural verities. But Christmas, and its equally resilient ghosts, opened new avenues for
our hopes and fears with new myths and new truths. If Christmas often seems to us a
narrative of banality, full of crass commercialism and crude religiosity, it is only because
we are not reading it properly. Rather, we are simply letting it be read to us.
I suggest we read Christmas again, and again and again, as it may be, at least until
we come to a greater sense of why we need it, and why it haunts us so. We should read it
like Scrooge, ghost-haunted and mad – who, if he cannot escape Christmas, can at least
be disturbed by it. Christmas does not, in the end, normalize him, it disrupts him.
Perhaps Scrooge, as his poor clerk Bob Cratchit suspects, has gone mad. So much the
better for him. We are exhilarated by Scrooge for his manic-depressive reading of
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Christmas. He reads it, as perhaps all texts should be read, in the crazed way Deleuze
and Guattari recommend in their own Oedipal excursion into nuttiness:
For reading a text is never a scholarly exercise in search of what is signified, still
less a highly textual exercise in search of a signifier. Rather it is a productive use
of the literary machine, a montage of desiring-machines, a schizoid exercise that
extracts from the text its revolutionary force. The exclamation ‘So it's...!’ […] in
an essential relationship with madness. (Anti-Oedipus 106)
Perhaps it doesn’t matter if the revolution isn’t an arrow of progress, but a recursive
circle: something has happened to Scrooge, and to us, if we read him attentively.
Christmas has scarred Scrooge, because, appropriately, beneath its pleasing comforts, it
has even more pleasingly horrified him. Scrooge’s Victorian Christmas in Hell, is,
ultimately, the most pleasing of fictions, if only because its fictionality, its textuality, so
resolutely defies a “reality” that, as the Victorians discovered to their horror, and as we
sometimes find to ours, seems to deny textuality, and demolish fictions. For the reality
that opposes the fiction of Christmas is a reality that often seems to offer only a horror
beyond the pleasure of horror: a zombified blank that is neither mad nor sane, that
recognizes neither Heaven nor Hell.
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